123
edits
Changes
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
Created page with "{{Bibliographic Record |Title=Descartes as a Critic of Galileo's Scientific Methodology |Resource Type=journal article |Author=Roger Ariew, |Year=1986 |Abstract=Some philosoph..."
{{Bibliographic Record
|Title=Descartes as a Critic of Galileo's Scientific Methodology
|Resource Type=journal article
|Author=Roger Ariew,
|Year=1986
|Abstract=Some philosophers of science suggest that philosophical assumptions must
influence historical scholarship, because history (like science) has no neutral data and
because the treatment of any particular historical episode is going to be influenced to
some degree by one's prior philosophical conceptions of what is important in science.
However, if the history of science must be laden with philosophical assumptions, then how
can the history of science be evidence for the philosophy of science? Would not an
inductivist history of science confirm an inductivist philosophy of science and a
conventionalist history of science confirm a conventionalist philosophy of science? I
attempt to resolve this problem; essentially, I deny the claim that the history of science
must be influenced by one's conception of what is important in science - one's general
philosophy of science. To accomplish the task I look at a specific historical episode,
together with its history, and draw some metamethodological conclusions from it. The
specific historical episode I examine is Descartes' critique of Galileo's scientific methodology.
|URL=http://www.jstor.org/stable/20116258
|Journal=Synthese
|Volume=67
|Number=1
|Pages=77-90
}}
|Title=Descartes as a Critic of Galileo's Scientific Methodology
|Resource Type=journal article
|Author=Roger Ariew,
|Year=1986
|Abstract=Some philosophers of science suggest that philosophical assumptions must
influence historical scholarship, because history (like science) has no neutral data and
because the treatment of any particular historical episode is going to be influenced to
some degree by one's prior philosophical conceptions of what is important in science.
However, if the history of science must be laden with philosophical assumptions, then how
can the history of science be evidence for the philosophy of science? Would not an
inductivist history of science confirm an inductivist philosophy of science and a
conventionalist history of science confirm a conventionalist philosophy of science? I
attempt to resolve this problem; essentially, I deny the claim that the history of science
must be influenced by one's conception of what is important in science - one's general
philosophy of science. To accomplish the task I look at a specific historical episode,
together with its history, and draw some metamethodological conclusions from it. The
specific historical episode I examine is Descartes' critique of Galileo's scientific methodology.
|URL=http://www.jstor.org/stable/20116258
|Journal=Synthese
|Volume=67
|Number=1
|Pages=77-90
}}
