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Duhem thesis: Experiments in physics are observations He led to the idea of phenomena with interpretations so physicists do not submit a single hypothesis but whole group of hypothesis. Therefore, experimental under-determinism which was the idea that any scientifically based theory will always have one rival theory that is also supported by the evidence cannot falsify isolated hypothesisthat is provided.
The consequences This was radically different from the ideas of this thesis are far reaching. In factthe time which were that due to crucial experiments, theories could be determined to be superior to all other theories and that through evidence, it calls into questions the method of science we use today. The hypothetico deductive method we use today starts by proposing a hypothesis and then deducing consequences. These consequences are then tested or observed. Continuous with the hypothetico deductive method is the notion of falsification. It allows for rejection of a hypothesis if the opposite of once of the consequences is observed. It is evidence against person can induce general propositions about the hypothesisworld.<ref name = "Newton's HD"> (2011, “Isaac Newton's Scientific Method: Turning Data into Evidence about Gravity and Cosmology”, OUP Oxford, 214-216) </ref>
2. Another area where Duhem contradicted the present view of the time was his challenge to Newton’s inductive argument on InfallibilismDuhem believed science is perfect only when fully rid gravity. Newton’s Principia claimed to derive the law of empirical knowledge, when it is informative gravity by induction from phenomena without hypothesis. This reaffirmed the inductive scientific method and when it is open to correctnessthe idea of infallibilism. Despite this, he Duhem’s criticism was an infallibilist who believed common sense to be infallibleinstrumental in dismantling the idea of induction from the scientific method of the time. <ref name = "Infallibilist"> [[CiteRef::Duhem (2014 “ Popper and His Popular Critics: Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend and Imre Lakatos”, Springer. 41-431962) </ref>]]
With that said howeverDuhem criticized Newton’s methodology. In short, he took the first step towards fallibilismNewton uses Kepler’s 3 laws of planetary motion to derive his law of universal gravity. His belief However, Duhem believes that negative results tell us that there the derivation is a problem but does not tell us where possible since it contradicts Kepler’s law. He expressed the error is soon evolved.<ref name = Whereiserror> (Schick, Theodore Jr. Readings sentiment in the Philosophy following: The principle of Science: From Positivism to Postmodernism. Mayfield, 2000. ) </ref> Quine had his nonuniqueness thesis, stating for every theory given evidenceuniversal gravity, there is at least one other theory that is also supported very far from being derivable by generalization and induction from the same evidenceobservational laws of Kepler, formally contradicts these laws. Together they created the Duhem-Quine theorem: for any falsification, it If Newton’s theory is always possible to preserve a hypothesis by changing auxiliary hypothesis. Essentially given falsifiabilitycorrect, it is impossible to know if the theory was incorrect or any underlying assumption was incorrectKepler’s laws are necessarily false.[[CiteRef::Duhem (1914)]]
Together they 2. Duhem on Underdeterminism Duhem’s under-determination thesis introduced the belief that negative results tell us that there is a problem but does not tell us where the error is. [[CiteRef::Schick (2000)]] Quine was a philosopher born in 1908 who expanded on the work of Duhem. He worked with the notion of under determination and created his own non-uniqueness thesis. Quine had his non-uniqueness thesis, stating for every theory given evidence, there is at least one other theory that is also supported by the same evidence. He expanded on Duhem’s thesis resulting in the Duhem-Quine theorem: for any falsification, it is always possible to preserve a hypothesis by changing auxiliary hypothesis. Essentially given falsifiability, or a failed prediction it is impossible to know if the theory was incorrect or any underlying assumption was incorrect. The failed prediction informs us that something is wrong, but it does not tell us whether our hypothesis is wrong or any of the underlying assumptions that information will come as a result of judgement and additional research. The Duhem – -Quine thesis which simply goes: Theories are tested in groups. If a theory with its assumptions logically predict an outcome and that outcome does not happen, we do not know whether the theory is at fault or the countless assumptions.
no edit summary
Duhem opposed many of the beliefs accepted at the time including the idea of infallibilism. At the time, as a result of Newton’s Experimentum Crucis, many scientists and philosopher’s believed in the idea of crucial experiments. These are experiments that determine if a hypothesis or theory is superior or all other theories and hypothesis. Duhem developed the idea of under-determinism which stated it was impossible to know whether data proved a theory to be superior or simply supported an underlying assumption.[[CiteRef::Kanschik(2009)]]
He rejected both Newton's theory and atomism accepting his own idea of thermodynamics. Although Duhem's rejection of atomism was a belief in instrumentalism, he did believe that there was an ultimate truth. Certain groups of physics such as thermodynamics was a way to reach it. He believed that generalized thermodynamics could provide the foundation of all physics and chemistry.[[CiteRef::Hackett Duhem (19961903)]]|Major Contributions=1. Duhem on both the inductive Inductive method and hypothetico-deductive methodDuhem contributed to philosophy, the Duhem thesis. This thesis was the notion that experimental evidence and observations of phenomena are the result of a whole group of hypothesis. Therefore, neither evidence nor observation can falsify an isolated hypothesis.
The Duhem consequences of this thesis turns this falsification to something elseare far reaching. According to the Duhem thesis, when The hypothetico deductive method we use today starts by proposing a predicted consequence is not hypothesis and then deducing consequences. These consequences are then tested or observed, there . Continuous with the hypothetico deductive method is the notion of falsification. It allows for rejection of a falsity in hypothesis if the whole cloud opposite of once of assumptions made in addition to the hypothesisconsequences is observed. This means we do not know of any physical theory regardless of any It is evidence one provides in support or against the theoryhypothesis. [[CiteRef::Harper (2011)]]
The Duhem believed thesis turns this falsification to something else. According to the Duhem thesis, when a predicted consequence is not observed, there is a falsity in the science whole cloud of assumptions made in addition to the hypothesis. This means we cannot know the validity of thermodynamics and saw it as a replacement physical propositions through the evidence one provides either for general sciencesor against the theory. He saw it as the foundation Eventually, falsification evolved where scientists can make many adjustments to theories and assumptions, to account for all physics and chemistryunexpected findings by exercising good sense.<ref name = "Thermodynamics"> (1996 “Essays in the History and Philosophy of Science” Hackett: 261-283) </ref>
Duhem criticized Newton’s methodology. In short, Newton uses Kepler’s 3 laws of planetary motion to derive his law of universal gravity. However, Duhem believes believed that generalized thermodynamics were the derivation is not possible since it contradicts Kepler’s lawfoundations for all physics and chemistry. He expressed the sentiment in the following: The principle of universal gravity, very far from being derivable by generalization and induction from the observational laws of Kepler, formally contradicts these lawsspent his entire life working on energetics. If Newton’s theory is correct, Kepler’s laws are necessarily false."<ref name = "NewtonKepler"> (Duhem [1914][CiteRef: La théorie Physique: son Objet et sa Structure, 1914.Duhem (1903) </ref>]]
3. Duhem on Metaphysics
Unlike his predecessorpredecessors, Duhem believed metaphysics was a real form of knowledge, and in fact, surpasses physics in excellence in terms of providing understanding of things in a much deeper and intimate sense. <ref name= "Thermodynamics" /> Duhem believed that in order to understand the external world to the best of our abilities, two things needed to be done.
1. First is to study the world of phenomena and find the laws that govern them.
2. Scientists must induce from the phenomena, the properties of the substances that cause them. The second part is called metaphysics.
Duhem confronted criticism of metaphysics by redefining and clarifying some notions and terms, which he had. [[CiteRef::Duhem (1893)]]
In order for metaphysics to be knowledge, the logical priority is given to physics over metaphysics. This is because we cannot know any information or conduct any metaphysical investigation logically if we do not have an understanding of the physics driving the phenomena. While it is possible to deduce true physics from metaphysical ideas, it is incredibly difficult and dangerous unreliable in practice.
Another distinction is between truths of metaphysics and metaphysical systems. Metaphysical truths are from the result of physical observations of phenomena and given to the substances which cause them. They are often few and give negative information. Metaphysical systems on the other hand are usually positive judgements, most of the time hypothetical that tries to relate metaphysical truths in a logical order. Metaphysical systems are theoretically acceptable, if they do not contradict metaphysical truths, but have always been problematic. Metaphysical systems are often too general and have little determinate to be able to deduce physical laws. Lastly, a proposition derived from metaphysical systems are plagued with problematic characteristics that affect the metaphysical system itself and therefore, can only play an advisory role in what physics should examine. Physics alone must decide whether the proposition is correct or incorrect.
Lastly, metaphysical theories and physical theories are independent of each other. When making a theory, people use observations and then summarize their observations into laws. Theories classify experimental laws. When we have a set of experimental laws from experiments, we create theories. These theories are the same as the collection of laws. They do not convey more and try not to convey less information. When physical laws become theories, they are connected but the theory convey the same information as the separate laws. It is important to understand that while theories are easier, simpler, and perhaps more beautiful than the collection of laws they come from, they have the same foundation and do not change in character or content from the laws they were created from. They stay as physics and do not become metaphysics. In summary, a group of experimental laws teach us nothing about the foundation of the laws or the nature of phenomena they govern.
Similarly, laws of physical theory add nothing to the content of the laws, only providing jumping points for metaphysical investigation. Physical theories do not exert influence on the progress of metaphysical research except for these points.
In short, metaphysical and physical theories are independent.<ref name= "Thermodynamics" />[[CiteRef::Duhem (1893)]]|Criticism=There were many criticism for the Duhem-Quine thesis and the Duhem thesis in general. Grünbaum believed there was no general argument to prove the existence of at least one other theory for any theory containing evidence.The main criticism was voiced by Larry Lauden Laudan in ''Demystifying Underdeterminism''. The idea was also repeated in the identical rivals rival’s objection. The main argument is that in all the cases where there are seemingly endless theories that explain one theory and it's observations, (essentially in all instances of Quine's nonuniqueness non-uniqueness thesis), the theories are actually the same but just formulated differently. <ref = "Demystifying Underdeterminism"> [[CiteRef::Laudan, Larry. (1990. Demystifying Underdetermination. In Scientific Theories, ed. C. Wade Savage)]] John Norton, 267-297. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Reprinted who works in the Center for Philosophy of Science. The Central Issues, ed. M. Curd and J. A. CoverDepartment of History and Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh, 320-353. New York: Norton,1998 </ref>John Norton summarized this by saying "“The very fact that observational equivalence can be demonstrated by arguments brief enough to be included in a journal article means that we cannot preclude the possibility that the theories are merely variant formulations of the same theory.” <ref name = " [[CiteRef::Norton (2008)]] John Norton"> Nortonalso gave his own argument known as the Gap Argument. This argument stated that to date, John Dthere is no evidence that can determine the content of a scientific theory. 2008. Must Evidence Underdetermine Theory? In The Challenge of However since there is universal agreement on the Social andthe Pressure content of Practice: Science and Values Revisitedscientific theories, edthen there is a gap where some agreements cannot be explained by evidence. M. CarrierThis seems to undermine the under determination thesis [[CiteRef::Samir Okasha, DHenk W. Howardde Regt, and J.KouranyStephan Hartmann, 17-44. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press </ref>(Eds) (2009)]]
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