Property:Description
Revision as of 12:46, 14 March 2018 by Hakob Barseghyan (talk | contribs)
This is a property of type Text.
A
Barseghyan provides a very minimal discussion of acceptance criteria by simply pointing out that these are the criteria that "are supposed to tell us whether a given theory is ''acceptable'' or ''unacceptable''".[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 9]] +
In the [[Barseghyan (2015)|''Laws of Scientific Change'']], Barseghyan makes a claim that a method "can consist of different criteria for theory assessment".[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 9]] He argues that "these criteria come in different types and perform different functions".[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 9]] Among various types of criteria are those involved in determining "whether a given theory is ''acceptable'' or ''unacceptable''".[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 9]] +
This definition aims to discern between accidental groups, i.e. the ones that don't have a collective intentionality, and actual communities, i.e. groups that do have collective intentionality. +
By allowing the discussants to suggest alternative formulations in their comments, the workflow incentivizes commenting and aids consensus building. It often happens that the discussants agree that a little tweak in the original formulation would solve the problem. This can help speed up the advancement of our communal knowledge. In contrast, when the discussants are not permitted to reformulate the original formulations, the discussants have no other choice than to write a whole new paper arguing for what is otherwise a little tweak to the original formulation. Not only is this wasteful, but it also creates a bottleneck where a consensus formation is postponed due to bureaucratic restrictions. Thus, it is important to remove this bottleneck and allow the participants to alter original formulations.
If a discussion yielded a new formulation, any such formulation should be clearly stated and added to the respective suggested modification, possibly under a separate heading (e.g. by distinguishing “Original Suggestion” from “Final Suggestion”). By default, the new formulation should bear the name of the author(s) of the original suggested modification, unless the original author(s) decides to give credit to those who significantly contributed to the reformulation. This should be decided collegially by the author, the commentators, and the editors on a case-by-case basis. +
Some facts ''ought'' to be relevant to the [[Theory Acceptance|assessment of a theory]] because the content of the theory itself implies their relevance, and others ought to be relevant simply by definition. When assessing a theory concerning scientific change, relevant facts that ought necessarily to be considered include questions pertinent to scientific change processes. For example: What [[Theory|theories]] and [[Method|methods]] were part of the [[Scientific Mosaic|scientific mosaic]] of the community in question, both before and after the instance of [[Scientific Change|scientific change]]? What modifications were proposed and what parts of the mosaic did they intend to replace? Which of these modifications became accepted into the mosaic, and how?
Relevant questions will depend on accepted views about the [[Scope of Scientonomy|scope of scientonomy]]. For example, if scientonomy deals with scientific change [[Scope of Scientonomy - Individual and Social|at the level of scientific communities]], then facts about the accepted views of communities ought to be relevant, and the views of particular individuals ought not. If scientonomy [[Scope of Scientonomy - Construction and Appraisal|deals only with theory appraisal]] and not with theory construction, then it follows that facts concerning the former, but not the latter, ought to be considered.
Relevant facts will also depend on the content of the mosaic at the time in question. For example, it is anachronistic to speak of religious constraints on science in the seventeenth century since, at that time, religion and natural philosophy were not regarded as separate domains of knowledge, but as part of the same mosaic.[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 111]] +
The theorem states that the employment of a method is not necessarily simultaneous with the acceptance of a new theory. Being a direct logical consequence of [[The Third Law|the third law]], the theorem highlights the fact that some methods are a result of the implementation of some abstract requirements of other methods. In this way, a new method can be devised as a means of resolving a particular creative gap, and subsequently become employed long after the acceptance of the theory that led to the employment of the abstract method. +
Barseghyan presents a historical example showing that scientific change is not necessarily a ''synchronous'' process.
<blockquote> When it comes to acquiring data about such minute objects as molecules or living cells, the unaided human eye is virtually useless. This proposition yields, among other things, an abstract requirement that, when counting the number of cells, the resulting value is acceptable only if it is obtained with an “aided” eye. This abstract requirement has been implemented in a variety of different ways. First, there is the counting chamber method where the cells are placed in a counting chamber – a microscope slide with a special sink – and the number of cells is counted manually under a microscope. There is also the plating method where the cells are distributed on a plate with a growth medium and each cell gives rise to a single colony. The number of cells is then deduced from the number of colonies. In addition, there is the flow cytometry method where the cells are hit by a laser beam one by one and the number of cells is counted by means of detecting the light reflected by the cells. Finally, there is the spectrophotometry method where the number of cells is obtained by means of measuring the turbidity in a spectrophotometer.[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 151-152]]</blockquote>
These are three different implementations of the ''same'' abstract requirement, which were, importantly, all devised and employed at different times. +
One key corollary of the third law is put forth in Barseghyan (2015). "Scientific change is not necessarily a ''synchronous process'': changes in theories are not necessarily simultaneous with changes in methods".[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 150]]
<blockquote>Suppose a new theory becomes accepted and some new abstract constraints become imposed. In this case, we can say that the acceptance of a theory resulted in the employment of a new method and the employment of a new method was synchronous with the acceptance of a new theory. But we also know that there is the second scenario of method employment, where a method implements some abstract requirements of other employed methods. In this scenario, there is a certain creative gap between abstract requirements that follow directly from accepted theories and methods that implement these abstract requirements. Devising a new method that would implement abstract requirements takes a fair amount of ingenuity and, therefore, there are no guarantees that these abstract requirements will be immediately followed by a new concrete method. In short, changes in methods are not necessarily simultaneous with changes in theories.[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 150-151]]</blockquote> +
If we consider the fact that scientific research is so specialized that no single research lab can account for all accepted theories in their discipline, we quickly recognize that there exists some form of distribution of labour among subcommunities. Authority delegation is an attempt to capture that distribution of labour, in scientonomic terms.
What this definition of authority delegation jointly expresses is the acceptance of a theory and the associated employment of a method. In any instance of authority delegation, the delegating community accepts that the community delegated to is an expert in some field. It follows from accepting that expertise that the same delegating community will simply employ a method to accept whatever the expert community says to accept.
Importantly, the method employed by the delegating community is distinct from that employed by the community delegated to; it would be misleading to suggest that the delegating community employs the same method as the community delegated to. This definition is careful to capture such particularities, as the definition merely expressed a new theory accepted and method employed by the delegating community.
For a simple example, consider a relation of authority delegation between physicists and biologists. A community of physicists can be said to be delegating authority over the life sciences to a community of biologists, so long as the community of physicists ''both'' accepts that biologists are experts in the life sciences ''and'' will accept a theory on the life sciences if told so by the biologists. +
Authority delegation explained by Gregory Rupik +
The definition tweaks the [[Authority Delegation (Overgaard-Loiselle-2016)|original definition]] of the term by [[Nicholas Overgaard|Overgaard]] and [[Mirka Loiselle|Loiselle]] to ensure that the relationship of authority delegation can obtain between [[Epistemic Agent|epistemic agents]] of all types. It also substitutes [[Question|''question'']] for ''topic'', as the former is the proper scientonomic term that should be used. +
B
Hakob Barseghyan presenting the redrafted ontology +
There is only one type of agents that can bear a mosaic - community.[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 43-52]] As for ''individual'' epistemic agents, their status and role in the process of scientific change is unclear; thus, the notion of an individual bearing a mosaic is problematic. +
C
One potential way of addressing the problem of closure mechanism is by introducing a “countdown” mechanism, where the community is given a three-month (90-day) discussion period for commenting on a suggested modification and, if no objections raised during this period, the proposed modification becomes accepted by default. According to Shaw and Barseghyan:
<blockquote>This allows for the possibility of inclusive debate without stalling on the development of our theory of scientific change. One disadvantage is that it doesn’t address the worry about masked objections raised in the previous section – people still may not explicitly dissent.[[CITE_Shaw and Barseghyan (2019)|p. 11]]</blockquote> +
To ensure that a suggested modification is properly evaluated and a verdict is reached, the community should be given a certain time period to discuss the modification, after which a communal vote should be taken. This vote should be offered to all members of the community, who should be given a short timeframe to decide.
In principle, this strategy should contribute to the transparency and inclusivity of the workflow by involving larger amounts of the community into the workflow. Since voting doesn't require a great deal of effort, this approach also addresses the problem of lack of commenting. As stated by Shaw and Barseghyan:
<blockquote>In a sense, this proposal would look like an election where there are two main phases. In the first phase, arguments will be made but no particular line of action will be taken. In the second phase, the vote will take place and a decision will be made by the will of the people. In addition, this strategy has the advantage of overcoming the problem of masked objections. People can vote anonymously, expressing their view and approval or dissatisfaction with a proposed modification, without fear of any sort of reprisal. One disadvantage is that a vote is not always grounded in good reasons. Community members may ignore important considerations and vote without being informed on the topic, thus leading to a less-than-ideal consensus. As we are witnessing in the world around us, the will of the people does not always pick out the best choice.[[CITE_Shaw and Barseghyan (2019)|p. 11]]</blockquote> +
A [[Group|group]] that has a collective intentionality. +
When dealing with a community, it might be useful to analyze it in terms of its constituent subcommunities (e.g. the community of particle physicists within the community of physicists). But such an analysis is based on an assumption that a community can consist of other communities, i.e. subcommunities. This assumption is by no means trivial; indeed, there might exist a view that each community is to be treated separately as one indivisible whole and, thus, any talk of its constituents is meaningless. According to Overgaard, communities can be said to be consisting of other communities.[[CITE_Overgaard (2017)|p. 58]] Thus, there is such a thing as a subcommunity, i.e. a community that is part of a larger community. +
This definition of ''compatibility'' captures the main gist of the notion as it was originally intended by [[Rory Harder|Harder]] and [[Hakob Barseghyan|Barseghyan]] - the idea that two elements are compatible when they can coexist within the same mosaic. +
The corollary is meant to restate the content of [[Rory Harder|Harder]]'s [[The Zeroth Law (Harder-2015)|the zeroth law]] of scientific change. Since the corollary follows deductively from the definition of [[Compatibility (Fraser-Sarwar-2018)|''compatibility'']], it highlights that the zeroth law as it was formulated by Harder is tautologous. Since the corollary covers the same idea as the zeroth law, all the theorems that were thought to be deducible by means of the zeroth law (e.g. [[Theory Rejection theorem (Barseghyan-2015)|the theory rejection theorem]] or [[Method Rejection theorem (Barseghyan-2015)|the method rejection theorem]]) can now be considered deducible by means of the corollary. +
Like [[Demarcation Criteria|demarcation]] and [[Acceptance Criteria|acceptance criteria]], compatibility criteria can be part of a community's employed method. The community employs these criteria to determine whether two theories are mutually compatible or incompatible, i.e. whether they can be simultaneously part of the community's mosaic. Different communities can have different compatibility criteria. While some communities may opt to employ the logical law of noncontradiction as their criterion of compatibility, other communities may be more tolerant towards logical inconsistencies. According to Barseghyan, the fact that these days scientists "often simultaneously accept theories which strictly speaking logically contradict each other is a good indication that the actual criteria of compatibility employed by the scientific community might be quite different from the classical logical law of noncontradiction".[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 11]] For example, this is apparent in the case of general relativity vs. quantum physics where both theories are accepted as the best available descriptions of their respective domains (i.e. they are considered ''compatible''), but are known to be in conflict when applied simultaneously to such objects as black holes. +
