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|Description=This theorem explains why all Here is the deduction as it appears in Barseghyan (2015): <blockquote> According to the thesis of fallibilism, accepted in the contemporary epistemology, no contingent proposition (i.e. proposition with empirical content) can be demonstratively true. Therefore, since substantive methods are necessarily dynamic. By definition all substantive methods contain at least one based on fallible contingent proposition so propositions, they cannot be immune to change. Thus, from Imagine a typical mosaic with an accepted theory and a conjunction method that implements the constraints imposed by this theory. It is obvious that the method in question is necessarily substantive (by the definition of: 1substantive method). fallibilismNow, namely suppose that there appears a new theory that manages to satisfy the assumption that all propositions with empirical content are by definition both contingent current requirements and therefore fallible, 2as a result, replaces the accepted theory in the mosaic. Naturally, this new theory imposes new abstract constraints (by the premise third law). It is conceivable that these new abstract constraints are incompatible with the requirements of the current method. In such an instance, the old method will be replaced by the new one (by the method rejection theorem). In short, a rejection of theories can lead to the trigger a rejection of methods, and 3the substantive method. This idea has been already implicit in the Synchronism synchronism of Method Rejection Theorem (derived in turn from the Method Rejection Theorem and the Third Law)method rejection theorem. Thus, it follows there are no guarantees that all an employed substantive methods are method will necessarily remain employed ad infinitum. Consequently, any substantive method is necessarily ''dynamic''.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p.220]]</blockquote>