Difference between revisions of "Epistemic Agents"

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(Redirected page to Subtypes of Epistemic Agent)
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#REDIRECT [[Subtypes of Epistemic Agent]]
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|Question=Who can be a ''bearer'' of a ''mosaic''? Can a ''community'' be a bearer of a mosaic? Can an ''individual'' be a bearer of a mosaic? Can an ''instrument' be a bearer of a mosaic?
 
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|Topic Type=Descriptive
 
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|Description=An agent is defined as an entity with a capacity to act. [[CiteRef::Schlosser (2015)]] The question here is who or what can be an epistemic agent, that is, who or what can take [[Epistemic Stances|stances]] towards [[Epistemic Elements|epistemic elements]] or be the bearer of a [[Scientific Mosaic|scientific mosaic]]? For example, consider a [[Epistemic Community|community]] that [[Authority Delegation|delegates authority]] over a certain topic to its sub-community. Then this sub-community delegates authority over a sub-topic of this topic to its sub-sub-community. Finally, this sub-sub-community delegates one very specific question to a single expert. Does this mean that an individual scientist can also be a bearer of a mosaic? Another question is whether an artificial system, such as a database or an instrument, can function as an epistemic agent, and if so, what properties it would need to possess in order to do so.
 
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|Parent Topic=Ontology of Scientific Change
 
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|Authors List=Kevin Zheng, Hakob Barseghyan,
 
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|Formulated Year=2016
 
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|Academic Events=Scientonomy Seminar 2016,
 
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|Prehistory=For most of the history of western science and philosophy, human individuals were treated as the primary epistemic agents. Exceptions include discussions of when one should accept the testimony of others in the works of [[David Hume]] and [[Thomas Reid]]. [[CiteRef::Goldman (2015)]]
 
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In the nineteenth century, [[John S. Mill|John Stuart Mill]], in a political essay called ''On Liberty'' argued that, because individual human knowers are fallible, the critical discussion of ideas is necessary to help individuals avoid the falsity or partiality of beliefs framed in the context of only one point of view. The achievement of knowledge is thus a social rather than an individual matter. [[CiteRef:: Mill (1859)]][[CiteRef::Longino (2016)]] Charles Sanders Peirce formulated a consensual theory of truth, in which the acceptance of the truth of a proposition depends on the agreement of a community of inquirers. Peirce emphasized the instigation of doubt and critical interaction as means to knowledge. For Peirce then, communities are epistemic agents. [[CiteRef::Peirce (1878)]][[CiteRef::Longino (2016)]]
 
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|Related Topics=Scientific Community, Applicability of the Laws of Scientific Change, Scientific Mosaic, Epistemic Stances Towards Theories,
 
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|Community=Community:Scientonomy
 
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|Accepted From Year=2016
 
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|Accepted From Month=March
 
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|Accepted From Approximate=Yes
 
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|Acceptance Indicators=It was acknowledged as an open question by the [[Scientonomy Seminar 2016]].
 
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Latest revision as of 17:00, 9 February 2023

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References

  1. ^  Schlosser, Markus. (2015) Agency. In Zalta (Ed.) (2016). Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2015/entries/agency/.
  2. ^  Blanchard, Thomas and Goldman, Alvin. (2016) Social Epistemology. In Zalta (Ed.) (2016). Retrieved from https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology-social/.
  3. ^  Mill, John Stuart. (2003) On Liberty. Yale University Press.
  4. a b c d  Longino, Helen. (2016) The Social Dimensions of Scientific Knowledge. In Zalta (Ed.) (2016). Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/scientific-knowledge-social/.
  5. ^  Peirce, Charles Sanders. (1878) How to Make Our Ideas Clear. Popular Science Monthly 12, 286-302.
  6. a b  Fleck, Ludwik. (1979) Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact. University of Chicago Press.
  7. ^  Sady, Wojciech. (2016) Ludwik Fleck. In Zalta (Ed.) (2016). Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2016/entries/fleck/.
  8. ^  Popper, Karl. (1963) Conjectures and Refutations. Routledge.
  9. ^  Popper, Karl. (1972) Objective Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
  10. a b  Kuhn, Thomas. (1962) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. University of Chicago Press.
  11. ^ Bird (2013) 
  12. ^ Kuhn (1974) 
  13. ^  Losee, John. (2001) A Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Science. Oxford University Press.
  14. ^ Longino (2016) 
  15. ^  Barnes, Barry. (1977) Interests and the Growth of Knowledge. Routledge.
  16. ^  Shapin, Steven. (1982) The History of Science and its Sociological Reconstruction. History of Science 20, 157-211.
  17. ^ Colins (1983) 
  18. ^  Barseghyan, Hakob and Levesley, Nichole. (2021) Question Dynamics. Scientonomy 4, 1-19. Retrieved from https://scientojournal.com/index.php/scientonomy/article/view/37120.
  19. ^  Machado-Marques, Sarah and Patton, Paul. (2021) Scientific Error and Error Handling. Scientonomy 4, 21-39. Retrieved from https://scientojournal.com/index.php/scientonomy/article/view/37121.
  20. ^  Loiselle, Mirka. (2017) Multiple Authority Delegation in Art Authentication. Scientonomy 1, 41-53. Retrieved from https://www.scientojournal.com/index.php/scientonomy/article/view/28233.
  21. ^  Barseghyan, Hakob. (2018) Redrafting the Ontology of Scientific Change. Scientonomy 2, 13-38. Retrieved from https://scientojournal.com/index.php/scientonomy/article/view/31032.
  22. ^  Patton, Paul. (2019) Epistemic Tools and Epistemic Agents in Scientonomy. Scientonomy 3, 63-89. Retrieved from https://scientojournal.com/index.php/scientonomy/article/view/33621.

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