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| + | #REDIRECT: [[Epistemic Stances Towards Epistemic Elements]] |
| − | |Question=What are the ''epistemic stances'' that can be taken by epistemic agents towards different epistemic elements?
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| − | |Topic Type=Descriptive
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| − | |Description=Epistemic agents can take different epistemic stances towards different elements. The types of stances that can be in principle taken towards a theory may or may not be the same as the types of stances that can be taken towards methods of theory evaluation. Thus, it must be clarified which types of stances (e.g. ''acceptance'', ''use'', ''pursuit'', ''employment'') can be taken towards epistemic elements of any given type (e.g. ''theories'', ''methods'').
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| − | |Parent Topic=Ontology of Scientific Change
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| − | |Authors List=Hakob Barseghyan,
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| − | |Formulated Year=2015
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| − | |Prehistory=The simplest sort of epistemic stance one might take towards a theory is to regard it as either ''true'' or ''false''. NEED TO DISCUSS EMERGENCE OF FALIBILISM HERE TO EXPLAIN WHY OTHER STANCES WERE NEEDED.
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| − | In the early twentieth century, many [[Rudolf Carnap|logical positivists]] supported a confirmationist view of theory assessment, in which theories are assessed on the basis of the balance of confirming and disconfirming evidence. In 1945, [[Carl Hempel]], a logical empiricist and confirmationist, argued that an agent might take three stances towards a theory, ''accepting'' it, ''rejecting'' it, or ''withholding judgment'', based on confirming or disconfirming evidence. [[CiteRef::Losee (2001)|p. 167-168]][[CiteRef::Hempel (1945)]]
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| − | In his ''Logic of Scientific Discovery'' (1959), [[CiteRef::Popper (1959)]] [[Karl Popper]] argued for a falsificationist view of science. Scientific ideas gained ''acceptance'' when they had survived strong tests in which their unexpected novel predictions were verified, and where ''rejected'' when they failed to survive such tests. [[CiteRef::Thornton (2015)]][[CiteRef::Godfrey-Smith (2003)|p. 57-74]]
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| − | [[Thomas Kuhn]]'s ''Structure of Scientific Revolutions'' (1963) used a number of equally vague terms to refer to stances a community might take towards a theory, including ''universally received'', ''embraced'', ''acknowledged'', and ''committed to''.
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| − | In [[Imre Lakatos]]'s theory of scientific change [[CiteRef::Lakatos (1970)]] Individual theories were encompassed in larger assemblages called research programs. A research program consists of a family of scientific theories either sharing a hard core of empirical content, or a close association with having such content. Lakatos identified two epistemic stances with respect to research programs. A research program was ''progressive''
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| − | |Page Status=Stub
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| − | {{Acceptance Record
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| − | |Community=Community:Scientonomy
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| − | |Accepted From Era=CE
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| − | |Accepted From Year=2016
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| − | |Accepted From Month=January
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| − | |Accepted From Day=1
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| − | |Accepted From Approximate=No
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| − | |Acceptance Indicators=While, in this general form, the question wasn't clearly stated in [[Barseghyan (2015)|''The Laws of Scientific Change'']], it was implicit in a more specific question of [[Epistemic Stances Towards Theories]].
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| − | |Still Accepted=Yes
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| − | |Accepted Until Approximate=No
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| − | }}
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