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|Authors List=Hakob Barseghyan,
|Resource=Barseghyan (2018)
|Preamble=TODOIn section ''Explicit and Implicit'' of [[Barseghyan (2015)|''The Laws of Scientific Change'']], a distinction is drawn between ''methods'' and ''methodologies'', where methods are understood as the actual – often tacit/implicit – expectations of a certain agent, while methodologies are always openly/explicitly stated by a certain epistemic agent as the right way of theory evaluation.[[CiteRef: Sinan add :Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 53-54]] The analysis reveals that this characterization of methodologies as explicitly stated rules and methods as often implicitly employed rules is misleading. First, whether a rule has or hasn’t been explicitly stated has to do with contingent historical circumstances and says nothing about its ''propositional content''. Thus, the propositional content of the rule “astronomical data is acceptable only if it has been obtained by a healthy human eye” stays exactly the same regardless of whether, when, and by which epistemic agents it has or hasn’t been explicitly stated. Second, it is clear that all propositions can be both ''explicit'' and ''implicit''; that’s not what characterizes them. Descriptive or normative, theory or method – every epistemic element has the capacity of being explicitly stated as well as the capacity of being tacitly implied. The same holds for epistemic stances. For example, a theory or a preamblemethod can be accepted both openly and tacitly. Similarly, normative propositions can be employed both implicitly and explicitly. This confirms that the distinction between explicit and implicit cannot be taken as grounds for differentiating distinct epistemic elements or distinct epistemic stances.
|Modification=Accept that:
* Epistemic stances of all types can be taken explicitly and/or implicitly.

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