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|Authors List=Hakob Barseghyan,
|Formulated Year=2015
|Prehistory=Concepts pre-dating predating the current appreciation of contextual appraisal include epistemological concerns about the absolute appraisal of individual theories based on their available data. Early rationalist and empiricist philosophers believed in what has been called the justificationist interpretation of absolute appraisal , which states that there could can be decisive proofs and refutations of individual theories.
Later, probabilist interpretations were proposed stating that one cannot decisively prove a theory, but merely objectively measure its probability relative to the available evidence. This probabilistic tradition has been common amongst philosophers of science at both Cambridge , and by the logical positivist tradition in Vienna. Both interpretations of absolute appraisal share the opinion that theory assessment concerns an individual theory taken in isolation from other theories. For instance, the logical positivists believed that scientific theories were entirely driven created by fitting constructing logical structures for empirical data into logical structures.
In contrast, the comparative interpretation states contends that theory assessment does not concern individual theories considered in isolation. The shift towards the comparative interpretations of theory appraise appraisal began with the acceptance of fallibilism in epistemology. Fallibilism is the idea that no empirical belief can ever be rationally supported or justified in a conclusive way. Determining which theory is the best available required requires that extant competitors be appraised by their relative merit through a comparative appraisal process.
Among the first to philosophers of science to appreciate comparative appraisal was [[Karl Popper]]. In his conception of theory appraisal, a proposed theory was judged against an accepted theory on the basis of a crucial experiment. In a crucial experiment, the predictions of the old and new theory contradict each other. One As a result, one of the theories will must be falsifiedin this experiment. The other unfalsified theory will become the new accepted theory. [[CiteRef::Popper (1959)]]
According to [[Thomas Kuhn]], theories are assessed by the methods of the existing paradigm in periods of normal science. In a revolutionary period, the paradigm shifts and theories are assessed by the methods of the new paradigm. According to Kuhn, a scientific paradigm is the collection of accepted scientific theories. [[CiteRef::Kuhn (1962)| pp. 81, 84-87]] Kuhn was among the first to recognize that observational anomalies are not exceptional and do not automatically lead to theory rejection.
The traditional comparative procedure of theory appraisal only accounts for two competing theories, some method of assessment, and some relative evidence. What the traditional version of comparativism does not take into account is that all theory assessment takes place within a specific historical context.
|History=Patton, Overgaard, and Barseghyan have proposed a modified [[The Second Law (Patton-Overgaard-Barseghyan-2017)|Second Law]] of Scientific Change that significantly modifies they the way scientonomy believes scientific theories are appraised. They feel that their new Second Law better accommodates the possibility of an inconclusive result in the appraisal of a theory. [[CiteRef::Patton, Overgaard, and Barseghyan (2017)]] Their modified version of the Second Law has not been accepted yet by the scientonomy community.
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