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Later, probabilist interpretations were proposed stating that one cannot decisively prove a theory, but merely objectively measure its probability relative to the available evidence. This probabilistic tradition has been common amongst philosophers of science at Cambridge, and by the logical positivist tradition in Vienna. Both interpretations of absolute appraisal share the opinion that theory assessment concerns an individual theory taken in isolation from other theories. For instance, the logical positivists believed that scientific theories were created by constructing logical structures for empirical data.
In contrast, the comparative interpretation contends that theory assessment does not concern individual theories considered in isolation. The shift towards the comparative interpretations of theory appraisal began with the acceptance of fallibilism in epistemology. Fallibilism is the idea that no empirical belief can ever be rationally supported or justified in a conclusive way. Determining which theory is the best available requires that extant competitors be appraised by their relative merit through a comparative appraisal process. (Note: FIRST THREE PARAGRAPHS NEED CITATION OF REFERENCES)
Among the first to philosophers of science to appreciate comparative appraisal was [[Karl Popper]]. Popper maintained that theories are tested by attempts to refute them. In his conception of theory appraisal, a proposed theory was judged against an accepted theory on the basis of a crucial falsifying experiment. In a crucial such an experiment, the predictions of the old and new theory contradict each other. As a result, one of the theories must be falsified in this experiment. The unfalsified theory will become the new accepted theory. [[CiteRef::Popper (1959)]]
According to [[Thomas Kuhn]], theories are assessed by the methods of the existing paradigm in scientific development alternates between periods of normal scienceand scientific revolutions. A central concept was that of '''paradigms''', which were defined as "universally recognized scientific achievements that for a time provide model problems and solutions to a community of practitioners" [[CiteRef::Kuhn (1962)| p. viii]] or as "coherent traditions of scientific research" [[CiteRef::Kuhn (1962)| p. 10]]. In periods of normal science, a theory or set of interrelated theories contained within a revolutionary period, the paradigm shifts and theories are assessed by the methods used to explain a widening range of the new paradigmphenomena. According to Kuhn, The accumulation of anomalies which resist explanation can result in a scientific revolution, in which one paradigm is replaced with another. Kuhn argued that paradigms were "incommensurable", and initially described the collection of accepted scientific theories. conversion from one to another in ways that made paradigm choice seem non-rational [[CiteRef::Kuhn (1962)| pp. 81, 84111-87135]] . He later suggested that paradigm choice involved reasoned judgment guided by epistemic values that had remained fixed over history [[CiteRef:: Kuhn was among the first to recognize that observational anomalies are not exceptional and do not automatically lead to theory rejection(1974)]].
[[Imre Lakatos]] recognized that there is theories always face "an ocean of anomalies" but these saw this as only become becoming significant when a new rival theory makes a successful novel prediction. [[CiteRef::Lakatos (1971a)| pp. 111, 126-128]].
The later [[Larry Laudan]] agreed with the concept of comparative appraisal. [[CiteRef::Laudan (1984)]] In his reticulated model of science, theory choice is determined by the methods employed at the time. The methods in turn are determined by the accepted theories. Lakatos is an important precursor to modern scientonomy.
