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{{Topic
|QuestionSubject=What is the nature of '''theory appraisal'''? Does actual '''theory assessment''' concern an individual theory taken in isolation from other theories?
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|Description='''Theory appraisal''' refers to how we assess a theory to determine whether to accept it. From ancient times up until the mid-twentieth century, it was widely supposed that theories were appraised in isolation from one another; a position known as '''absolute appraisal'''. Once fallibilism became widely accepted, it was suggested instead that theory appraisal is a '''comparative''' matter, in which the relative merits of competing theories were assessed. '''Contextual appraisal''' contends that a theory is assessed only in relation to the entire mosaic of accepted theories and employed methods. For the historian, several elements must be considered in order to avoid committing anachronisms.
|Authors List=Hakob Barseghyan
|Formulated Year=2015
|Prehistory=Concepts predating the current appreciation of contextual appraisal include epistemological concerns about the absolute appraisal of individual theories based on their available data. Early rationalist and empiricist philosophers believed in what has been called the justificationist interpretation of absolute appraisal (''justificationism''), which states that there can be decisive proofs and refutations of individual theories.[[CiteRef::Laudan (1970a)]]
Later, ''probabilist'' (or ''neo-justificationist'', in Lakatos' terminology) interpretations were proposed conceding that one cannot decisively prove a theory, but merely objectively measure its probability relative to the available evidence. This probabilistic tradition has been common amongst philosophers of science at Cambridge, and by the logical positivist tradition in Vienna. [[Larry Laudan|Laudan]] has a good discussion on probabilism in theory appraisal.[[CiteRef::Laudan (1968a)]] Both interpretations of absolute appraisal share the opinion that theory assessment concerns an individual theory taken in isolation from other theories. For instance, the logical positivists believed that scientific theories were created by constructing logical structures for empirical data.
In contrast, the comparative interpretation contends that theory assessment does not concern individual theories considered in isolation. The shift towards the comparative interpretations of theory appraisal began with the acceptance of ''fallibilism'' in epistemology. Fallibilism is the idea that no empirical belief can ever be rationally supported or justified in a conclusive way. Determining which theory is the best available requires that extant competitors be appraised by their relative merit through a comparative appraisal process.[[CiteRef::Laudan (1981a)| pp. 111-140]] [[CiteRef::Laudan (1996)|pp. 211-215]] [[CiteRef::Lakatos (1970)|pp. 10-12]] In introducing the history of '''theory appraisal,''' Barseghyan notes that "that nowadays we take the comparative view for granted".[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 184]]
Among the first philosophers of science to appreciate comparative appraisal was [[Karl Popper]]. Popper maintained that theories are tested by attempts to refute them. In his conception of theory appraisal, a proposed theory was judged against an accepted theory on the basis of a crucial falsifying experiment. In such an experiment, the predictions of the old and new theory contradict each other. As a result, one of the theories must be falsified in this experiment. The unfalsified theory will become the new accepted theory.[[CiteRef::Popper (1959)]]
[[Thomas Kuhn]] saw theories as forming interrelated groups united under the banner of what he called a '''paradigm'''. Paradigms were defined as "coherent traditions of scientific research".[[CiteRef::Kuhn (1962a)|p. 10]] Appraisal was thus contextual. Scientific development alternated between periods of normal science and scientific revolutions. In normal science the paradigm guides the explanation of a widening range of phenomena. The accumulation of anomalies which resist explanation can result in a scientific revolution, in which one paradigm is replaced with another. Kuhn argued that paradigms were "incommensurable", and initially described the conversion from one to another in ways that made paradigm choice seem non-rational.[[CiteRef::Kuhn (1962a)|pp. 111-135]] He later suggested that paradigm choice was comparative and involved reasoned judgment guided by epistemic values that had remained fixed over history.[[CiteRef:: Kuhn (1974a)]]
Like Kuhn, [[Imre Lakatos]] saw theories as grouped into interrelated sets called '''research programs''' and saw their assessment as contextual.[[CiteRef::Lakatos (1970)|pp. 47-67]] The theories comprising a research program were not accorded equal status. Its ''hard core'' consisted of the central tenets of the research program, and its ''protective belt'' of subsidiary theories or assumptions. Theories constituting the protective belt were modified or replaced as needed to account for new experimental findings with the goal of protecting the hard core of from falsification. He recognized that theories always face "an ocean of anomalies" but saw this as only becoming significant when a new rival theory makes a successful novel prediction.[[CiteRef::Lakatos (1971a)|pp. 111, 126-128]]
The later [[Larry Laudan]] agreed with the concept of comparative appraisal.[[CiteRef::Laudan (1984a)]] In his '''reticulated model''' of science, theory choice is determined by the methods employed at the time. The methods in turn are shaped by the accepted theories. Laudan's reticulated model is an important precursor to modern scientonomy.
However, the traditional comparative procedure of theory appraisal only accounts for two competing theories, some method of assessment, and some relative evidence. What the traditional version of comparativism does not take into account is that all theory assessment takes place within a specific historical context.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 186-196]]
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|Parent Topic=Mechanism of Theory Acceptance
|Authors ListSorting Order=Hakob Barseghyan,|Formulated YearPage Status=2015Needs Editing
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