Changes

|Description=In the process of [[Mechanism of Scientific Change|scientific change]], we are dealing with different epistemic ''agents'', taking different epistemic ''stances'' towards different epistemic ''elements''. For instance, we can say that the Paris community of 1720 [[Theory Acceptance|accepted ]] [[René Descartes|Cartesian natural philosophy]]. In this example, Paris community is the epistemic ''agent'', acceptance is their epistemic ''stance'', and Cartesian natural philosophy is the epistemic element. There are a number of important ontological questions that arise here: * What types of [[Epistemic Agents|epistemic ''agents'' ]] can there be? I.e. can epistemic agents be communal, individual and/or artificial (instruments, AI)?* What types of [[Epistemic Elements|epistemic ''elements'' ]] can there be in the process of scientific change? I.e. are there theories, method, values, research programmes, paradigms, etc?* What are the different [[Epistemic Stances|''stances'' ]] that an agent can take towards an element? I.e. do these include acceptance, use, pursuit, employment, commitment, neglect, rejection, etc.?

|Prehistory=At the level of ontology, the philosophy of science begins noteworthy progress with the logical positivists. While the positivists individually had varying views, we can summarize their ontology by generalizing from any existing overlap between authors. The logical positivist ontology consisted of a scientific community which stipulated theories and determined whether those theories were worthy of pursuit based on their empirical probability. A theory’s given empirical probability is determined by observational proof evidence in favor favour of it. The positivists did not recognize a multitude of methods and so the only epistemic elements in their ontology were theories (it should be noted that given the singular nature of methods it was assumed all science would adhere to one perfect method). Furthermore, the logical positivists did not share the belief that theories can be outright rejected. Instead, they believed theories are simply pursued on a basis of instances of confirmation.[[CiteRef::Schlick (1931)|pp.145-162]]