Changes

|Prehistory=At the level of ontology, the philosophy of science begins noteworthy progress with the logical positivists. While the positivists individually had varying views, we can summarize their ontology by generalizing from any existing overlap between authors. The logical positivist ontology consisted of a scientific community which stipulated theories and determined whether those theories were worthy of pursuit based on their empirical probability. A theory’s given empirical probability is determined by observational proof in favor of it. The positivists did not recognize a multitude of methods and so the only epistemic elements in their ontology were theories (it should be noted that given the singular nature of methods it was assumed all science would adhere to one perfect method). Furthermore, the logical positivists did not share the belief that theories can be outright rejected. Instead, they believed theories are simply pursued on a basis of instances of confirmation.[[CiteRef::Schlick (1931)|pp.145-162]]

More drastically, Thomas Kuhn instantiated multiple changes to the existing epistemic elements with his model of scientific change. Kuhn’s Scientific Revolutions suggested that there was now a second epistemic element beyond theories – methods – which could be modified and were dynamic in nature.[[CiteRef::Kuhn (1962a)|pp. 66-80]] Unlike his predecessors, Kuhn’s ontology did not share the same relations between epistemic agents and epistemic elements; while previously theories and methods were entirely under the control of the scientific community, under Kuhn’s view, the elements change arbitrarily when an overflow of anomalies occurs.[[CiteRef::Kuhn (1962a)|pp. 35-50]]