Changes

|QuestionSubject=What is the '''ontology''' of scientific change? What are the fundamental ''elements'' that undergo scientific change?

|DescriptionSubfield=Ontology|Inherited From=|Heritable=No|Question Text Formula=|Question Title Formula=|Question=In principle, What is the process '''ontology''' of scientific change can concern many different types of entities. One important question is to establish ? What are the most fundamental units that undergo ''entities'', ''processes'', and ''relations'' of scientific change. Over ?|Question Title=|Predicate=|Object Type=Text|Object Value True=|Object Value False=|Object Class=|Object Enum Values=|Object Regexp=|Single Answer Text Formula=|Multiple Answers Text Formula=|Answer Title Formula=|Description=In the years, it has been argued that the fundamental units process of scientific change include theories ([[Karl PopperMechanism of Scientific Change|Popperscientific change]]), paradigms (we are dealing with different epistemic ''agents'', taking different epistemic ''stances'' towards different epistemic ''elements''. For instance, we can say that the Paris community of 1720 [[Thomas KuhnTheory Acceptance|Kuhnaccepted]]), research programmes ([[Imre LakatosRené Descartes|LakatosCartesian natural philosophy]]). In this example, Paris community is the epistemic ''agent'', acceptance is their epistemic ''stance'', research traditions (early and Cartesian natural philosophy is the epistemic element. There are a number of important ontological questions that arise here: * What types of [[Larry LaudanEpistemic Agent|Laudanepistemic agents]])can there be? I.e. can epistemic agents be communal, methods individual and/or artificial ([[Thomas Kuhn|Kuhn]]instruments, AI)?* What types of [[Dudley ShapereEpistemic Element|Shapereepistemic elements]]can there be in the process of scientific change? I.e. are there theories, later [[Larry Laudan|Laudan]])method, and values (, research programmes, paradigms, etc.?* What are the different [[Thomas KuhnEpistemic Stance|Kuhnepistemic stances]]that an agent can take towards an element? I.e. do these include acceptance, use, pursuit, employment, commitment, neglect, rejection, later [[Larry Laudan|Laudan]])etc. This ?  Addressing these questions is not surprising, as any theory the main task of scientific change needs to establish a basic the ontology of scientific change.|Authors List=Hakob Barseghyan,

|Prehistory=Thomas Kuhn's theory Historically, theories of scientific change differed not only in their explanations of how science changes through time, but also in their views on what exactly underwent change in science. Thus, a range of different ontologies of scientific change identified have been suggested over the years.  In the ontological units early twentieth century, logical positivists formulated an ontology of scientific change as frameworks which he referred to as ''paradigms''. While they individually held varying views, which we can be defined as a characteristic set of beliefs and preconceptions held summarize their ontology by generalizing from the overlap between authors. The positivists generally supposed that there was a single scientific community including instrumental, theoretical, and metaphysical commitments all together. [[CiteRef::Kuhn (1962)Method|method]] that did not change through history or across disciplines so that the only epistemic elements capable of change in their ontology were [[Theory|scientific theories]].[[CiteRef::KuhnSchlick (19771931)|pp.293145-319162]] A similar ontology was championed by many non-positivist authors, including [[Karl Popper]] Kuhn himself confessed that he had confusingly used the term in several different senses. [[CiteRef::KuhnPopper (19771963)|pp.29362-29463]] In an attempt to clarify matters he sought to replace his broadest definition of the paradigm, given above, with the concept of ''disciplinary matrices'' Despite its inherent vagueness, defined as those shared elements that account for the relatively unproblematic professional communication and relative unanimity of professional judgment within a scientific community. Kuhn’s [[CiteRef::Kuhn (19771962a) |p.297''Structure of Scientific Revolutions'']] For Kuhncan be interpreted as suggesting a number of new ontological elements, including ''methods'', ''values'', ''questions'', then''standards'', a theory of scientific change ought and ''problems''. It is not quite clear whether these are all meant to deal with disciplinary matrices and be independent epistemic elements in their changes over time. While for Kuhn, paradigms or disciplinary matrices were primary, there was likewise confusion about the different stances a community might take towards a theoryown right. Kuhn also famously used a number whole range of equally vague wordsdenoting epistemic stances, including such as ''universally receivedembraced'', ''embraceduniversally received'', ''acknowledged'', and ''committed'' among many others.[[CiteRef::Kuhn (1970c)|pp. 10-13]] It remains to be seen whether he meant them as synonyms, or whether he ascribed different meanings to at least some of them.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 30]]  Imre Lakatos generated a holistic account of scientific change slightly regressive to describe previous ontologies. Lakatos kept Kuhn’s view of the status fluidity of theories paradigms within scientific communitieshowever, with two small modifications. Firstly, Lakatos saw paradigms as research programmes, of which many simultaneously existed, and secondly Lakatos believed they followed a more rational model of change, i.e. modifications were judged as regressive or progressive based on certain conditions. [[CiteRef::Kuhn Lakatos (19621970)|pp. 1031-1334]] With regards to regression, Paul Feyerabend criticized Lakatos for once again suggesting that theories can only be pursued. The whole system Lakatos built was a high functioning competition between research programmes.[[CiteRef::Feyerabend (1970a)]]As such, per Lakatos, theories could never really be accepted, and thus they carried the potential to threaten science with a potentially infinite number of theories all of which are rational to pursue. NOTE- This is only partial for nowFinally, Larry Laudan paints the closest picture to the ontology scientonomy posits today. Laudan recognized values, theories, and methodologies as epistemic elements with relations to scientists as epistemic agents. Theories could be accepted under his view and methodologies could be employed. Each epistemic element under Laudan’s reticulated model could be modified. Laudan did not recognize the potential of theories to be used but not accepted but he did recognize pursued and accepted theories in contrast to Lakatos and the logical positivists.[[CiteRef::Laudan (1984a)]]|History=InitiallyIn [[Hakob Barseghyan|Barseghyan]]'s [[Barseghyan (2015)|''The Laws of Scientific Change'']], the question of the ontology of scientific change is discussed without being explicitly formulated. While the question has been accepted and discussed at length by [[Community:Scientonomy|the scientonomy community]] ever since its inception, it wasn't until the early 2017 when the question was posited in openly formulated and documented.  Barseghyan's original ontology included:* [[Theory Is a Subtype of Epistemic Element (Barseghyan-2015)|Theories]] and [[Method Is a Subtype of Epistemic Element (Barseghyan-2015)|methods]] as the only two types of [[Epistemic Elements|epistemic elements]] that undergo scientific change;[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 3-11]]* Three [[Epistemic Stances Towards Theories|epistemic stances towards theories]]: ''acceptance'', ''use''Metatheory, and '' of pursuit'',[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|the LSCpp. 30-42]] as well as one [[Epistemic Stances Towards Methods|epistemic stance towards methods]], '' through the employment'';[[CiteRef:Category:Definitional TopicBarseghyan (2015)|definitionpp. 52-62]]'' of * Community as the sole [[Scientific MosaicSubtypes of Epistemic Agent|scientific mosaictype of epistemic agent]] as a set capable of all accepted taking these stances towards theories and employed methods.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|ppp.543-52]]  Only [[Descriptive Theory|descriptive theories]] were included in Barseghyan's original ontology, while the status of [[Normative Theory|normative theories]] was left indeterminate due to the [[The Paradox of Normative Propositions|the paradox of normative propositions]] Towards . Once the paradox of normative propositions was [[Resolution to the end Paradox of Normative Propositions (Sebastien-2016)|resolved]], it gradually became clear that the original ontology was extended by [[Zoe Sebastien|Sebastien]] to also include [[Normative Theory Is a Subtype of Theory (Sebastien-2016)|normative theories]].[[CiteRef::Sebastien (2016)]] In 2018, [[William Rawleigh|Rawleigh]] suggested that [[Question|questions]] are to be accepted as a field cannot separate [[Question Is a Subtype of Epistemic Element (Rawleigh-2018)|type of epistemic element]]; the suggestion became accepted later that year and should not be postulated via definitions. What constitutes the elements of a certain ontology is for the respective empirical research was modified to be established include theories, methods, andquestions.[[CiteRef::Rawleigh (2018)]] The ontology was further modified by Barseghyan in 2018. In his [[Barseghyan (2018)|redrafted ontology]], thus, is not he suggested that methods are a matter subtype of normative theory. He also suggested including [[Definition|definitions]] as a subtype of theory. In other words, the question [[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2018)]] As a result of what constitutes the ontology acceptance of a certain field is a ''[[Modification:Category:Descriptive TopicSciento-2018-0006|descriptive questionthat modification]]'', not definitional. Indeed, what sort theories and questions became the two basic subtypes of epistemic elements change during the process of scientific change is not something that should be decided by a definition, but should be formulated as a with definitions, normative, and descriptive theories being subtypes of [[Theory|theory that says "Such-and-such elements undergo scientific change"]].|Current View=|Parent Topic=|Related Topics=Mechanism of Scientific Change,|Sorting Order=50