Changes

|Author=Hakob Barseghyan,|Prehistory=Although almost all of the great philosophers of science of the 20th century have described the history of science in terms of a changing, systematic collection of beliefs, there has never been a real consensus in the language used to describe such a collection. [[Thomas Kuhn]] used the word “paradigm” ''paradigm'' to talk of integrated collections of theories, methods, and values that were replaced during episodes of revolutionary scientific change .[[CiteRef::Bird (2011)]] [[CiteRef::Kuhn (19621962a)]]. [[Imre Lakatos]] described a set of propositions as fitting into a scientific “research programme”''research programme'';[[CiteRef::Lakatos (1978a)]]; [[Larry Laudan]] used the concept of "''research tradition"''.[[CiteRef::Matheson and Dallmann (2015)]][[CiteRef::Laudan (19841984a)]]. Richard DeWitt talks of “worldviews” ''worldviews'' to describe the beliefs held by a scientific community at any given time.[[CiteRef::DeWitt (2010)|p. 7]].

Although these terms are used to describe collections of scientific beliefs at some particular point in history, it would be wrong to assume that they are interchangeable. There has been much debate within the philosophy of science over what constitutes the exact contents of a given community’s system of beliefs. While for [[Karl Popper]] and [[Imre Lakatos]] a belief system would only include descriptive propositions, for the later Larry Laudan, methods and values should be included along with theories as part of the fabric of a community’s belief system .[[CiteRef::Laudan (19841984a)|p. 26]]. According to Kuhn, all theories within a given paradigm use a certain “taxonomy” unique to that paradigm. Thus, beliefs held by a community holding paradigm A can never be fully understood by the community believing paradigm B, because both paradigms operate under at least partially untranslatable languages[[CiteRef::Bird (2011)]].

There has also been debate concerning whether or not scientific methods change over time. The methods of science were once supposed to be fixed. The idea that methods should be included as historically relative elements within a community’s system of beliefs is known as [[Static and Dynamic Methods|the dynamic method thesis]], and was proposed by [[Paul Feyerabend]] in the 1970’s.[[CiteRef::Preston (2016)]] [[CiteRef::Feyerabend (19751975a)]]. In the late 1980's, the question of the existence of static methods became a focal point of the debate between Larry Laudan and John Worrall. In his ''Science and Values'', Laudan (referred to as the 'later Laudan' because his views changed substantially over his career) argued that no method of theory assessment is immune to change. Worrall disagreed, claiming that there are some methods which have persisted throughout all changes.[[CiteRef::Laudan (19841984a)]][[CiteRef::Worrall (1988)]] [[CiteRef::Laudan (19891989a)]] [[CiteRef::Worrall (1989)]]. The idea that scientific methods change through time is now generally accepted among contemporary historians and philosophers of science.|History=The term ''scientific mosaic'' was coined by [[Hakob Barseghyan |Barseghyan]] in 2012 within the context of the [[The Theory of Scientific Change]] (TSC). It was suggested at the outset that a scientific mosaic should be understood as a collection of ''changeable '' [[Theory|theories ]] and [[Method|methods]]. The mosaic metaphor was chosen because the tiles of a mosaic may be tightly adjusted, or their may be a considerable gap between them. In scientific mosaics there may be considerable gaps, such as that between general relativity and quantum mechanics, despite the fact that both are accepted parts of the mosaic .[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)| p. 5]].

When the TSC was initially formulated, it made no mention The [[Scientific Mosaic (Barseghyan-2015)|initial notion of ''scientific mosaic'']] worked well with the status original ontology of epistemic elements suggested by Barseghyan in [[Theory#Descriptive and NormativeBarseghyan (2015)|normative propositions''The Laws of Scientific Change'']] in relation to as well as the scientific mosaic. In 2014, Joel Burkholder identified a problem that would arise if normative propositions, such as, ethical conceptions or modified ontology suggested by [[MethodologyZoe Sebastien|methodologiesSebastien]] – were included in the mosaic. If this were the case, then by [[Sebastien (2016)|"The Third Law|Status of Normative Propositions in the third lawTheory of Scientific Change"]], methods would have to be deducible from accepted methodologies. However, the history since in both ontologies [[Theory Is a Subtype of science shows that methodologies Epistemic Element (Barseghyan-2015)|theories]] and [[Method Is a Subtype of Epistemic Element (Barseghyan-2015)|methods often conflict. How, then, can ]] are the latter be a deductive consequence only two fundamental types of the former? epistemic elements.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)]][[CiteRef::Sebastien (2016)]]

In 2015, With the acceptance of [[William Rawleigh|Rawleigh]]'s new ontology of epistemic elements which added questions as a new [[Modification:2016Question Is a Subtype of Epistemic Element (Rawleigh-00022018)|Zoe Sebastien proposedtype of epistemic element]] , it became apparent that the definition of “[[theory]]” scientific mosaic should be changed adjusted to include both descriptive and normative propositionsquestions. She showed how this change could be implemented without violating [[The Zeroth Law|the law of compatibilityCiteRef::Rawleigh (2018)]]. Her [[Modification:2016Scientific Mosaic (Barseghyan-00022018)|suggestion]] became [[Theory Acceptance|acceptedOne such definition]] was suggested by Barseghyan in 2016his [[CiteRef::Sebastien Barseghyan (20162018)]].|Current View=Currently, a ''scientific mosaic'' is defined as a collection "Redrafting the Ontology of all [[Theory Acceptance|acceptedScientific Change"]] theories and [[Method Employment|employed]] methods.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (20152018)|p. 5]]. a ''The new definition became [[TheoryModification:Sciento-2018-0009|theorybecame accepted]]'' in 2020. As this definition does not refer to any epistemic elements explicitly, it is defined in principle compatible with any future ontology insofar as any set that ontology involves the notions of propositions, descriptive or normative,[[CiteRef::Sebastien (2016)]] while a ''[[method]]acceptance'' and ''employment'' is defined as a set .|Related Topics=Scientific Change, Theory, Method, Mechanism of requirements employed in theory assessment[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)Scientific Change, Employed Method, Theory Acceptance,|p. 3-10]].Page Status=Needs Editing}}{{Acceptance Record[[File|Community=Community:Scientific_Mosaic_Theory_Method_Class_Diagram.pngScientonomy|centerAccepted From Era=CE|632px]]Accepted From Year=2016|Accepted From Month=JanuaryAt the moment, theories and methods are believed to be the only two fundamental entities that constitute a scientific mosaic. In the TSC, values are not regarded as separate entities within the scientific mosaic. This is because all values can be formulated as methods, there is no essential distinction between the two.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 6-7]] Accepted From Day=1|Accepted From Approximate=NoWhile it |Acceptance Indicators=This is not included in when the community accepted its first definitionof the term, it is understood that the bearer of a mosaic is a [[Scientific Community|scientific community]].[[CiteRef::Barseghyan Mosaic (2015)|p. xi]] The reason for this omission is , which indicates that there the question is currently no accepted definition of "scientific community"itself considered legitimate.|Related TopicsStill Accepted=Yes|Accepted Until Approximate=Scientific Change, Theory, Method, Mechanism of Scientific Change,No