Difference between revisions of "Scope of Scientonomy - Descriptive (Barseghyan-2015)"

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|Authors List=Hakob Barseghyan,
 
|Authors List=Hakob Barseghyan,
 
|Formulated Year=2015
 
|Formulated Year=2015
|Description=There are at least three sorts of questions that we might ask about the process of [[Scientific Change|scientific change]]; Historical questions having to do with what theories and methods were accepted by a particular community at a particular point in time, Theoretical questions about the mechanisms of how scientific change happens, and methodological questions about how scientific change ought to happen and what theories and methods ought to be accepted. The first two questions are descriptive in nature, and the third is normative.  
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|Description=There are at least three sorts of questions that we might ask about the process of [[Scientific Change|scientific change]]; Historical questions having to do with what theories and methods were accepted by a particular community at a particular point in time, Theoretical questions about the mechanisms of scientific change, and methodological questions about how scientific change ought to happen and what theories and methods ought to be accepted. The first two questions are descriptive in nature, and the third is normative.  
  
Normative and descriptive concerns have often been conflated in discussions of scientific change.  For example, [[Thomas Kuhn]] wrote that his theory "should be read in both ways at once" [[CiteRef:: Kuhn (1970a)]]. The traditional belief in a fixed an unchanging method of science contributed to this conflation, since the problem of identifying the true method of science was seen as both a descriptive historical and a normative methodological question. By the 1980's most authors agreed that the methods of science had changed over time, and that a theory of scientific change needed to account for both theory change and method change.
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As the "science of science" [[scientonomy]] seeks a purely descriptive account of processes of change in the [[scientific mosaic]] and therefore encompasses only historical and theoretical questions. Keeping descriptive scientific questions distinct from questions of normative methodology avoids numerous pitfalls. For example, those who conflate the two sometimes argue that because some method is known to have flaws of logical consistency or soundness, it cannot possibly have been the one that was, in fact, used by scientists.  However, there is a great deal historical evidence that scientists actually have used logically flawed methods. Inductive reasoning is a ubiquitous part of science, despite its [https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/induction-problem/ well known flaws]. The intrusion of normative concerns would also undermine scientonomy's aspirations to scientific status [[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 19-20]]. If any laws of scientific change discovered were accorded normative force they would become tautological truths incapable being called into question by empirical inquiry.
 
 
As the "science of science" scientonomy seeks a descriptive account of processes of change in the scientific mosaic, and sets normative concerns aside as the concerns of methodologists. To do otherwise runs the risk of rendering any laws of scientific change discovered
 
 
|Resource=Barseghyan (2015)
 
|Resource=Barseghyan (2015)
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|Prehistory=Discussions of scientific change have traditionally conflated normative and descriptive concerns. [[Thomas Kuhn]], for example, wrote that his wor "should be read in both ways at once" [[CiteRef:: Kuhn (1970a)]]. Belief in an unchanging true method of science contributed to this conflation, since the problem of identifying this method was seen as both a descriptive and a normative question. By the 1980's most authors agreed that the methods of science had changed over time, and that a theory of scientific change needed to account for both theory change and method change.
 
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{{Acceptance Record
 
{{Acceptance Record

Revision as of 20:31, 15 June 2017

This is an answer to the question Scope of Scientonomy - Descriptive and Normative that states "Scientonomy is a descriptive discipline whose main task is to explain the process of changes in the scientific mosaic. It is distinct from normative methodology, whose task is to evaluate and prescribe methods. The findings of scientonomy may be used in such normative evaluations, but scientonomy itself should not be expected to perform any normative functions."

Scope of Scientonomy - Descriptive was formulated by Hakob Barseghyan in 2015.1 It is currently accepted by Scientonomy community as the best available answer to the question.

Broader History

Discussions of scientific change have traditionally conflated normative and descriptive concerns. Thomas Kuhn, for example, wrote that his wor "should be read in both ways at once" 2. Belief in an unchanging true method of science contributed to this conflation, since the problem of identifying this method was seen as both a descriptive and a normative question. By the 1980's most authors agreed that the methods of science had changed over time, and that a theory of scientific change needed to account for both theory change and method change.

Scientonomic History

Acceptance Record

Here is the complete acceptance record of this theory:
CommunityAccepted FromAcceptance IndicatorsStill AcceptedAccepted UntilRejection Indicators
Scientonomy1 January 2016The theory was introduced by Barseghyan in The Laws of Scientific Change pp. 12-20 and became de facto accepted by the community at that time together with the whole theory of scientific change.Yes

Question Answered

Scope of Scientonomy - Descriptive (Barseghyan-2015) is an attempt to answer the following question: Ought a scientonomic theory be descriptive or normative?

See Scope of Scientonomy - Descriptive and Normative for more details.

Description

There are at least three sorts of questions that we might ask about the process of scientific change; Historical questions having to do with what theories and methods were accepted by a particular community at a particular point in time, Theoretical questions about the mechanisms of scientific change, and methodological questions about how scientific change ought to happen and what theories and methods ought to be accepted. The first two questions are descriptive in nature, and the third is normative.

As the "science of science" scientonomy seeks a purely descriptive account of processes of change in the scientific mosaic and therefore encompasses only historical and theoretical questions. Keeping descriptive scientific questions distinct from questions of normative methodology avoids numerous pitfalls. For example, those who conflate the two sometimes argue that because some method is known to have flaws of logical consistency or soundness, it cannot possibly have been the one that was, in fact, used by scientists. However, there is a great deal historical evidence that scientists actually have used logically flawed methods. Inductive reasoning is a ubiquitous part of science, despite its well known flaws. The intrusion of normative concerns would also undermine scientonomy's aspirations to scientific status 1pp. 19-20. If any laws of scientific change discovered were accorded normative force they would become tautological truths incapable being called into question by empirical inquiry.

Reasons

No reasons are indicated for this theory.

If a reason supporting this theory is missing, please add it here.

Questions About This Theory

There are no higher-order questions concerning this theory.

If a question about this theory is missing, please add it here.

References

  1. a b  Barseghyan, Hakob. (2015) The Laws of Scientific Change. Springer.
  2. ^  Kuhn, Thomas. (1970) Reflections on My Critics. In Lakatos and Musgrave (Eds.) (1970), 231-278.