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Synchronism of Method Rejection theorem (Barseghyan-2015) (view source)
Revision as of 19:13, 24 February 2023
, 19:13, 24 February 2023no edit summary
|Formulated Year=2015
|Formulation File=Synchronism-of-method-rejection-box-only.jpg
|Description=The principle of this theorem is first introduced in [[Barseghyan (2015)]]. We recall that "there are two somewhat distinct scenarios of method employment. In the first scenario, a method becomes employed when it strictly follows from newly accepted theories. In the second scenario, a method becomes employed when it implements the abstract requirements of some other employed method by means of other accepted theories. It can be shown that method rejection is only possible in the first scenario; no method can be rejected in the second scenario. Namely, it can be shown that method rejection can only take place when some other method becomes employed by strictly following from a new accepted theory; the employment of a method that is not a result of the acceptance of a new theory and is merely a new implementation of some already employed method cannot possibly lead to a method rejection."[[CiteRef::Barseghyan(2015)|p. 174]]
As per Barseghyan, it is important to note that "two implementations of the same method are not mutually exclusive and the employment of one doesn’t lead to the rejection of the other".[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 176]] Barseghyan illustrates this nicely with the example of cell-counting methods (see below). Furthermore, he writes, "an employment of a new concrete method cannot possibly lead to a rejection of any other employed method. Indeed, if we take into account the fact that a new concrete method follows deductively from the conjunction of an abstract method and other accepted theories, it will become obvious that this new concrete method cannot possibly be incompatible with any other element of the mosaic. We know from the ''zeroth law'' that at any stage the elements of the mosaic are compatible with each other. Therefore, no logical consequence of the mosaic can possibly be incompatible with other elements of the mosaic. But the new method that implemented the abstract method is just one such logical consequence".[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 176-7]]
{{Theory Example
|Title=Transition from the blind trial method to the double-blind trial method
|Description=As Barseghyan notes, it can be tempting to say that the ''double blind trial method'' replaced ''the blind trial method''. But this is not a correct explication of the method dynamics at play. Barseghyan provides a correct more detailed explanation in this historical example that helps to explain the ''synchronism of what happened heremethod rejection theorem''. He begins:
<blockquote>To be sure, ''the blind trial method'' was replaced in the mosaic, but not by ''the double-blind trial method''. Rather, it was replaced by the abstract requirement that when assessing a drug’s efficacy one must take into account the possible experimenter’s bias. The employment of ''the double-blind trial method ''was due to the fact that it specified this abstract requirement. Its employment ''per se'' had nothing to do with the rejection of the blind trial method.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan(2015)|p. 178]]</blockquote>
He continues his explanation with a closer look at the ''blind trial method'':
<blockquote>Recall ''the blind trial method'' which required that a drug’s efficacy is to be shown in a trial with two groups of patients, where the active group is given the real pill, while the control group is given a placebo. Implicit in ''the blind trial method'' was a clause that it is ok if the researchers know which group is which. This clause was based on the tacit assumption that the researchers’ knowledge cannot affect the patients and, thus, cannot void the results of the trial. Although this assumption was hardly ever expressed, it is safe to say that it was taken for granted – we would allow the researchers to know which group of patients is which until we learned about the phenomenon of experimenter’s bias ... Once we learned about the possibility of experimenter’s bias, the blind trial method became instantly rejected. More precisely, the acceptance of the ''experimenter’s bias thesis'' immediately resulted in the abstract requirement that, when assessing a drug’s efficacy, one must take the possibility of the experimenter’s bias into account. Consequently, two elements of the mosaic became rejected: the blind trial method and the tacit assumption that the experimenters’ knowledge doesn’t affect the patients and cannot void the results of trials ...
Now, ''the experimenter’s bias thesis'' yielded the new abstract requirement to take into account the possible experimenter’s bias. This requirement, in turn, replaced the blind trial method with which it was incompatible (by the method rejection theorem).[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 178-80]] </blockquote>
Therefore, Barseghyan concludes, "the double-blind trial method had nothing to do with the rejection of the blind trial method. By the time the double-blind trial method became employed, the blind trial method had already been rejected. So even if we had never devised the double-blind trial method, the blind trial method would have been rejected all the same".[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 180]] In summary, "the rejection of the blind trial method took place synchronously with the rejection of the theory on which it was based".[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 180]] Hence, this is a historical example of the ''synchronism of method rejection theorem''.
|Example Type=Historical
}}
{{Theory Example
|Title=Aristotelian-Medieval experimentation
|Description="The belief that the nature of a thing cannot be properly studied if it is placed in artificial conditions," Barseghyan writes, was central in Aristotelian-Medieval thought thanks to the strict distinction between ''natural'' and artificial'' in the Aristotelian-Medieval mosaic.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 180-1]] Since it was understood that, "when placed in artificial conditions, a thing does not behave as it is prescribed by its very nature, but as designed by the craftsman", it was accepted in the Aristotelian-Medieval mosaic that "experiments can reveal nothing about the natures of things".[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 181]]
Barseghyan notes that a "requirement that follows from this belief is that an acceptable hypothesis that attempts to reveal the nature of a thing cannot rely on experimental data; the nature of a thing is to be discovered only by observing the thing in its natural, unaffected state any experiments could not constitute proper study or reveal true information about the nature of things".[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 181]] We may call this the ''no experiments'' limitation.
Perhaps obviously, the ''no experiments'' limitation came to be rejected. The dynamics of this rejection are important as a historical example of the ''synchronism of method rejection'' theorem. "Importantly," continues Barseghyan, "the rejection was synchronous with the rejection of the natural/artificial distinction".[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 182]] Particularly, he notes, the two theories that came to replace the Aristotelian natural philosophy – the Cartesian and Newtonian natural philosophies – both assumed that there is no strict distinction between artificial and natural, that is, "that all material objects obey the same set of laws, regardless of whether they are found in nature or whether they are created by a craftsman".[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 182]]
In abandoning the artificial/natural distinction, "we also realized that experiments can be as good a source of knowledge about the world as observations. Consequently, we had to modify our method, and accepted the new ''experimental method'': "When assessing a theory, it is acceptable to rely on the results of both observations and experiments".[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 182]] Since the ''experimental method'' was incompatible with the previous Aristotelian ''no-experiments method,'' that method, by the ''method rejection theorem,'' was rejected. The crux of this historical episode, as Barseghyan emphasizes, is that the Aristotelian "limitation was rejected simultaneously with the rejection of the natural/artificial distinction on which it was based – exactly as ''the synchronism of method rejection theorem'' stipulates".[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 182]]
|Example Type=Historical
}}
