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Mechanism of Theory Acceptance (view source)
Revision as of 20:57, 9 March 2017
, 20:57, 9 March 2017no edit summary
|Description=The question of theory acceptance is one of the central problems of theoretical [[Scientonomy|scientonomy]]. Any scientonomic theory should explain how theories become part of a mosaic. Initially, when philosophy had a static conception of science, this question did not exist. However, as science progressed, it soon became clear that science replaces its theories with theories that it considers superior, and it does this on a continuous basis. At this point, how science accepts theories became a central question for the philosophy of science. Answering this question is not trivial, because all of the obvious answers, such as verisimilitude and best fit to the data, all come with philosophical problems. The difficulty of solving the problem was compounded when it was realized that the methods by which theories are accepted changes over time.
One historical example of theory acceptance was when the acceptance of Copernican heliocentrism replaced , which involved the rejection of Aristotelian-Ptolemaic Astronomyastronomy. Another example was when the General Theory Einstein's general theory of Relativity relativity replaced the Classical Mechanics initially developed by Isaac [[Newton's|Issac Newton]] theory of universal gravitation.
|Parent Topic=Mechanism of Scientific Change
|Authors List=Hakob Barseghyan,
Initially, philosophy held a static conception of science. [[Immanuel Kant]] believed that the axioms of Newtonian Mechanics were a priori synthetic propositions. Philosophy believed in a static conception of science because no scientific revolution had been experienced since the advent of modern science. While Scientonomy recognizes the transition from the Aristotilian-Medieval method to the Newtonian world view as a scientific revolution, this was not the case historically.[[CiteRef::Kant (1781)]]
The scientific revolutions in the early twentieth century caused philosophers of science to wonder how science accepts its theories. In his [[Popper (1959)|''Logic of Scientific Discovery'']], [[Karl Popper]] argued that old theories are replaced by new theories when an old theory is falsified and a new theory is corroborated in a crucial experimentby experimental evidence. This occurs in a crucial when an experiment that successfully tests a bold conjecture made by the new theory.[[CiteRef::Popper (1959)]]
The importance of novel predictions in theory acceptance was also stressed by [[Imre Lakatos]]. He believed that theories are not necessarily falsified by bad false predictions. Rather, a theory's fate depends on its place centrality in the overall an overarching research program. The more central a theory is to its research program, the more effort will be extended towards saving it can be saved by modifying the research program's auxiliary hypotheses.
The next significant development occurred when [[Thomas Kuhn]] suggested in [[Kuhn_(1962)| ''The Structure of Scientific Revolutions'']] that theory changes are paradigm shifts. According to Kuhn, the world view of the entire scientific community changes in a paradigm shift. In his conception of theory change, the old and new theories are incommensurable.[[CiteRef::Kuhn (1962)]]
[[Paul Feyerabend]] argued in [[Feyerabend_(1975a)| ''Against Method'']] that the methods of theory acceptance change over time in science, and that these changes are largely arbitrary. [[Dudley Shapere]] agreed that scientific methods change over time. In [[Shapere_(1980)| ''The Character of Scientific Change'']], Shapere argued that the scientific methods used at the time are affected by the beliefs that the scientific community holds.[[CiteRef::Feyerabend (1975a)]][[CiteRef::Shapere (1980)]]
[[Larry Laudan]] agreed. In [[Laudan_(1984)| ''Science and Values'']], Laudan argues that the methods that scientific theories are accepted depend on the epistemic values that scientists hold. He recounted how knowledge of experimenters bias and the placebo effect led to the development of the double blind method in drug testing. Many of the Laudan's ideas promoted by Laudan are important precursors to Scientonomy.[[CiteRef::Laudan (1984)]][[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)]]
In contrast, the Sociologist Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (SSK) research program, including sociologists like [[Barry Barnes]] and [[David Bloor]] believe that scientists are motivated seek to explain science as a large extent sociological phenomenon and sometimes stress the role played by non-empirical social valuesin scientific change.
|History=Patton, Overgaard and Barseghyan have proposed a reformulation of the Second Law of Theory Acceptance. The reformulated Second Law allows for the possibility an inconclusive outcome to theory assessment. With an inconclusive outcome, theory acceptance, unacceptance or mosaic split are all possible. [[CiteRef::Patton, Overgaard, and Barseghyan (2017)]]
|Related Topics=Mechanism of Method Employment,
