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|Authors List=Hakob Barseghyan,
|Formulated Year=2015
|Prehistory=This question has been one of the central questions of the classic philosophy of science. It wouldn't be too much of an exaggeration to say , that no philosopher of science could bypass this issue.  Initially, philosophy held a static conception of science. [[Immanuel Kant]] believed that the axioms of Newtonian Mechanics mechanics were a priori synthetic propositions. Philosophy [[CiteRef::Kant (1781)]] Philosophers believed in a static conception of science because no scientific revolution had been experienced since the advent of modern science. While Scientonomy recognizes the transition from the AristotilianAristotelian-Medieval method to the Newtonian world view as a scientific revolution, this was not the case historically.[[CiteRef::Kant (1781)]]
The scientific revolutions in the early twentieth century caused philosophers of science to wonder how science accepts its theories. In his [[Popper (1959)|''Logic of Scientific Discovery'']], [[Karl Popper]] argued that old theories are replaced by new theories when an old theory is falsified and a new theory is corroborated in by experimental evidence. This occurs when an experiment successfully tests a bold conjecture made by the new theory.[[CiteRef::Popper (1959)]]
The importance A major development occurred when [[Thomas Kuhn]] presented his groundbreaking analysis of novel predictions scientific change in theory acceptance was also stressed by [[Imre LakatosKuhn_(1962)| ''The Structure of Scientific Revolutions'']]. He believed that theories According to Kuhn, periods of 'normal science' are not necessarily falsified interrupted by false predictions'scientific revolutions' that involve paradigm shifts. Rather, In a paradigm shift involves a theory's fate depends on its centrality fundamental change in an overarching research programworld view for the relevant scientific communities. The more central a In his conception of theory is to its research programchange, the more effort will be extended towards saving it by modifying the research programold and new theories are incommensurable.[[CiteRef::Kuhn (1962)]] While Kuhn's auxiliary hypothesesideas stirred much controversy, they were generally recognized as highly important.
The next significant development occurred when [[Thomas KuhnImre Lakatos]] suggested in [[Kuhn_(1962)| ''The Structure advocated a less cataclysmic view of scientific change, extending the earlier views of Scientific RevolutionsPopper. Refining Popper'']] s views, he believed that theory changes theories are paradigm shiftsnot necessarily falsified by failed predictions. According to KuhnRather, the world view of the entire scientific community changes a theory's fate depends on its centrality in an overarching research program. The more central a paradigm shift. In his conception of theory changeis to its research program, the old and new theories are incommensurablemore effort will be extended towards saving it by modifying the research program's auxiliary hypotheses.[[CiteRef::Kuhn Lakatos (19621978)]]
[[Paul Feyerabend]] argued in [[Feyerabend_(1975a)| ''Against Method'']] that the methods of theory acceptance change over time in science, and that these changes are largely arbitrary. [[Dudley Shapere]] agreed that scientific methods change over time. In [[Shapere_(1980)| ''The Character of Scientific Change'']], Shapere argued that the scientific methods used at the time are affected by the beliefs that the scientific community holds.[[CiteRef::Feyerabend (1975a)]][[CiteRef::Shapere (1980)]]
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