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Among the first philosophers of science to appreciate comparative appraisal was [[Karl Popper]]. Popper maintained that theories are tested by attempts to refute them. In his conception of theory appraisal, a proposed theory was judged against an accepted theory on the basis of a crucial falsifying experiment. In such an experiment, the predictions of the old and new theory contradict each other. As a result, one of the theories must be falsified in this experiment. The unfalsified theory will become the new accepted theory. [[CiteRef::Popper (1959)]]
[[Thomas Kuhn]][[CiteRef::Kuhn (1962)]] saw theories as forming interrelated groups united under the banner of what he called a '''paradigm'''. Paradigms were defined as "coherent traditions of scientific research" [[CiteRef::Kuhn (1962)| p. 10]]. Appraisal was thus contextual. Scientific development alternated between periods of normal science and scientific revolutions. In normal science, a theory or set the paradigm guides the explanation of interrelated theories contained within a paradigm are used to explain a widening range of phenomena. The accumulation of anomalies which resist explanation can result in a scientific revolution, in which one paradigm is replaced with another. Kuhn argued that paradigms were "incommensurable", and initially described the conversion from one to another in ways that made paradigm choice seem non-rational [[CiteRef::Kuhn (1962)| pp. 111-135]]. He later suggested that paradigm choice was comparative and involved reasoned judgment guided by epistemic values that had remained fixed over history [[CiteRef:: Kuhn (1974)]].
Like Kuhn, [[Imre Lakatos]] saw theories as grouped into interrelated sets called '''research programs''' and saw their assessment as contextual. [[CiteRef:: Lakatos (1978)|pp. 47-67]] The theories comprising a research program were not accorded equal status. Its ''hard core'' consisted of the central tenets of the research program, and its ''protective belt'' of subsidiary theories or assumptions. Theories constituting the protective belt were modified or replaced as needed to account for new experimental findings with the goal of protecting the hard core of from falsification. He recognized that theories always face "an ocean of anomalies"
