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|Prehistory=Concepts predating the current appreciation of contextual appraisal include epistemological concerns about the absolute appraisal of individual theories based on their available data. Early rationalist and empiricist philosophers believed in what has been called the justificationist interpretation of absolute appraisal, which states that there can be decisive proofs and refutations of individual theories. [[CiteRef:: Laudan (1970)]]

Later, probabilist interpretations were proposed stating that one cannot decisively prove a theory, but merely objectively measure its probability relative to the available evidence. This probabilistic tradition has been common amongst philosophers of science at Cambridge, and by the logical positivist tradition in Vienna. [[Laudan]] has a good discussion on probabilism in theory appraisal. [[CiteRef::Laudan (1968a)]] Both interpretations of absolute appraisal share the opinion that theory assessment concerns an individual theory taken in isolation from other theories. For instance, the logical positivists believed that scientific theories were created by constructing logical structures for empirical data.

In contrast, the comparative interpretation contends that theory assessment does not concern individual theories considered in isolation. The shift towards the comparative interpretations of theory appraisal began with the acceptance of fallibilism in epistemology. Fallibilism is the idea that no empirical belief can ever be rationally supported or justified in a conclusive way. Determining which theory is the best available requires that extant competitors be appraised by their relative merit through a comparative appraisal process. [[CiteRef::Laudan (Note1981)| pp. 111-140]] [[CiteRef: FIRST THREE PARAGRAPHS NEED CITATION OF REFERENCES:Laudan (1996)| pp. 211-215]] [[CiteRef::Lakatos (1970)| pp. 10-12]]