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Like Kuhn, [[Imre Lakatos]] saw theories as grouped into interrelated sets called '''research programs''' and saw their assessment as contextual.[[CiteRef::Lakatos (1970)|pp. 47-67]] The theories comprising a research program were not accorded equal status. Its ''hard core'' consisted of the central tenets of the research program, and its ''protective belt'' of subsidiary theories or assumptions. Theories constituting the protective belt were modified or replaced as needed to account for new experimental findings with the goal of protecting the hard core of from falsification. He recognized that theories always face "an ocean of anomalies" but saw this as only becoming significant when a new rival theory makes a successful novel prediction.[[CiteRef::Lakatos (1971a)|pp. 111, 126-128]]
The later [[Larry Laudan]] agreed with the concept of comparative appraisal.[[CiteRef::Laudan (19841984a)]] In his '''reticulated model''' of science, theory choice is determined by the methods employed at the time. The methods in turn are shaped by the accepted theories. Laudan's reticulated model is an important precursor to modern scientonomy.
However, the traditional comparative procedure of theory appraisal only accounts for two competing theories, some method of assessment, and some relative evidence. What the traditional version of comparativism does not take into account is that all theory assessment takes place within a specific historical context.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 186-196]]

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