Changes

As in the later works of Larry Laudan [[CiteRef::Laudan (1984a)]], the TSC rejects the idea of a fixed universal scientific method, and accepts the idea that the methods of science have changed over time. This rejection is based on clear evidence from the history of science that the methods of science have, in fact, changed.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|ppp. 3-21]] In contrast to most earlier views of the process of scientific change, TSC draws a clear distinction between methods, which are the implicit standards actually used in theory assessment, and the normative epistemic methodologies espoused by scientists or philosophers of science. The TSC takes normative methodological prescriptions to be outside its scope. It seeks a purely descriptive account of the methods employed by scientists to assess theories.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|ppp. 12-21]] Following the resolution of logical problems by Sebastien [[CiteRef::Sebastien (2016)]], it also views the descriptive study of scientific methodologies, and their relationship to employed methods, as within its scope. The TSC rejects Kuhn[[CiteRef::Kuhn (1977a)]] and Laudan's[[CiteRef::Laudan (1984a)]] distinction between values and methods, asserting that values can more parsimoniously be included within the category of methods. Thus, the value of predictive accuracy is instead seen as the method 'accept theories that are predictively accurate'.

The TSC draws a distinction between the process of scientific theory construction, in which new theories are generated or constructed, and that of theory appraisal, in which theories are evaluated by a scientific community. It seeks a descriptive account of the process of theory appraisal, but does not view the process of theory construction as a necessary part of its scope.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|ppp. 21-30]] Unlike past usage, the TSC seeks a clear technical vocabulary to categorize the stances that a scientific community can take towards a theory. It proposes three categories: acceptance, use, and pursuit. A theory is said to be ''accepted'' if it is taken to be the best available description of its object. A theory is said to be ''used'' if it is taken to be an adequate tool for practical application, and to be ''pursued'' if it is considered worthy of further development.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|ppp. 30-42]]

Rather than individual scientists, the TSC focuses primarily on the behavior of [[Scientific Community|scientific communities]]. A scientific community consists of individual scientists and their interactions with one another. Past research in the history of science has often focused on prominent individual scientists. The beliefs and decisions of individual scientists are diverse and the relationship between their behavior and that of a scientific community is by no means obvious. Scientific change takes place at the level of the community, when a community as a whole decides to accept a new theory, or employ a new method. This is the reason why the TSC focuses at this level.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|ppp. 43-52]] It seeks distinctive historical research methods, such as the analysis of textbooks and encyclopedias, as indicators of the accepted beliefs of a scientific community.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|ppp. 113-120]]

The TSC seeks to account for the process of scientific change during all historical time periods within which a corpus of accepted scientific beliefs existed. It seeks to account for this entire corpus of beliefs. The TSC defines "science" broadly. For example, during the medieval and early modern period, propositions about the natural world and about theological matters were considered part of the same system of beliefs. For those time periods, the TSC takes theological beliefs to be within its purview.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|ppp. 3-21]]