171
edits
Changes
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
m
Ontology of Scientific Change (view source)
Revision as of 21:29, 10 March 2018
, 21:29, 10 March 2018no edit summary
|Authors List=Hakob Barseghyan,
|Formulated Year=2015
|Prehistory=At the level of ontology, the philosophy of science begins noteworthy progress with the logical positivists. While the positivists individually had varying views, we can summarize their ontology by generalizing from any existing overlap between authors. The logical positivist ontology consisted of a scientific community which stipulated theories and determined whether those theories were worthy of pursuit based on their empirical probability. A theory’s given empirical probability is determined by observational proof in favor of it. The positivists did not recognize a multitude of methods and so the only epistemic elements in their ontology were theories (it should be noted that given the singular nature of methods it was assumed all science would adhere to one perfect method). Furthermore, the logical positivists did not share the belief that theories can be outright rejected. Instead, they believed theories are simply pursued on a basis of instances of confirmation.[[CiteRef::Schlick (1931)|pp.140-165]]
Proceeding the positivists, Karl Popper proposed his ontology of scientific change in his book Conjectures and Refutations. This ontology included the same entities and agents as the logical positivists. However, Popper introduced the notion of acceptance as an epistemic stance by suggesting the rejection of theories which faced any refutation.[[CiteRef::Popper (1963)|pp. 62-63]] The contrast of terms suggested scientists could do more than simply pursue theories.
More drastically, Thomas Kuhn instantiated multiple changes to the existing epistemic elements with his model of scientific change. Kuhn’s Scientific Revolutions suggested that there was now a second epistemic element beyond theories – methods – which could be modified and were dynamic in nature.[[CiteRef::Kuhn (1962a)|pp. 66-80]] Unlike his predecessors, Kuhn’s ontology did not share the same relations between epistemic agents and epistemic elements; while previously theories and methods were entirely under the control of the scientific community, under Kuhn’s view, the elements change arbitrarily when an overflow of anomalies occurs.[[CiteRef::Kuhn (1962a)|pp. 35-50]]
Shifting backwards, Imre Lakatos generated a holistic account of scientific change slightly regressive to previous ontologies. Lakatos kept Kuhn’s view of the fluidity of paradigms within scientific communities however, with two small modifications. Firstly, Lakatos saw paradigms as research programmes, of which many simultaneously existed, and secondly Lakatos believed they followed a more rational model of change, i.e. modifications were judged as regressive or progressive based on certain conditions.[[CiteRef::Lakatos (1970)|pp. 31-34]] With regards to regression, Paul Feyerabend criticized Lakatos for once again suggesting that theories can only be pursued. The whole system Lakatos built was a high functioning competition between research programmes.[[CiteRef::Feyerabend (1970a)]] As such, per Lakatos, theories could never really be accepted, and thus they carried the potential to threaten science with a potentially infinite number of theories all of which are rational to pursue.
Finally, Larry Laudan paints the closest picture to the ontology scientonomy posits today. Laudan recognized values, theories, and methodologies as epistemic elements with relations to scientists as epistemic agents. Theories could be accepted under his view and methodologies could be employed. Each epistemic element under Laudan’s reticulated model could be modified. Laudan did not recognize the potential of theories to be used but not accepted but he did recognize pursued and accepted theories in contrast to Lakatos and the logical positivists.
|History=In [[Hakob Barseghyan|Barseghyan]]'s [[Barseghyan (2015)|''The Laws of Scientific Change'']], the question of the ontology of scientific change is discussed without being explicitly formulated. While the question has been accepted and discussed at length by [[Community:Scientonomy|the scientonomy community]] ever since its inception, it wasn't until the early 2017 when the question was openly formulated and documented.
