editor, Administrators
2,020
edits
Changes
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
no edit summary
|Authors List=Hakob Barseghyan,
|Formulated Year=2015
|Prehistory=The simplest sort of epistemic stance one might take towards a theory is to regard it as either ''true'' or ''false''. NEED TO DISCUSS EMERGENCE OF FALIBILISM HERE TO EXPLAIN WHY OTHER STANCES WERE NEEDED. In the early twentieth century, many [[Rudolf Carnap|logical positivists]] supported a confirmationist view of theory assessment, in which theories are assessed on the basis of the balance of confirming and disconfirming evidence. In 1945, [[Carl Hempel]], a logical empiricist and confirmationist, argued that an agent might take three stances towards a theory, ''accepting'' it, ''rejecting'' it, or ''withholding judgment'', based on confirming or disconfirming evidence. [[CiteRef::Losee (2001)|p. 167-168]][[CiteRef::Hempel (1945)]]
In his ''Logic of Scientific Discovery'' (1959), [[CiteRef::Popper (1959)]] [[Karl Popper]] argued for a falsificationist view of science. Scientific ideas gained ''acceptance'' when they had survived strong tests in which their unexpected novel predictions were verified, and where ''rejected'' when they failed to survive such tests. [[CiteRef::Thornton (2015)]][[CiteRef::Godfrey-Smith (2003)|p. 57-74]]
