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In his ''Logic of Scientific Discovery'' (1959), [[CiteRef::Popper (1959)]] [[Karl Popper]] argued for a falsificationist view of science. Scientific ideas gained ''acceptance'' when they had survived strong tests in which their unexpected novel predictions were verified, and where ''rejected'' when they failed to survive such tests. [[CiteRef::Thornton (2015)]][[CiteRef::Godfrey-Smith (2003)|p. 57-74]]
[[Thomas Kuhn]]'s ''Structure of Scientific Revolutions'' (1963) used a number of equally vague terms to refer to stances a community might take towards a theory, including ''universally received'', ''embraced'', ''acknowledged'', and ''committed to''. [[CiteRef::Kuhn (1962)|pp. 10-13]]
In [[Imre Lakatos]]'s theory of scientific change [[CiteRef::Lakatos (1970)]] Individual theories were encompassed in larger assemblages called research programs. A research program consists of a family of scientific theories either sharing a containing 'hard core of empirical content' assumptions, or surrounded by a close association with having such contentprotective belt of associated auxiliary assumptions. Lakatos identified two three epistemic stances with respect to research programs. A research program was ''progressive''if its theories successfully predicted hitherto unexpected facts. [[CiteRef::Lakatos (1978)]], otherwise it was ''degenerating''.
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