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Necessary Method theorem (Barseghyan-2015) (view source)
Revision as of 19:14, 23 November 2023
, 19:14, 23 November 2023no edit summary
|Formulation File=Necessary-method-theorem-box-only.jpg
|Description=According to the [[Non-Empty Mosaic theorem (Barseghyan-2015)|non-empty mosaic theorem]], there must be at least one element present in a mosaic. The Necessary Method theorem specifies that this element must be a method. That is, "one method is a must for the whole enterprise of scientific change to take off the ground".[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 228]]
What would this method be? As per Barseghyan (2015):
<blockquote> This necessary method cannot be [[Substantive Method|substantive]]. Since a substantive method is necessarily based on at least one contingent proposition, it is not a necessary element of any mosaic. Indeed, any substantive method can become employed after the acceptance of those contingent propositions on which it is based. Of course, in some mosaics, substantive methods can also be present from the outset. Moreover, it is quite likely that even the earliest of mosaics tacitly contained some primitive substantive methods (e.g. “trust your senses”, or “trust the chieftain”). Yet, the key theoretical point is that no substantive method is necessarily part of any mosaic, for a substantive method can become employed after the acceptance of the theories on which it is based.
|Resource=Barseghyan (2015)
|Prehistory=Insofar as necessary methods go, the philosophy of science was initially not very concerned with this subject. Philosophers like the logical positivists, [[Karl Popper]], and all those up until [[Thomas Kuhn]] held the general tacit belief that there was a singular method of science and that all scientific communities would abide by it. This method was inherently necessary because science was exclusively a function of it; to believe otherwise would imply irrationality in science. For example, with Popper, theories were accepted on a basis of falsification and corroborated content.[[CiteRef::Popper (1963)]] During this time, anything accepted without a method of acceptance was simply unscientific.
Similarly, if we have a community φ which experiences a change of expectations (i.e. a change of method), it is deductively true that φ already had a set of expectations which could be referred to as a method.
|Example Type=Hypothetical
}}
{{Theory Example
|Title=A necessary method cannot be substantive: Testability
|Description=The requirement of 'testability', according to which a scientific theory must be empirically testable, is often portrayed as "one of the prerequisites of science" though it is by no means a necessary element in any mosaic. Barseghyan (2015) develops the case study as follows:
<blockquote>The explanation is simple: the requirement of testability is ''substantive'' and, therefore, we can easily conceive of a mosaic where it is not present. It is substantive for it is based, among other things, on such a non-trivial assumption as “observations and experiments are a trustworthy source of knowledge about the world”. Thus, the requirement is not a necessarily a part of any mosaic; it can become employed after the acceptance of the assumptions on which it is based. The historical record confirms this conclusion.
It is well known that testability hasn’t always been among the implicit requirements of the scientific community. For example, it played virtually no role in the Aristotelian-medieval mosaic.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan(2015)|p. 139]] The same holds for any substantive method. For instance, the oft-cited requirement of repeatability of experiments is evidently part of our current mosaic, but not of every possible mosaic. Similarly, the requirement to avoid supernatural explanations is implicit in our contemporary mosaic, but it is not a necessary part of any mosaic.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan(2015)|p. 229]]</blockquote>
|Example Type=Hybrid
}}
{{Acceptance Record
