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Necessary Method theorem (Barseghyan-2015) (view source)
Revision as of 19:33, 23 November 2023
, 19:33, 23 November 2023no edit summary
What would this method be? As per Barseghyan (2015):
<blockquote> This necessary method cannot be [[Substantive Method|substantive]]. Since a substantive method is necessarily based on at least one contingent proposition, it is not a necessary element of any mosaic. Indeed, any substantive method can become employed after the acceptance of those contingent propositions on which it is based. Of course, in some mosaics, substantive methods can also be present from the outset. Moreover, it is quite likely that even the earliest of mosaics tacitly contained some primitive substantive methods (e.g. “trust your senses”, or “trust the chieftain”). Yet, the key theoretical point is that no substantive method is necessarily part of any mosaic, for a substantive method can become employed after the acceptance of the theories on which it is based.
Therefore, the necessary method is not substantive, but [[Procedural Method|procedural]], i.e. it doesn’t presuppose any contingent propositions. But it is a procedural method of a very special kind in that it cannot presuppose any propositions whatsoever: "the method that is necessarily present in any mosaic is not based on any propositions".[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 230]]
<blockquote> In other words, it must be the most abstract of all methods. Any concrete method is an implementation of a more abstract method. Any concrete method is a logical consequence of the conjunction of some accepted theories and that abstract method (by the third law). Thus, a concrete method can become employed after the acceptance of the propositions on which it is based. Therefore, what we are looking for is the most abstract of all possible requirements.
We have come across that requirement on many occasions: the most abstract requirement ''to accept only the best available theories''. This basic requirement is the most abstract of all, for it does not presuppose any other methods or theories. It is not surprising given that this abstract method is only a restatement of the definition of [[Theory Acceptance|acceptance]]: this abstract method basically says that a theory is acceptable when it is the best available description of its object. But since this abstract requirement isn’t based on any theories, it cannot become accepted; it must be built into any mosaic from the outset.
As vague and unrestricting as this method is, it nevertheless performs two very important functions. First, it indicates the main goal of the whole scientific enterprise – the acquisition of best available descriptions. Second, being a link between accepted theories and more concrete methods, it allows us to modify our methods as we learn new things about the world, i.e. it allows for concrete methods to become employed as we accept new theories. In short, it is this abstract requirement that makes the process of scientific change possible.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 230-231]]<blockquote>
|Resource=Barseghyan (2015)
|Prehistory=Insofar as necessary methods go, the philosophy of science was initially not very concerned with this subject. Philosophers like the logical positivists, [[Karl Popper]], and all those up until [[Thomas Kuhn]] held the general tacit belief that there was a singular method of science and that all scientific communities would abide by it. This method was inherently necessary because science was exclusively a function of it; to believe otherwise would imply irrationality in science. For example, with Popper, theories were accepted on a basis of falsification and corroborated content.[[CiteRef::Popper (1963)]] During this time, anything accepted without a method of acceptance was simply unscientific.
It is well known that testability hasn’t always been among the implicit requirements of the scientific community. For example, it played virtually no role in the Aristotelian-medieval mosaic.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan(2015)|p. 139]] The same holds for any substantive method. For instance, the oft-cited requirement of repeatability of experiments is evidently part of our current mosaic, but not of every possible mosaic. Similarly, the requirement to avoid supernatural explanations is implicit in our contemporary mosaic, but it is not a necessary part of any mosaic.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan(2015)|p. 229]]</blockquote>
|Example Type=Hybrid
}}
{{Theory Example
|Title=Procedural methods that presuppose propositions are not necessary methods
|Description=To show why a necessary method must ''not'' presuppose any necessary propositions, we will consider a procedural method that does presuppose some necessary propositions:
<blockquote>Let it be the prescription that “if a proposition is deductively inferred from other accepted propositions, it must also be accepted”. As we know, this abstract method of deductive acceptance is procedural, as it is based on the definition of deductive logical inference.420 Now, it is obvious that this procedural method can become employed after the acceptance of the proposition on which it is based. Therefore, this procedural method is not necessarily part of any possible mosaic. The same applies to any procedural method that presupposes at least one necessary proposition. Such methods aren’t necessarily present in any mosaic, for they can be employed after the acceptance of the necessary propositions on which they are based.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 229-230]]</blockquote>
{{PrintDiagramFile|diagram file=Procedural_Methods_Can_Presuppose_Necessary_Propositions.png}}
|Example Type=Historical
}}
{{Acceptance Record
