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3. Duhem on Metaphysics
Unlike his predecessor, Duhem believed metaphysics was a real form of knowledge, and in fact, surpasses physics in excellence in terms of providing understanding of things in a much deeper and intimate sense. <ref name= "Thermodynamics" /> Duhem believed that in order to understand the external world to the best of our abilities, two things needed to be done.
1. First is to study the world of phenomena and find the laws that govern them.
2. Scientists must induce from the phenomena, the properties of the substances that cause them. The second part is called metaphysics.
Similarly, laws of physical theory add nothing to the content of the laws, only providing jumping points for metaphysical investigation. Physical theories do not exert influence on the progress of metaphysical research except for these points.
In short, metaphysical and physical theories are independent.
<ref name= "Thermodynamics" />
|Criticism=There were many criticism for the Duhem-Quine thesis and the Duhem thesis in general. Grünbaum believed there was no general argument to prove the existence of at least one other theory for any theory containing evidence.The main criticism was voiced by Larry Lauden in ''Demystifying Underdeterminism''. The idea was also repeated in the identical rivals objection.
The main argument is that in all the cases where there are seemingly endless theories that explain one theory and it's observations, (essentially in all instances of Quine's nonuniqueness thesis), the theories are actually the same but just formulated differently. <ref = "Demystifying Underdeterminism"> Laudan, Larry. 1990. Demystifying Underdetermination. In Scientific Theories, ed. C. Wade Savage, 267-297. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Reprinted in Philosophy of Science. The Central Issues, ed. M. Curd and J. A. Cover, 320-353. New York: Norton,1998 </ref>
