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The main argument is that in all the cases where there are seemingly endless theories that explain one theory and it's observations, (essentially in all instances of Quine's non-uniqueness thesis), the theories are actually the same but just formulated differently. [[CiteRef::Laudan (1990)]] John Norton, who works in the Center for Philosophy of Science and Department of History and Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh, summarized this by saying "β€œThe very fact that observational equivalence can be demonstrated by arguments brief enough to be included in a journal article means that we cannot preclude the possibility that the theories are merely variant formulations of the same theory.” [[CiteRef::Norton (2008)]]
John Norton also gave his own argument known as the Gap Argument. This argument stated that to date, there is no evidence that can determine the content of a scientific theory. However since there is universal agreement on the content of scientific theories, then there is a gap where some agreements cannot be explained by evidence. This seems to undermine the under determination thesis [[CiteRef::Samir Okasha,Henk W. de Regt, Stephan and Hartmann, (Eds.) (2009)]]
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