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| + | #REDIRECT [[Subtypes of Epistemic Element]] |
| − | |Question=What are the fundamental ''epistemic elements'' that undergo scientific change?
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| − | |Topic Type=Descriptive
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| − | |Description=In principle, the process of scientific change can concern many different types of entities. One important question is to establish the most fundamental units that undergo scientific change. Over the years, it has been argued that the fundamental units of scientific change include theories ([[Karl Popper|Popper]]), paradigms ([[Thomas Kuhn|Kuhn]]), research programmes ([[Imre Lakatos|Lakatos]]), research traditions (early [[Larry Laudan|Laudan]]), methods ([[Thomas Kuhn|Kuhn]], [[Dudley Shapere|Shapere]], later [[Larry Laudan|Laudan]]), and values ([[Thomas Kuhn|Kuhn]], later [[Larry Laudan|Laudan]]). This is not surprising, as any theory of scientific change needs to establish a basic ontology of scientific change.
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| − | |Parent Topic=Ontology of Scientific Change
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| − | |Authors List=Hakob Barseghyan,
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| − | |Formulated Year=2015
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| − | |Prehistory=[[Karl Popper]]’s theory of scientific change took theories to be the units of scientific change. According to Popper, theories become accepted in accordance to the quantity of empirical content they present, and based on how many confirmed novel predictions they make.[[CiteRef::Popper (1959)]]
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| − | [[Thomas Kuhn]]'s theory of scientific change identified the ontological units of scientific change as frameworks which he referred to as ''paradigms'', which can be defined as a characteristic set of beliefs and preconceptions held by a scientific community including instrumental, theoretical, and metaphysical commitments all together.[[CiteRef::Kuhn (1962a)]][[CiteRef::Kuhn (1977a)|pp. 293-319]] Kuhn himself confessed that he had confusingly used the term in several different senses.[[CiteRef::Kuhn (1977a)|pp. 293-294]] In an attempt to clarify matters he sought to replace his broadest definition of the paradigm, given above, with the concept of ''disciplinary matrices'', defined as those shared elements that account for the relatively unproblematic professional communication and relative unanimity of professional judgment within a scientific community.[[CiteRef::Kuhn (1977a)|p. 297]] For Kuhn, then, a theory of scientific change ought to deal with disciplinary matrices and their changes over time.
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| − | In [[Imre Lakatos]]’ theory of scientific change, the ontological elements were individual scientific theories and his so-called scientific research programmes[[CiteRef::Lakatos (1970)]] which were reducible to distinct families of scientific theories. For Lakatos, a scientific research programme consisted of all theories which shared a common hard core of empirical content and a peripheral protective belt of potentially distinct empirical content such that a small change in the protective belt would not impact the ontology of the theory. The hard core of empirical content constituted that which links together all theories in the research programme as subscribing to the same physical ontology. Within this framework, the units of scientific change are piecemeal changes in the peripheral elements of research programmes, and the rejection of these programmes themselves.
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| − | [[Larry Laudan]] also proposed a theory of scientific change, namely his reticulated model[[CiteRef::Laudan (1984a)]]l, wherein there are scientific theories, scientific methods, and scientific values, all interdependent. In this model, the epistemic elements are theories, methods, and values, and this model posits that the values of the community are reflected in the methods, and the methods determine which theories become accepted. However, he also notes that the accepted theories influence which methods the community will employ, and can equally change the values of the community. In this respect, the reticulated model is a fully dynamic, covariant theory of scientific change wherein all epistemic elements influence one another. This was notably one of the first attempts at a theory of scientific change that included a dynamic method and acknowledged that such a dynamic method could itself be influenced by the theories that become accepted under it.
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| − | |History=Initially, the ontology of scientific change was posited in the ''Metatheory'' of ''[[Barseghyan (2015)|the LSC]]'' through the ''[[:Category:Definitional Topic|definition]]'' of [[Scientific Mosaic|scientific mosaic]] as a set of all accepted theories and employed methods.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 5]] Towards the end of 2016, it gradually became clear that the ontology of a field cannot and should not be postulated via definitions. What constitutes the elements of a certain ontology must be established by empirical research and, thus, is not a matter of definitions. In other words, the question of what constitutes the ontology of a certain field is a ''[[:Category:Descriptive Topic|descriptive question]]'', not definitional. Indeed, what sort of elements change during the process of scientific change is not something that should be decided by a definition, but should be formulated as a descriptive theory that says "Such-and-such elements undergo scientific change".
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| − | |Related Topics=Mechanism of Scientific Change,
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| − | |Page Status=Editor Approved
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| − | {{Acceptance Record
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| − | |Community=Community:Scientonomy
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| − | |Accepted From Era=CE
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| − | |Accepted From Year=2016
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| − | |Accepted From Month=January
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| − | |Accepted From Day=1
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| − | |Accepted From Approximate=No
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| − | |Acceptance Indicators=The question was tacitly accepted even before its explicit formulation in 2017. Thus, it has the same acceptance date as the rest of the original TSC.
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| − | |Still Accepted=Yes
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| − | |Accepted Until Approximate=No
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| − | }}
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