Difference between revisions of "Epistemic Stances"

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#REDIRECT: [[Epistemic Stances Towards Epistemic Elements]]
|Question=What are the ''epistemic stances'' that can be taken by epistemic agents towards different epistemic elements?
 
|Topic Type=Descriptive
 
|Description=Epistemic agents can take different epistemic stances towards different elements. The types of stances that can be in principle taken towards a theory may or may not be the same as the types of stances that can be taken towards methods of theory evaluation. Thus, it must be clarified which types of stances (e.g. ''acceptance'', ''use'', ''pursuit'', ''employment'') can be taken towards epistemic elements of any given type (e.g. ''theories'', ''methods'').
 
|Parent Topic=Ontology of Scientific Change
 
|Authors List=Hakob Barseghyan,
 
|Formulated Year=2015
 
|Prehistory=In the early twentieth century, many [[Rudolf Carnap|logical positivists]] supported a confirmationist view of theory assessment, in which theories are assessed on the basis of the balance of confirming and disconfirming evidence. In 1945, [[Carl Hempel]], a logical empiricist and confirmationist, argued that an agent might take three stances towards a theory, ''accepting'' it, ''rejecting'' it, or ''withholding judgment'', based on confirming or disconfirming evidence. [[CiteRef::Losee (2001)|p. 167-168]][[CiteRef::Hempel (1945)]]
 
 
 
In his ''Logic of Scientific Discovery'' (1959), [[CiteRef::Popper (1959)]] [[Karl Popper]] argued for a falsificationist view of science. Scientific ideas gained ''acceptance'' when they had survived strong tests in which their unexpected novel predictions were verified, and where ''rejected'' when they failed to survive such tests. [[CiteRef::Thornton (2015)]][[CiteRef::Godfrey-Smith (2003)|p. 57-74]]
 
 
 
[[Thomas Kuhn]]'s ''Structure of Scientific Revolutions'' (1963) used a number of equally vague terms to refer to stances a community might take towards a theory, including ''universally received'', ''embraced'', ''acknowledged'', and ''committed to''. [[CiteRef::Kuhn (1962)|pp. 10-13]]
 
 
 
In [[Imre Lakatos]]'s theory of scientific change individual theories were encompassed in larger assemblages called research programs.  A research program consists of a family of scientific theories containing 'hard core' assumptions, which are stubbornly defended, surrounded by a protective belt of associated auxiliary assumptions, which may be modified if needed to protect the hard core. Lakatos identified two epistemic stances with respect to research programs.  They were either ''progressive'' or ''degenerating''. A research program was ''progressive'' if its theories successfully predicted hitherto unexpected facts.It was degenerating if it failed to make such predictions, and if its theories were fabricated in order to accommodate already known facts. [[CiteRef::Lakatos (1978)]]
 
 
 
[[Larry Laudan]]'s reticulated model of scientific change involved scientific theories, scientific methods, and scientific values, all interdependent. Methods could change along with theories, and thus epistemic agents could take stances with respect to them both. Laudan distinguished between the ''pursuit'' and ''acceptance'' of theories. To accept a theory, for Laudan, is to believe in its truth, and to pursue it is to work with it or explore it without committing to a belief that it is true. A theory may also be ''rejected'' as false. [[CiteRef::Godfrey-Smith (2003)]][[CiteRef::Laudan (1997)|pp. 108-114]]
 
|Page Status=Stub
 
}}
 
{{Acceptance Record
 
|Community=Community:Scientonomy
 
|Accepted From Era=CE
 
|Accepted From Year=2016
 
|Accepted From Month=January
 
|Accepted From Day=1
 
|Accepted From Approximate=No
 
|Acceptance Indicators=While, in this general form, the question wasn't clearly stated in [[Barseghyan (2015)|''The Laws of Scientific Change'']], it was implicit in a more specific question of [[Epistemic Stances Towards Theories]].
 
|Still Accepted=Yes
 
|Accepted Until Approximate=No
 
}}
 

Latest revision as of 18:56, 23 January 2023

References

  1. ^  Losee, John. (2001) A Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Science. Oxford University Press.
  2. ^  Hempel, Carl. (1945) Studies in the Logic of Confirmation. Mind 54 (213), 1-26.
  3. ^  Popper, Karl. (1959) The Logic of Scientific Discovery. Hutchinson & Co.
  4. ^ Thornton (2015) 
  5. ^  Godfrey-Smith, Peter. (2003) Theory and Reality. University of Chicago Press.
  6. ^  Lakatos, Imre. (1970) Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes. In Lakatos (1978a), 8-101.
  7. ^  Fraser, Patrick and Sarwar, Ameer. (2018) A Compatibility Law and the Classification of Theory Change. Scientonomy 2, 67-82. Retrieved from https://scientojournal.com/index.php/scientonomy/article/view/31278.