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Later, probabilist interpretations were proposed stating that one cannot decisively prove a theory, but merely objectively measure its probability relative to the available evidence. This probabilistic tradition has been common amongst philosophers of science at Cambridge, and by the logical positivist tradition in Vienna. [[Larry Laudan|Laudan]] has a good discussion on probabilism in theory appraisal.[[CiteRef::Laudan (1968a)]] Both interpretations of absolute appraisal share the opinion that theory assessment concerns an individual theory taken in isolation from other theories. For instance, the logical positivists believed that scientific theories were created by constructing logical structures for empirical data.
In contrast, the comparative interpretation contends that theory assessment does not concern individual theories considered in isolation. The shift towards the comparative interpretations of theory appraisal began with the acceptance of fallibilism in epistemology. Fallibilism is the idea that no empirical belief can ever be rationally supported or justified in a conclusive way. Determining which theory is the best available requires that extant competitors be appraised by their relative merit through a comparative appraisal process.[[CiteRef::Laudan (1981)| pp. 111-140]][[CiteRef::Laudan (1996)|pp. 211-215]][[CiteRef::Lakatos (1970)|pp. 10-12]]
Among the first philosophers of science to appreciate comparative appraisal was [[Karl Popper]]. Popper maintained that theories are tested by attempts to refute them. In his conception of theory appraisal, a proposed theory was judged against an accepted theory on the basis of a crucial falsifying experiment. In such an experiment, the predictions of the old and new theory contradict each other. As a result, one of the theories must be falsified in this experiment. The unfalsified theory will become the new accepted theory.[[CiteRef::Popper (1959)]]

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