Difference between revisions of "Scope of Scientonomy - Appraisal (Barseghyan-2015)"
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|Description=The goal of [[scientonomy]] is to give a descriptive account of the process of [[Scientific Change|scientific change]]. Given this goal, it is obvious that it must describe and explain how changes in the [[Scientific Mosaic|mosaic]] of accepted scientific [[Theory|theories]] and employed [[Method|methods]] take place. Any actual instance of scientific change is the result of an appraisal. Therefore, a theory of scientific change must provide an account of how theories are actually appraised and thereby explain how changes in the mosaic occur. It is not, on the other hand, required to account for the process of theory construction. Scientific creativity and theory construction have typically been regarded as questions of psychology and sociology. [[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 29]] | |Description=The goal of [[scientonomy]] is to give a descriptive account of the process of [[Scientific Change|scientific change]]. Given this goal, it is obvious that it must describe and explain how changes in the [[Scientific Mosaic|mosaic]] of accepted scientific [[Theory|theories]] and employed [[Method|methods]] take place. Any actual instance of scientific change is the result of an appraisal. Therefore, a theory of scientific change must provide an account of how theories are actually appraised and thereby explain how changes in the mosaic occur. It is not, on the other hand, required to account for the process of theory construction. Scientific creativity and theory construction have typically been regarded as questions of psychology and sociology. [[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 29]] | ||
|Resource=Barseghyan (2015) | |Resource=Barseghyan (2015) | ||
| − | |Prehistory=[[Hans Reichenbach]] is commonly considered to have been the first to draw the distinction between the context of discovery, which is a historical and creative process having to do with the construction of the theory, and the context of justification, which is the supposedly distinct logical enterprise of the defense and appraisal of a theory. [[CiteRef::Laudan (1980)]] However the distinction was implicit in works of scientific methodology since the nineteenth century, and has been traced by Popper back to Kant. [[CiteRef::Popper (1959)]] | + | |Prehistory=[[Hans Reichenbach]] is commonly considered to have been the first to draw the distinction between the context of discovery, which is a historical and creative process having to do with the construction of the theory, and the context of justification, which is the supposedly distinct logical enterprise of the defense and appraisal of a theory. [[CiteRef::Laudan (1980)]] However the distinction was implicit in works of scientific methodology since the nineteenth century, and has been traced by Popper back to Kant. [[CiteRef::Popper (1959)]] The idea that the historical context of discovery can be clearly distinguished from the logical context of justification was questioned by [[Norwood Hanson|Hanson]], [[Thomas Kuhn|Kuhn]], and [[Paul Feyerabend|Feyerabend]]. [[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015) p. 23]][[CiteRef::Feyerabend (1975) p. 149]] Paul Hoyningen-Huene proposed a lean distinction between the two contexts, proposing that they are simply two different perspectives that can be taken towards scientific knowledge. Unlike earlier views, it does not suppose that discovery and justification are two distinct processes. [[CiteRef::Hoyningen-Huene (2006) pp. 128-130]] Barseghyan [[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015) pp. 23-25]] noted that the terms 'discovery' and 'justification' are misleading. 'Discovery' is generally taken to refer to an epistemic achievement that has been positively appraised, such as the discovery of the planet Neptune. The term 'construction', he supposes, is better suited to refer to the creative processes by which new theories come about. Theories undergo a process of appraisal by a scientific community. |
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Revision as of 15:11, 22 June 2017
This is an answer to the question Scope of Scientonomy - Construction and Appraisal that states "Scientonomy should describe and explain how changes in the mosaic of accepted scientific theories and employed methods take place. Any such instance of scientific change is a result of appraisal, which is a decision of the community to accept a proposed modification to the mosaic. Scientonomy must provide an account of this appraisal process. A theory of scientific change is not required to account for the process of theory construction."
Scope of Scientonomy - Appraisal was formulated by Hakob Barseghyan in 2015.1 It is currently accepted by Scientonomy community as the best available answer to the question.
Contents
Broader History
Hans Reichenbach is commonly considered to have been the first to draw the distinction between the context of discovery, which is a historical and creative process having to do with the construction of the theory, and the context of justification, which is the supposedly distinct logical enterprise of the defense and appraisal of a theory. 2 However the distinction was implicit in works of scientific methodology since the nineteenth century, and has been traced by Popper back to Kant. 3 The idea that the historical context of discovery can be clearly distinguished from the logical context of justification was questioned by Hanson, Kuhn, and Feyerabend. 45 Paul Hoyningen-Huene proposed a lean distinction between the two contexts, proposing that they are simply two different perspectives that can be taken towards scientific knowledge. Unlike earlier views, it does not suppose that discovery and justification are two distinct processes. 6 Barseghyan 7 noted that the terms 'discovery' and 'justification' are misleading. 'Discovery' is generally taken to refer to an epistemic achievement that has been positively appraised, such as the discovery of the planet Neptune. The term 'construction', he supposes, is better suited to refer to the creative processes by which new theories come about. Theories undergo a process of appraisal by a scientific community.
Scientonomic History
Acceptance Record
| Community | Accepted From | Acceptance Indicators | Still Accepted | Accepted Until | Rejection Indicators |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Scientonomy | 1 January 2016 | The theory was introduced by Barseghyan in The Laws of Scientific Change pp. 21-29 and became de facto accepted by the community at that time together with the whole theory of scientific change. | Yes |
Question Answered
Scope of Scientonomy - Appraisal (Barseghyan-2015) is an attempt to answer the following question: Ought the process of scientific change be viewed from the perspective of theory construction or that of theory appraisal?
See Scope of Scientonomy - Construction and Appraisal for more details.
Description
The goal of scientonomy is to give a descriptive account of the process of scientific change. Given this goal, it is obvious that it must describe and explain how changes in the mosaic of accepted scientific theories and employed methods take place. Any actual instance of scientific change is the result of an appraisal. Therefore, a theory of scientific change must provide an account of how theories are actually appraised and thereby explain how changes in the mosaic occur. It is not, on the other hand, required to account for the process of theory construction. Scientific creativity and theory construction have typically been regarded as questions of psychology and sociology. 1p. 29
Reasons
No reasons are indicated for this theory.
If a reason supporting this theory is missing, please add it here.
Questions About This Theory
There are no higher-order questions concerning this theory.
If a question about this theory is missing, please add it here.
References
- a b Barseghyan, Hakob. (2015) The Laws of Scientific Change. Springer.
- ^ Laudan, Larry. (1980) Why Was the Logic of Scientific Discovery Abandoned? In Nickles (Ed.) (1980), 173-183.
- ^ Popper, Karl. (1959) The Logic of Scientific Discovery. Hutchinson & Co.
- ^ Barseghyan (2015) p. 23
- ^ Feyerabend (1975) p. 149
- ^ Hoyningen-Huene (2006) pp. 128-130
- ^ Barseghyan (2015) pp. 23-25
