Difference between revisions of "The Theory of Scientific Change"

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'''Theory of Scientific Change''' (TSC) is a descriptive theory that attempts to explain changes in a [[Scientific Mosaic|scientific mosaic]], i.e. transitions from one [[theory]] to the next and one [[method]] to the next. The current theory of scientific change explains many different aspects of the process such as [[The Second Law|theory acceptance]] and [[The Third Law|method employment]], [[The First Law|scientific inertia]] and [[The Zeroth Law|compatibility]], [[Mosaic Split and Merge|splitting and merging of scientific mosaics]], [[Scientific Underdeterminism|scientific underdeterminism]], [[Static and Dynamic Methods|changeability of scientific methods]], role of [[Sociocultural Factors|sociocultural factors]], and more.
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{{Descriptive Theory
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|Topic=Mechanism of Scientific Change
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== Prehistory ==
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|Title=Theory of Scientific Change
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<div class="mw-collapsible mw-collapsed">
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|Alternative Titles=
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===Ludwig Fleck 'Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact' 1935===
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|Formulation Text='''Theory of Scientific Change''' (TSC) is a descriptive theory that attempts to explain changes in a scientific mosaic, i.e. transitions from one theory to the next and one method to the next. The current theory of scientific change explains many different aspects of the process such as theory acceptance and method employment, scientific inertia and compatibility, splitting and merging of scientific mosaics, scientific underdeterminism, changeability of scientific methods, role of sociocultural factors, and more.  
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[[Fleck (1979)|Ludwig Fleck]], an epidemiologist, made one of the earliest attempts to understand scientific change as a social process, and to develop a conceptual framework for understanding how scientific communities function.[[CiteRef::Sady (2016)]] His most comprehensive work was 'Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact' published in 1935.[[CiteRef::Fleck (1979)]] For Fleck, cognition was necessarily a collective social activity, since it depends on prior knowledge obtained from other people.  New ideas arise within ''thought collectives'', which are groups of people who participate in the mutual exchange of ideas.  As an emergent consequence of mutual understandings and misunderstandings within such a group a particular ''thought style'' arises.  An established thought style carves the social world into an ''esoteric circle'' of expert members of the thought collective, and an ''exoteric circle'' who are outside the thought collective.  How individual members of a thought collective think and perceive within the relevant domain is determined by the thought style.  Scientific facts are socially constructed by thought collectives.  Reality in itself cannot be known, but the thought style can be compared with reality through observation and experiment, and may be revised or abandoned on the basis of such interactions.[[CiteRef::Fleck (1979)]] [[CiteRef::Sady (2016)]] The thought style of a particular collective can, at most, be only partially understood by members of other collectives, and may be completely ''incommensurable'' with the thinking of some other collectives.
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|Description====What is the theory of scientific change?===
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===Thomas Kuhn- 'The Structure of Scientific Revolutions' 1962===
 
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Drawing partially on Fleck’s ideas, physicist and historian of science [[Thomas_Kuhn|Thomas Kuhn]] published his ideas about scientific change as 'The Structure of Scientific Revolutions' in 1962.[[CiteRef::Kuhn (1962)]] Kuhn spoke of ''scientific paradigms'', which are constellations of theoretical and metaphysical beliefs, values, methods, and instrumental techniques shared by a scientific discipline.  A paradigm determines which questions are asked of the natural world by observation and experiment. Adherents to a paradigm engage in ''normal science'', which solves the puzzles needed to expand the range of natural phenomena that can be explained using the paradigm. Eventually, ''anomalies'' may be unearthed.  These are phenomena that recalcitrantly resist explanation in terms of the paradigm.  If anomalies persist and grow in number, practitioners seek fundamentally new approaches.  If a new approach is successful at resolving salient anomalies and is deemed to hold promise for solving new puzzles, a ''scientific revolution'' may result, in which a new paradigm replaces the old.  Because paradigms are holistic networks of theories, methods, and values, they are ''incommensurable'' with one another, meaning that the terms and categories of the old paradigm cannot be translated into those of the new.  Adoption of a new paradigm thus appeared, especially to Kuhn’s critics, to involve a kind of non-rational leap of faith.[[CiteRef::Bird (2013)]] [[CiteRef::Kuhn (1962)]]
 
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===Paul Feyerabend 'On Method' 1975===
 
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In his 'On Method', published in 1975, philosopher [[Paul_Feyerabend|Paul Feyerabend]], an epistemic anarchist, launched a much more radical attack on the idea of a fixed scientific method, and on the rationality of science.[[CiteRef::Feyerabend (1975)]] On his account, science does not possess the regularities that would make a science of science and a theory of scientific change possible.  Social constructivists likewise favored an historically contingent, relativist, and particularist view of science, which they supposed was incompatible with a coherent theory of scientific change.
 
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===Irme Lakatos 'Methodology of Scientific Research Programs' 1970===
 
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Philosopher [[Imre_Lakatos|Irme Lakatos]], a proponent of the rationality of science and of a fixed scientific method launched a new account of scientific change with his 'Methodology of Scientific Research Programs' in 1970.[[CiteRef::Lakatos (1970)]] Lakatos sought to challenge both Kuhn and Feyerabend. He saw interrelated scientific theories as constituting ''research programs''. Unlike Kuhn, he believed that scientific fields typically host multiple competing research programs and rejected the idea of coherent unitary paradigms. Not all theoretical constituents of a research program were assigned equal importance. The ''hard core'' of a research program consisted of those theoretical claims that were indispensable to it.  Adherents to a research program attempt to explain an increasingly wide range of natural phenomena in terms of the core claims.  This is the ''positive heuristic'' of the research program. The ''protective belt'' consists of those theoretical assumptions that allowed the application of the hard core to an increasing range of cases.  Scientists used their ingenuity to protect the hard core by making alterations to the protective belt so as to protect the core from falsification.  The protection of the hard core is a research program's ''negative heuristic''. A ''progressive'' research program is one that makes successful novel predictions.  A ''degenerating'' research program is one whose predictions repeatedly fail, and whose protective belt must be altered in an arbitrary, ad hoc fashion to protect the hard core from falsification.  Lakatos rejected Kuhn’s distinction between normal and revolutionary science, and supposed that a revolution occurs when scientists simply switch allegiance from a degenerating research program to a progressive one.
 
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===Larry Laudan 'Science and Values' 1984===
 
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In his 1984 'Science and Values' philosopher [[Larry_Laudan|Larry Laudan]] accepted growing empirical evidence that the methods of science had changed with time.[[CiteRef::Grobler (1990)]] [[CiteRef::Laudan (1984)]] "Our views about the proper procedures for investigating the world", he wrote, "have been significantly affected by our shifting beliefs about how the world works".[[CiteRef::Laudan (1984)|p. 39]] However he did not accept Feyerabend’s anarchism, or his view that a coherent theory of scientific change was impossible. Laudan proposed a ''reticulated model'' of scientific rationality in which other theories, methods, and research aims all interact in the assessment of a theory, with all three subject to alteration or replacement in the light of the others.  Like Lakatos, he supposed that scientific theories were linked into logically related groups which he called ''research traditions'', and rejected the radical holism of Kuhnian paradigms.  Laudan distinguished between the ''acceptance'' of a theory by a scientific community as the best available and ''pursuit'' of a theory as holding potential.  Similar ideas were adopted as part of the Barseghyan theory of scientific change.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)]]
 
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</div>
 
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== History ==
 
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The ''theory of scientific change'' (TSC) was proposed by Hakob Barseghyan in his book 'The Laws of Scientific Change', published in 2015.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)]]
 
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In 2016, Zoe Sebastien resolved an important logical paradox, which necessitated a [[Modification:Sebastien-2016-001|change]] to the [[The_Third_Law|third law of scientific change]].[[CiteRef::Sebastien (2016)]] At the same time, the definition of [[Theory|''theory'']] was also [[Modification:Sebastien-2016-002|modified]] to include not only descriptive propositions but also normative propositions (e.g. normative scientific methodologies, ethical beliefs, etc.). As a result, the scope of the TSC was expanded to include also normative beliefs accepted by a community.
 
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== Current View ==
 
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===What is the theory of scientific change?===
 
 
[[File:Scientific change.jpg|right|475px]]  
 
[[File:Scientific change.jpg|right|475px]]  
 
The ''theory of scientific change (TSC)'' is a general descriptive social scientific theory of the actual process of [[Scientific_Change|''scientific change'']] stated in axiomatic deductive form. It is the founding theory of the new field of [[Scientonomy|scientonomy]]. It was proposed by Hakob Barseghyan in 2015 in his book 'The Laws of Scientific Change'[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)]].  
 
The ''theory of scientific change (TSC)'' is a general descriptive social scientific theory of the actual process of [[Scientific_Change|''scientific change'']] stated in axiomatic deductive form. It is the founding theory of the new field of [[Scientonomy|scientonomy]]. It was proposed by Hakob Barseghyan in 2015 in his book 'The Laws of Scientific Change'[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)]].  
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[[File:methodology-shapes-method.jpg|center|500px]].
 
[[File:methodology-shapes-method.jpg|center|500px]].
  
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== Open Questions ==  
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|Year Formulated=2015
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|Authors List=
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|Resource=
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|Formulation File=
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|Prehistory====Ludwig Fleck 'Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact' 1935===
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[[Fleck (1979)|Ludwig Fleck]], an epidemiologist, made one of the earliest attempts to understand scientific change as a social process, and to develop a conceptual framework for understanding how scientific communities function.[[CiteRef::Sady (2016)]] His most comprehensive work was 'Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact' published in 1935.[[CiteRef::Fleck (1979)]] For Fleck, cognition was necessarily a collective social activity, since it depends on prior knowledge obtained from other people.  New ideas arise within ''thought collectives'', which are groups of people who participate in the mutual exchange of ideas.  As an emergent consequence of mutual understandings and misunderstandings within such a group a particular ''thought style'' arises.  An established thought style carves the social world into an ''esoteric circle'' of expert members of the thought collective, and an ''exoteric circle'' who are outside the thought collective.  How individual members of a thought collective think and perceive within the relevant domain is determined by the thought style.  Scientific facts are socially constructed by thought collectives.  Reality in itself cannot be known, but the thought style can be compared with reality through observation and experiment, and may be revised or abandoned on the basis of such interactions.[[CiteRef::Fleck (1979)]] [[CiteRef::Sady (2016)]] The thought style of a particular collective can, at most, be only partially understood by members of other collectives, and may be completely ''incommensurable'' with the thinking of some other collectives.
  
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• Currently, the necessary element theorem states that the method,“only accept the best available theories”, is a necessary element for any mosaic. Are there any necessary theories in addition to this method? It seems as though there must be some necessary analytic theories, because any scientific enterprise assumes a whole network of analytic propositions. Are there any necessary synthetic propositions? If so, this could mean that synthetic a priori knowledge is possible. (Hakob Barseghyan, 2016)
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===Thomas Kuhn- 'The Structure of Scientific Revolutions' 1962===
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Drawing partially on Fleck’s ideas, physicist and historian of science [[Thomas_Kuhn|Thomas Kuhn]] published his ideas about scientific change as 'The Structure of Scientific Revolutions' in 1962.[[CiteRef::Kuhn (1962)]] Kuhn spoke of ''scientific paradigms'', which are constellations of theoretical and metaphysical beliefs, values, methods, and instrumental techniques shared by a scientific discipline.  A paradigm determines which questions are asked of the natural world by observation and experiment. Adherents to a paradigm engage in ''normal science'', which solves the puzzles needed to expand the range of natural phenomena that can be explained using the paradigm. Eventually, ''anomalies'' may be unearthed.  These are phenomena that recalcitrantly resist explanation in terms of the paradigm.  If anomalies persist and grow in number, practitioners seek fundamentally new approaches.  If a new approach is successful at resolving salient anomalies and is deemed to hold promise for solving new puzzles, a ''scientific revolution'' may result, in which a new paradigm replaces the old. Because paradigms are holistic networks of theories, methods, and values, they are ''incommensurable'' with one another, meaning that the terms and categories of the old paradigm cannot be translated into those of the new. Adoption of a new paradigm thus appeared, especially to Kuhn’s critics, to involve a kind of non-rational leap of faith.[[CiteRef::Bird (2013)]] [[CiteRef::Kuhn (1962)]]
  
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• The Contextual Appraisal Theorem defines “historical context” as “scientific historical context” (i.e, the set of accepted theories and employed methods held at time t). When discussing the influence of socio-cultural factors on the mosaic, however, we shift to a conception of “historical context” which includes non-scientific socio-cultural phenomenon. Should the idea of “historical context” be consistent through the TSC, and if so, how should we define it? Will this alter the Contextual Appraisal Theorem? (Stephen Watt, 2016)
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===Paul Feyerabend 'On Method' 1975===
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In his 'On Method', published in 1975, philosopher [[Paul_Feyerabend|Paul Feyerabend]], an epistemic anarchist, launched a much more radical attack on the idea of a fixed scientific method, and on the rationality of science.[[CiteRef::Feyerabend (1975)]] On his account, science does not possess the regularities that would make a science of science and a theory of scientific change possible. Social constructivists likewise favored an historically contingent, relativist, and particularist view of science, which they supposed was incompatible with a coherent theory of scientific change.
  
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== Related Articles ==  
+
===Irme Lakatos 'Methodology of Scientific Research Programs' 1970===
 +
Philosopher [[Imre_Lakatos|Irme Lakatos]], a proponent of the rationality of science and of a fixed scientific method launched a new account of scientific change with his 'Methodology of Scientific Research Programs' in 1970.[[CiteRef::Lakatos (1970)]] Lakatos sought to challenge both Kuhn and Feyerabend. He saw interrelated scientific theories as constituting ''research programs''. Unlike Kuhn, he believed that scientific fields typically host multiple competing research programs and rejected the idea of coherent unitary paradigms. Not all theoretical constituents of a research program were assigned equal importance. The ''hard core'' of a research program consisted of those theoretical claims that were indispensable to it.  Adherents to a research program attempt to explain an increasingly wide range of natural phenomena in terms of the core claims.  This is the ''positive heuristic'' of the research program. The ''protective belt'' consists of those theoretical assumptions that allowed the application of the hard core to an increasing range of cases.  Scientists used their ingenuity to protect the hard core by making alterations to the protective belt so as to protect the core from falsification.  The protection of the hard core is a research program's ''negative heuristic''. A ''progressive'' research program is one that makes successful novel predictions.  A ''degenerating'' research program is one whose predictions repeatedly fail, and whose protective belt must be altered in an arbitrary, ad hoc fashion to protect the hard core from falsification.  Lakatos rejected Kuhn’s distinction between normal and revolutionary science, and supposed that a revolution occurs when scientists simply switch allegiance from a degenerating research program to a progressive one.
 +
===Larry Laudan 'Science and Values' 1984===
 +
In his 1984 'Science and Values' philosopher [[Larry_Laudan|Larry Laudan]] accepted growing empirical evidence that the methods of science had changed with time.[[CiteRef::Grobler (1990)]] [[CiteRef::Laudan (1984)]] "Our views about the proper procedures for investigating the world", he wrote, "have been significantly affected by our shifting beliefs about how the world works".[[CiteRef::Laudan (1984)|p. 39]] However he did not accept Feyerabend’s anarchism, or his view that a coherent theory of scientific change was impossible. Laudan proposed a ''reticulated model'' of scientific rationality in which other theories, methods, and research aims all interact in the assessment of a theory, with all three subject to alteration or replacement in the light of the others.  Like Lakatos, he supposed that scientific theories were linked into logically related groups which he called ''research traditions'', and rejected the radical holism of Kuhnian paradigms.  Laudan distinguished between the ''acceptance'' of a theory by a scientific community as the best available and ''pursuit'' of a theory as holding potential.  Similar ideas were adopted as part of the Barseghyan theory of scientific change.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)]]
  
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[[Scientific Mosaic]]
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|History=The ''theory of scientific change'' (TSC) was proposed by Hakob Barseghyan in ''The Laws of Scientific Change'', published in 2015.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)]]  
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In 2016, Zoe Sebastien resolved an important logical paradox, which necessitated a [[Modification:Sebastien-2016-001|change]] to the [[The_Third_Law|third law of scientific change]].[[CiteRef::Sebastien (2016)]] At the same time, the definition of [[Theory|''theory'']] was also [[Modification:Sebastien-2016-002|modified]] to include not only descriptive propositions but also normative propositions (e.g. normative scientific methodologies, ethical beliefs, etc.). As a result, the scope of the TSC was expanded to include also normative beliefs accepted by a community.
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[[Scientonomy]]
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}}
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[[Scientific Change]]
 
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[[The Zeroth Law]]
 
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[[The First Law]]
 
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[[The Second Law]]
 
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[[The Third Law]]
 
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== Notes ==
 
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<references />
 

Revision as of 02:02, 26 August 2016

Template:Descriptive Theory

References

  1. a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z aa ab ac ad ae af ag ah ai  Barseghyan, Hakob. (2015) The Laws of Scientific Change. Springer.
  2. a b  Sebastien, Zoe. (2016) The Status of Normative Propositions in the Theory of Scientific Change. Scientonomy 1, 1-9. Retrieved from https://www.scientojournal.com/index.php/scientonomy/article/view/26947.
  3. a b Laudan (1984) 
  4. ^ Kuhn (1977) 

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