Changes

|Prehistory=Concepts pre-dating the current appreciation of contextual appraisal include epistemological concerns about the absolute appraisal of individual theories based on their available data. Early rationalist and empiricist philosophers believed in what has been called the justificationist interpretation of absolute appraisal which states that there could be decisive proofs and refutations of individual theories.  Later, probabilist interpretations were proposed stating that one cannot decisively prove a theory, but merely objectively measure its probability relative to the available evidence. This probabilistic tradition has been common amongst philosophers of science at both Cambridge and by the logical positivist tradition in Vienna. Both interpretations of absolute appraisal share the opinion that theory assessment concerns an individual theory taken in isolation from other theories. For instance, the logical positivists believed that scientific theories were entirely driven by fitting empirical data into logical structures. In contrast, the comparative interpretation states that theory assessment does not concern individual theories considered in isolation. The epistemological consensus shift towards the comparative interpretations of theory appraise began with the acceptance of fallibilism, in epistemology. Fallibilism is the idea that no empirical belief can ever be rationally supported or justified in a conclusive way, resulted in a shift towards the comparative interpretations of theory appraisal. An epistemological concern of whether a Determining which theory is the best available required there to be that extant competitors to appraise be appraised by their relative merit through a comparative appraisalprocess.  Among the first to philosophers of science to appreciate comparative appraisal was [[Karl Popper]].  Among many others, comparative appraisal can be noted in the work of philosophers of science such as [[Karl Popper]], [[Thomas Kuhn]], [[Imre Lakatos]], and [[Larry Laudan]]. The traditional comparative procedure of theory appraisal only accounts for two competing theories, some method of assessment, and some relative evidence. What the traditional version of comparativism does not take into account is that all theory assessment takes place within a specific historical context.|History=Patton, Overgaard, and Barseghyan have proposed a modified [[The Second Law (Patton-Overgaard-Barseghyan-2017)|Second Law]] of Scientific Change that significantly modifies they way scientonomy believes scientific theories are appraised. They feel that their new Second Law better accommodates the possibility of an inconclusive result in the appraisal of a theory. [[CiteRef::Patton, Overgaard, and Barseghyan (2017)]] Their modified version of the Second Law has not been accepted yet by the scientonomy community.