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|Authors List=Hakob Barseghyan,
|Formulated Year=2015
|Prehistory=Concepts pre-dating the current appreciation of contextual appraisal include epistemological concerns about the absolute appraisal of individual theories based on their available data. Early rationalist and empiricist philosophers believed in what has been called the justificationist interpretation of absolute appraisal which states that there could be decisive proofs and refutations of individual theories. Later, probabilist interpretations were proposed stating that one cannot decisively prove a theory, but merely objectively measure its probability relative to the available evidence. This probabilistic tradition has been common amongst philosophers of science at both Cambridge and Vienna. Both interpretations of absolute appraisal share the opinion that theory assessment concerns an individual theory taken in isolation from other theories. In contrast, the comparative interpretation states that theory assessment does not concern individual theories considered in isolation. The epistemological consensus of fallibilism, that no empirical belief can ever be rationally supported or justified in a conclusive way, resulted in a shift towards the comparative interpretations of theory appraisal. An epistemological concern of whether a theory is the best available required there to be extant competitors to appraise relative merit through comparative appraisal. Among many others, comparative appraisal can be noted in the work of philosophers of science such as [[Karl Popper]], [[Thomas Kuhn]], [[Imre Lakatos]], and [[Larry Laudan]]. The traditional comparative procedure of theory appraisal only accounts for two competing theories, some method of assessment, and some relative evidence. What the traditional version of comparativism does not take into account is that all theory assessment takes place within a specific historical context.
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{{Acceptance Record
