Difference between revisions of "Nature of Appraisal"

From Encyclopedia of Scientonomy
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Line 6: Line 6:
 
|Authors List=Hakob Barseghyan,
 
|Authors List=Hakob Barseghyan,
 
|Formulated Year=2015
 
|Formulated Year=2015
 +
|Prehistory=Concepts pre-dating the current appreciation of contextual appraisal include epistemological concerns about the absolute appraisal of individual theories based on their available data. Early rationalist and empiricist philosophers believed in what has been called the justificationist interpretation of absolute appraisal which states that there could be decisive proofs and refutations of individual theories. Later, probabilist interpretations were proposed stating that one cannot decisively prove a theory, but merely objectively measure its probability relative to the available evidence. This probabilistic tradition has been common amongst philosophers of science at both Cambridge and Vienna. Both interpretations of absolute appraisal share the opinion that theory assessment concerns an individual theory taken in isolation from other theories. In contrast, the comparative interpretation states that theory assessment does not concern individual theories considered in isolation. The epistemological consensus of fallibilism, that no empirical belief can ever be rationally supported or justified in a conclusive way, resulted in a shift towards the comparative interpretations of theory appraisal. An epistemological concern of whether a theory is the best available required there to be extant competitors to appraise relative merit through comparative appraisal. Among many others, comparative appraisal can be noted in the work of philosophers of science such as [[Karl Popper]], [[Thomas Kuhn]], [[Imre Lakatos]], and [[Larry Laudan]]. The traditional comparative procedure of theory appraisal only accounts for two competing theories, some method of assessment, and some relative evidence. What the traditional version of comparativism does not take into account is that all theory assessment takes place within a specific historical context.
 
}}
 
}}
 
{{Acceptance Record
 
{{Acceptance Record

Revision as of 15:50, 9 February 2017

What is the nature of theory appraisal? Does actual theory assessment concern an individual theory taken in isolation from other theories?

Theory appraisal refers to how we assess a theory to determine whether to accept it. From ancient times up until the mid-twentieth century, it was widely supposed that theories were appraised in isolation from one another; a position known as absolute appraisal. Once fallibilism became widely accepted, it was suggested instead that theory appraisal is a comparative matter, in which the relative merits of competing theories were assessed. Contextual appraisal contends that a theory is assessed only in relation to the entire mosaic of accepted theories and employed methods. For the historian, several elements must be considered in order to avoid committing anachronisms.

In the scientonomic context, this question was first formulated by Hakob Barseghyan in 2015. The question is currently accepted as a legitimate topic for discussion by Scientonomy community.

In Scientonomy, the accepted answer to the question is:

  • If a theory satisfies the acceptance criteria of the method employed at the time, it becomes accepted into the mosaic; if it does not, it remains unaccepted; if assessment is inconclusive, the theory can be accepted or not accepted.

Broader History

Concepts pre-dating the current appreciation of contextual appraisal include epistemological concerns about the absolute appraisal of individual theories based on their available data. Early rationalist and empiricist philosophers believed in what has been called the justificationist interpretation of absolute appraisal which states that there could be decisive proofs and refutations of individual theories. Later, probabilist interpretations were proposed stating that one cannot decisively prove a theory, but merely objectively measure its probability relative to the available evidence. This probabilistic tradition has been common amongst philosophers of science at both Cambridge and Vienna. Both interpretations of absolute appraisal share the opinion that theory assessment concerns an individual theory taken in isolation from other theories. In contrast, the comparative interpretation states that theory assessment does not concern individual theories considered in isolation. The epistemological consensus of fallibilism, that no empirical belief can ever be rationally supported or justified in a conclusive way, resulted in a shift towards the comparative interpretations of theory appraisal. An epistemological concern of whether a theory is the best available required there to be extant competitors to appraise relative merit through comparative appraisal. Among many others, comparative appraisal can be noted in the work of philosophers of science such as Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, Imre Lakatos, and Larry Laudan. The traditional comparative procedure of theory appraisal only accounts for two competing theories, some method of assessment, and some relative evidence. What the traditional version of comparativism does not take into account is that all theory assessment takes place within a specific historical context.

Scientonomic History

Acceptance Record

Here is the complete acceptance record of this question (it includes all the instances when the question was accepted as a legitimate topic for discussion by a community):
CommunityAccepted FromAcceptance IndicatorsStill AcceptedAccepted UntilRejection Indicators
Scientonomy1 January 2016That is when the community accepted its first answer to this question, Contextual Appraisal theorem (Barseghyan-2015), which indicates that the question is itself considered legitimate.Yes

All Theories

The following theories have attempted to answer this question:
TheoryFormulationFormulated In
Contextual Appraisal theorem (Barseghyan-2015)Theory assessment is an assessment of a proposed modification of the mosaic by the method employed at the time.2015

If an answer to this question is missing, please click here to add it.

Accepted Theories

The following theories have been accepted as answers to this question:
CommunityTheoryAccepted FromAccepted Until
ScientonomyContextual Appraisal theorem (Barseghyan-2015)1 January 2016

Suggested Modifications

According to our records, there have been no suggested modifications on this topic.

Current View

In Scientonomy, the accepted answer to the question is The Second Law (Patton-Overgaard-Barseghyan-2017).

Mechanism of Theory Acceptance

The Second Law (Patton-Overgaard-Barseghyan-2017) states: "If a theory satisfies the acceptance criteria of the method employed at the time, it becomes accepted into the mosaic; if it does not, it remains unaccepted; if assessment is inconclusive, the theory can be accepted or not accepted."

The Second Law (Patton-Overgaard-Barseghyan-2017).png

According to this formulation of the second law, if a theory satisfies the acceptance criteria of the method actually employed at the time, then it becomes accepted into the mosaic; if it does not, it remains unaccepted; if it is inconclusive whether the theory satisfies the method, the theory can be accepted or not accepted.

Unlike the previous formulation of the second law, this formulation makes the causal connection between theory assessment outcomes and cases of theory acceptance/unacceptance explicit. In particular, it specifies what happens to a theory in terms of its acceptance/unacceptance when a certain assessment outcome obtains.

In addition, this new formulation is clearly not a tautology because it forbids certain logically possible scenarios, such as a theory satisfying the method of the time yet remaining unaccepted.

Related Topics

This question is a subquestion of Mechanism of Theory Acceptance.

References

  1. ^  Laudan, Larry. (1970) Commentary. In Stuewer (Ed.) (1970), 127-132; 230-238.
  2. ^  Laudan, Larry. (1968) Theories of Scientific Method from Plato to Mach: A Bibliographical Review. History of Science 7, 1-63.
  3. ^  Laudan, Larry. (1981) Science and Hypothesis. Historical Essays on Scientific Methodology. D. Reidel Publishing Company.
  4. ^  Laudan, Larry. (1996) Beyond Positivism and Relativism. Theory, Method, and Evidence. Westview Press.
  5. a b  Lakatos, Imre. (1970) Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes. In Lakatos (1978a), 8-101.
  6. a b  Barseghyan, Hakob. (2015) The Laws of Scientific Change. Springer.
  7. ^  Popper, Karl. (1959) The Logic of Scientific Discovery. Hutchinson & Co.
  8. a b  Kuhn, Thomas. (1962) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. University of Chicago Press.
  9. ^  Kuhn, Thomas. (1974) Second Thoughts on Paradigms. In Suppe (Ed.) (1974), 459-482.
  10. ^  Lakatos, Imre. (1971) History of Science and Its Rational Reconstructions. In Lakatos (1978a), 102-138.
  11. ^  Laudan, Larry. (1984) Science and Values. University of California Press.