Difference between revisions of "The Theory of Scientific Change"
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The role of methodologies in shaping methods under the TSC is indicated by the third law, under which the employed method is strictly determined by other methods and accepted theories of the time. A methodology can shape employed methods, but only if its requirements implement abstract requirements of some other employed method[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p.240-243]] | The role of methodologies in shaping methods under the TSC is indicated by the third law, under which the employed method is strictly determined by other methods and accepted theories of the time. A methodology can shape employed methods, but only if its requirements implement abstract requirements of some other employed method[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p.240-243]] | ||
[[File:methodology-shapes-method.jpg|center|500px]]. | [[File:methodology-shapes-method.jpg|center|500px]]. | ||
| + | |||
| + | == Open Questions == | ||
| + | • The Asynchronism of Method Employment theorem says that employment of methods is not always necessarily a result of the acceptance of new theories. But surely all methods (even concrete implementations of abstract requirements) are employed simultaneously with the acceptance of a descriptive proposition which states that that method is effective. Does this poses a challenge towards the Asynchronism of Method Employment theorem? (Mirka Loiselle, 2016) | ||
| + | • Currently, the existence of a mosaic split is the only way for us as historians of science to identify a case of inconclusive theory assessment. However, it is logically possible (given the Laws of Scientific Change) for the result of theory assessment to be inconclusive and yet the entire community chooses to accept the theory. In this case, no mosaic split would occur. Is it possible to identify these cases in our historical analysis? (Paul Patton, 2016) | ||
|Resource=Barseghyan (2015) | |Resource=Barseghyan (2015) | ||
|Prehistory====Ludwig Fleck 'Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact' 1935=== | |Prehistory====Ludwig Fleck 'Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact' 1935=== | ||
Revision as of 16:32, 29 August 2016
References
- a b Sady, Wojciech. (2016) Ludwik Fleck. In Zalta (Ed.) (2016). Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2016/entries/fleck/.
- a b Fleck, Ludwik. (1979) Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact. University of Chicago Press.
- a b Kuhn (1962)
- ^ Bird (2013)
- ^ Feyerabend, Paul. (2010) Against Method. Fourth Edition. Verso.
- ^ Lakatos, Imre. (1970) Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes. In Lakatos (1978a), 8-101.
- ^ Grobler, Adam. (1990) Between Rationalism and Relativism: On Larry Laudan's Model of Scientific Rationality. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 41 (4), 493-507.
- a b c d Laudan (1984)
- a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z aa ab ac ad ae af ag ah ai aj Barseghyan, Hakob. (2015) The Laws of Scientific Change. Springer.
- a b Sebastien, Zoe. (2016) The Status of Normative Propositions in the Theory of Scientific Change. Scientonomy 1, 1-9. Retrieved from https://www.scientojournal.com/index.php/scientonomy/article/view/26947.
- ^ Kuhn (1977)
