Difference between revisions of "The Theory of Scientific Change"
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== Open Questions == | == Open Questions == | ||
• The Asynchronism of Method Employment theorem says that employment of methods is not always necessarily a result of the acceptance of new theories. But surely all methods (even concrete implementations of abstract requirements) are employed simultaneously with the acceptance of a descriptive proposition which states that that method is effective. Does this poses a challenge towards the Asynchronism of Method Employment theorem? (Mirka Loiselle, 2016) | • The Asynchronism of Method Employment theorem says that employment of methods is not always necessarily a result of the acceptance of new theories. But surely all methods (even concrete implementations of abstract requirements) are employed simultaneously with the acceptance of a descriptive proposition which states that that method is effective. Does this poses a challenge towards the Asynchronism of Method Employment theorem? (Mirka Loiselle, 2016) | ||
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• Currently, the existence of a mosaic split is the only way for us as historians of science to identify a case of inconclusive theory assessment. However, it is logically possible (given the Laws of Scientific Change) for the result of theory assessment to be inconclusive and yet the entire community chooses to accept the theory. In this case, no mosaic split would occur. Is it possible to identify these cases in our historical analysis? (Paul Patton, 2016) | • Currently, the existence of a mosaic split is the only way for us as historians of science to identify a case of inconclusive theory assessment. However, it is logically possible (given the Laws of Scientific Change) for the result of theory assessment to be inconclusive and yet the entire community chooses to accept the theory. In this case, no mosaic split would occur. Is it possible to identify these cases in our historical analysis? (Paul Patton, 2016) | ||
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| + | • Currently, the Necessary Element theorem states that the method “only accept the best available theories” is a necessary element for any mosaic. Are there any necessary theories in addition to this method? It seems as though there must be some necessary analytic theories, because any scientific enterprise assumes a whole network of analytic propositions. Are there any necessary synthetic propositions? If so, this could mean that synthetic a priori knowledge is possible. (Hakob Barseghyan, 2016) | ||
|Resource=Barseghyan (2015) | |Resource=Barseghyan (2015) | ||
|Prehistory====Ludwig Fleck 'Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact' 1935=== | |Prehistory====Ludwig Fleck 'Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact' 1935=== | ||
Revision as of 16:41, 29 August 2016
References
- a b Sady, Wojciech. (2016) Ludwik Fleck. In Zalta (Ed.) (2016). Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2016/entries/fleck/.
- a b Fleck, Ludwik. (1979) Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact. University of Chicago Press.
- a b Kuhn (1962)
- ^ Bird (2013)
- ^ Feyerabend (1975)
- ^ Lakatos, Imre. (1970) Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes. In Lakatos (1978a), 8-101.
- ^ Grobler, Adam. (1990) Between Rationalism and Relativism: On Larry Laudan's Model of Scientific Rationality. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 41 (4), 493-507.
- a b c d Laudan (1984)
- a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z aa ab ac ad ae af ag ah ai aj Barseghyan, Hakob. (2015) The Laws of Scientific Change. Springer.
- a b Sebastien, Zoe. (2016) The Status of Normative Propositions in the Theory of Scientific Change. Scientonomy 1, 1-9. Retrieved from https://www.scientojournal.com/index.php/scientonomy/article/view/26947.
- ^ Kuhn (1977)
