Difference between revisions of "The Theory of Scientific Change"
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• Currently, the Necessary Element theorem states that the method “only accept the best available theories” is a necessary element for any mosaic. Are there any necessary theories in addition to this method? It seems as though there must be some necessary analytic theories, because any scientific enterprise assumes a whole network of analytic propositions. Are there any necessary synthetic propositions? If so, this could mean that synthetic a priori knowledge is possible. (Hakob Barseghyan, 2016) | • Currently, the Necessary Element theorem states that the method “only accept the best available theories” is a necessary element for any mosaic. Are there any necessary theories in addition to this method? It seems as though there must be some necessary analytic theories, because any scientific enterprise assumes a whole network of analytic propositions. Are there any necessary synthetic propositions? If so, this could mean that synthetic a priori knowledge is possible. (Hakob Barseghyan, 2016) | ||
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| + | • Can there be delegation authority to tools, or other material objects? Imagine a community which takes all of its scientific knowledge from an ancient manuscript. Is the community delegating authority to the long-dead writers of this manuscript, or to the book itself? When scientists use an instrument in an experiment, who are they delegating authority to? Standard research practice says that when using an instrument in an experiment, the scientist should cite the manufacturers of the instrument in their research paper. Does this indicate that authority is being delegated to the manufacturers rather than the tool itself? If authority can be delegated to a material object, does this mean that the object is the bearer of a mosaic? (Nick Overgaard, Hakob Barseghyan, 2016) | ||
|Resource=Barseghyan (2015) | |Resource=Barseghyan (2015) | ||
|Prehistory====Ludwig Fleck 'Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact' 1935=== | |Prehistory====Ludwig Fleck 'Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact' 1935=== | ||
Revision as of 17:12, 29 August 2016
References
- a b Sady, Wojciech. (2016) Ludwik Fleck. In Zalta (Ed.) (2016). Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2016/entries/fleck/.
- a b Fleck, Ludwik. (1979) Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact. University of Chicago Press.
- a b Kuhn (1962)
- ^ Bird, Alexander. (2011) Thomas Kuhn. In Zalta (Ed.) (2016). Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2016/entries/thomas-kuhn/.
- ^ Feyerabend, Paul. (1975) Against Method. New Left Books.
- ^ Lakatos, Imre. (1970) Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes. In Lakatos (1978a), 8-101.
- ^ Grobler, Adam. (1990) Between Rationalism and Relativism: On Larry Laudan's Model of Scientific Rationality. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 41 (4), 493-507.
- a b c d Laudan, Larry. (1984) Science and Values. University of California Press.
- a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z aa ab ac ad ae af ag ah ai aj Barseghyan, Hakob. (2015) The Laws of Scientific Change. Springer.
- a b Sebastien, Zoe. (2016) The Status of Normative Propositions in the Theory of Scientific Change. Scientonomy 1, 1-9. Retrieved from https://www.scientojournal.com/index.php/scientonomy/article/view/26947.
- ^ Kuhn (1977)
