Epistemic Stances Towards Theories
What epistemic stances can be taken towards a theory?
There has been a long tradition of confusing different stances that a community can take towards a theory. Kuhn, for instance, used a number of equally vague words, including universally received,embraced, acknowledged, and committed, to describe the status of a theory.1 Acceptance too has had a plethora of different meanings. Clarifying the list of possible stances towards a theory is one of the central topics within the ontology of scientific change.
Importantly, an answer to this question should specify all the epistemic stances that can be taken towards theories of all types; if a stance can be taken only towards a specific subtype of theory, that stance shouldn't be included in the answer to this question. Similarly, this list of stances should not include the more general stances that can be taken towards epistemic elements of all types, but only those that can be taken towards theories.
In the scientonomic context, this question was first formulated by Hakob Barseghyan in 2015. The question is currently accepted as a legitimate topic for discussion by Scientonomy community. Epistemic Stances Towards Theories - Acceptance Use and Pursuit (Barseghyan-2015) is currently accepted by Scientonomy community as the best available theory on the subject. Epistemic Stances Towards Theories - Acceptance Use and Pursuit (Barseghyan-2015) states "The list of possible stances towards a theory includes acceptance, use, and pursuit."
In the historical literature, many different words have been used to describe the attitudes a scientific community can take towards a theory, generally without any attempt to clarify their respective meanings. Larry Laudan and Stephen Wykstra were among the first who distinguished between the acceptance and the pursuit of a theory.2 3 Hakob Barseghyan has argued that a similar distinction was implicit in the work of Imre Lakatos, although Lakatos did not explicitly draw the distinction.45
|Community||Accepted From||Acceptance Indicators||Still Accepted||Accepted Until||Rejection Indicators|
|Scientonomy||1 January 2016||This is when the community accepted its first answer to this question, Epistemic Stances Towards Theories - Acceptance Use and Pursuit (Barseghyan-2015), which indicates that the question itself is legitimate.||Yes|
|Epistemic Stances Towards Theories - Acceptance Use and Pursuit (Barseghyan-2015)||The list of possible stances towards a theory includes acceptance, use, and pursuit.||2015|
|Epistemic Stances Towards Theories - Scientificity Acceptance Use and Pursuit (Sarwar-Fraser-2018)||The list of possible stances towards a theory includes scientificity, acceptance, use, and pursuit.||2018|
|Community||Theory||Accepted From||Accepted Until|
|Scientonomy||Epistemic Stances Towards Theories - Acceptance Use and Pursuit (Barseghyan-2015)||1 January 2016|
|Modification||Community||Date Suggested||Summary||Verdict||Verdict Rationale||Date Assessed|
|Sciento-2018-0013||Scientonomy||28 December 2018||Accept scientificity as a distinct epistemic stance that epistemic agents can take towards theories. Also accept several questions concerning the definition of scientificity and the applicability of scientificity to other epistemic elements, such as methods and questions, as legitimate topics of scientonomic inquiry.||Open|
In Scientonomy community, the accepted theory on the subject is Epistemic Stances Towards Theories - Acceptance Use and Pursuit (Barseghyan-2015). It states: "The list of possible stances towards a theory includes acceptance, use, and pursuit." There are three distinct stances that one can take towards a theory - acceptance, use, and pursuit. These stances are in principle independent from each other, meaning that one stance one can take any these stances towards a theory without taking the other stances. Thus, all of the following combinations are possible: Read More
This topic is a sub-topic of Epistemic Stances.
It has the following sub-topic(s):
This topic is also related to the following topic(s):
- Kuhn, Thomas. (1970) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions: Second Edition, Enlarged. University of Chicago Press.
- Laudan, Larry. (1977) Progress and Its Problems. University of California Press.
- Wykstra, Stephen. (1980) Toward a Historical Meta-Method for Assessing Normative Methodologies: Rationability, Serendipity, and the Robinson Crusoe Fallacy. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, 211-222.
- Barseghyan, Hakob. (2015) The Laws of Scientific Change. Springer.
- Barseghyan, Hakob and Shaw, Jamie. (2017) How Can a Taxonomy of Stances Help Clarify Classical Debates on Scientific Change? Philosophies 2 (4), 24. Retrieved from http://www.mdpi.com/2409-9287/2/4/24.