Difference between revisions of "Mechanism of Theory Pursuit"
m |
|||
| Line 5: | Line 5: | ||
|Authors List=Hakob Barseghyan, | |Authors List=Hakob Barseghyan, | ||
|Formulated Year=2015 | |Formulated Year=2015 | ||
| − | |Prehistory=Among classical philosophers of science, there was no unanimity as to whether the question of theory pursuit can have a reasonable answer. For instance, [[Imre Lakatos]] can be interpreted as claiming that while one has to [[Theory Acceptance|accept]] the most progressive research programme, one can legitimately [[Theory Pursuit|pursue]] any research programme whatsoever.[[CiteRef::Lakatos ( | + | |Prehistory=Among classical philosophers of science, there was no unanimity as to whether the question of theory pursuit can have a reasonable answer. For instance, [[Imre Lakatos]] can be interpreted as claiming that while one has to [[Theory Acceptance|accept]] the most progressive research programme, one can legitimately [[Theory Pursuit|pursue]] any research programme whatsoever.[[CiteRef::Lakatos (1971a)|p. 117]] The latter part of the claim would be readily accepted by Paul Feyerabend.[[CiteRef::Feyerabend (1976a)|pp. 213-216]] |
However, there were other philosophers who thought that there ''can'' be rules telling us which theories are pursuit worthy. In his [[Laudan (1977)|''Progress and Its Problems'']], [[Larry Laudan]] devises a methodological rule indicating when it is rational to pursue a certain research tradition. According to Laudan, "''it is always rational to pursue any research tradition which has a higher rate of progress than its rivals''".[[CiteRef::Laudan (1977)|p. 111]] | However, there were other philosophers who thought that there ''can'' be rules telling us which theories are pursuit worthy. In his [[Laudan (1977)|''Progress and Its Problems'']], [[Larry Laudan]] devises a methodological rule indicating when it is rational to pursue a certain research tradition. According to Laudan, "''it is always rational to pursue any research tradition which has a higher rate of progress than its rivals''".[[CiteRef::Laudan (1977)|p. 111]] | ||
|History=In [[Barseghyan (2015)|''The Laws of Scientific Change'']], Barseghyan left the question of including the logic of pursuit into the scope of scientonomy open. According to Barseghyan, "we are neither restrained nor obliged to provide an account of pursuit in an actual TSC".[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 41]] | |History=In [[Barseghyan (2015)|''The Laws of Scientific Change'']], Barseghyan left the question of including the logic of pursuit into the scope of scientonomy open. According to Barseghyan, "we are neither restrained nor obliged to provide an account of pursuit in an actual TSC".[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 41]] | ||
}} | }} | ||
Revision as of 02:26, 31 December 2016
Is there a logic of theory pursuit?
The scope of scientonomy encompasses the process of theory acceptance, whereas the question of how theories become pursued is currently not within the scope of theoretical scientonomy. However, in principle, it might be interesting to see if there is any logic to the process of theory pursuit.
In the scientonomic context, this question was first formulated by Hakob Barseghyan in 2015. The question is currently accepted as a legitimate topic for discussion by Scientonomy community.
Contents
Broader History
Among classical philosophers of science, there was no unanimity as to whether the question of theory pursuit can have a reasonable answer. For instance, Imre Lakatos can be interpreted as claiming that while one has to accept the most progressive research programme, one can legitimately pursue any research programme whatsoever.1p. 117 The latter part of the claim would be readily accepted by Paul Feyerabend.2pp. 213-216
However, there were other philosophers who thought that there can be rules telling us which theories are pursuit worthy. In his Progress and Its Problems, Larry Laudan devises a methodological rule indicating when it is rational to pursue a certain research tradition. According to Laudan, "it is always rational to pursue any research tradition which has a higher rate of progress than its rivals".3p. 111
Scientonomic History
In The Laws of Scientific Change, Barseghyan left the question of including the logic of pursuit into the scope of scientonomy open. According to Barseghyan, "we are neither restrained nor obliged to provide an account of pursuit in an actual TSC".4p. 41
Acceptance Record
| Community | Accepted From | Acceptance Indicators | Still Accepted | Accepted Until | Rejection Indicators |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Scientonomy | 1 January 2016 | The question became de facto accepted by the community as legitimate at that time together with the whole theory of scientific change. | Yes |
All Theories
If an answer to this question is missing, please click here to add it.
Accepted Theories
Suggested Modifications
Current View
There is currently no accepted answer to this question.
Related Topics
It has the following sub-topic(s):
This topic is also related to the following topic(s):
References
- ^ Lakatos, Imre. (1971) History of Science and Its Rational Reconstructions. In Lakatos (1978a), 102-138.
- ^ Feyerabend, Paul. (1976) On the Critique of Scientific Reason. In Cohen et al. (Eds.) (1976), 109-143.
- ^ Laudan (1977)
- ^ Barseghyan, Hakob. (2015) The Laws of Scientific Change. Springer.
