Patton (2019)
Patton, Paul. (2019) Epistemic Tools and Epistemic Agents in Scientonomy. Scientonomy 3, 63-89. Retrieved from https://scientojournal.com/index.php/scientonomy/article/view/33621.
Title | Epistemic Tools and Epistemic Agents in Scientonomy |
---|---|
Resource Type | journal article |
Author(s) | Paul Patton |
Year | 2019 |
URL | https://scientojournal.com/index.php/scientonomy/article/view/33621 |
DOI | 10.33137/js.v3i0.33621 |
Journal | Scientonomy |
Volume | 3 |
Pages | 63-89 |
Abstract
The only subtype of epistemic agent currently recognized within scientonomy is community. The place of both individuals and epistemic tools in the scientonomic ontology is yet to be clarified. This paper extends the scientonomic ontology to include epistemic agents and epistemic tools as well as their relationship to one another. Epistemic agent is defined as an agent capable of taking epistemic stances towards epistemic elements. These stances must be taken intentionally, that is, based on a semantic understanding of the epistemic element in question and its available alternatives, with reason, and for the purpose of acquiring knowledge. I argue that there can be both communal and individual epistemic agents. Epistemic agents are linked by relationships of authority delegation based on their differing areas of expertise. Having established the role of epistemic agents in the process of scientific change, I then turn to the role of epistemic tools, such as a thermometer, a text, or a particle accelerator in epistemic activities. I argue that epistemic tools play a different role in scientific change than do epistemic agents. This role is specified by an agent’s employed method. A physical object or system is an epistemic tool for some epistemic agent if there is a procedure by which the tool can provide an acceptable source of knowledge for answering some question under the employed method of the agent. An agent is said to rely on such a tool.
Theories
Here are all the theories formulated in Patton (2019):
Theory | Type | Formulation | Formulated In |
---|---|---|---|
One-sided Authority Delegation (Patton-2019) | Definition | Epistemic agents A and B are said to be in a relationship of one-sided authority delegation iff A delegates authority over question x to B, but B doesn’t delegate any authority to A. | 2019 |
Multiple Authority Delegation (Patton-2019) | Definition | Epistemic agent A is said to engage in a relationship of multiple authority delegation over question x iff A delegates authority over question x to more than one epistemic agent. | 2019 |
Singular Authority Delegation (Patton-2019) | Definition | Epistemic agent A is said to engage in a relationship of singular authority delegation over question x iff A delegates authority over question x to exactly one epistemic agent. | 2019 |
Mutual Authority Delegation (Patton-2019) | Definition | Epistemic agents A and B are said to be in a relationship of mutual authority delegation iff A delegates authority over question x to B, and B delegates authority over question y to A. | 2019 |
Hierarchical Authority Delegation (Patton-2019) | Definition | A sub-type of multiple authority delegation where different epistemic agents are delegated different degrees of authority over question x. | 2019 |
Epistemic Agent (Patton-2019) | Definition | An agent capable of taking epistemic stances towards epistemic elements. | 2019 |
Non-Hierarchical Authority Delegation (Patton-2019) | Definition | A sub-type of multiple authority delegation where different epistemic agents are delegated the same degree of authority over question x. | 2019 |
Epistemic Tool (Patton-2019) | Definition | A physical object or system is an epistemic tool for an epistemic agent iff there is a procedure by which the tool can provide an acceptable source of knowledge for answering some question under the employed method of that agent. | 2019 |
Tool Reliance (Patton-2019) | Definition | An epistemic agent is said to rely on an epistemic tool iff there is a procedure through which the tool can provide an acceptable source of knowledge for answering some question under the employed method of that agent. | 2019 |
Authority Delegation (Patton-2019) | Definition | Epistemic agent A is said to be delegating authority over question x to epistemic agent B iff (1) agent A accepts that agent B is an expert on question x and (2) agent A will accept a theory answering question x if agent B says so. | 2019 |
Individual Epistemic Agent Exists | Descriptive | There is such a thing as an individual epistemic agent. | 2019 |
Individual Epistemic Agent Is a Subtype of Epistemic Agent (Patton-2019) | Descriptive | Individual Epistemic Agent is a subtype of Epistemic Agent, i.e. epistemic agent is a supertype of individual epistemic agent. | 2019 |
Suggested Modifications
Here are all the modifications suggested in Patton (2019):
- Sciento-2019-0014: Accept the new definition of epistemic agent as an agent capable of taking epistemic stances towards epistemic elements. The modification was suggested to Scientonomy community by Paul Patton on 26 December 2019.1 The modification was accepted on 11 October 2020. The modification was characterized as "a very welcome addition to the scientonomic ontology" for despite all the talks of epistemic agents "the very notion of epistemic agency has remained unclear" for years,c1 for its "strict explication has been lacking".c2 It was agreed that the definition is an important starting point for our discussions concerning individual and communal agents.c3 c4 It was also noted that the definition is important for addressing the "the question of agency of epistemic tools"c5 and the question of "the applicability of scientonomic laws to individual agents".c6
- Sciento-2019-0015: Accept that there are two types of epistemic agents – individual and communal. Also accept the question of applicability of the laws of scientific change to individuals as a legitimate topic of scientonomic inquiry. The modification was suggested to Scientonomy community by Paul Patton on 26 December 2019.1 The modification was accepted on 10 January 2022. It was agreed during seminar discussions that the "modification aims to codify our de facto communal stance towards the ontology of epistemic agents".c1 This is confirmed by the fact that several recent articles take this ontology of epistemic agents for granted (e.g., Barseghyan and Levesley (2021), Machado-Marques and Patton (2021)).23 Even as early as 2017, several of Loiselle's examples of authority delegation concern individual experts (see Loiselle (2017)).4
- Sciento-2019-0016: Accept the definition of epistemic tool, stating that a physical object or system is an epistemic tool for an epistemic agent, when there is a procedure by which the tool can provide an acceptable source of knowledge for answering some question under the employed method of that agent. The modification was suggested to Scientonomy community by Paul Patton on 26 December 2019.1 The modification is currently being evaluated; a verdict is pending.
- Sciento-2019-0017: Accept the definitions of authority delegation, and its subtypes, that generalize the currently accepted definitions to apply to all epistemic agents, rather than only communities. The modification was suggested to Scientonomy community by Paul Patton on 26 December 2019.1 The modification was accepted on 6 February 2023. The commentators found the modification uncontroversial.c1 c2 It was noted that the modification "merely attempts to capture what is already de facto accepted - namely, the idea that authority can be delegated by and to epistemic agents of all kinds (both communal and individual)" as indicated by the "fact that the canonical examples of authority delegation often involve individual experts (see, for example, Loiselle 2017)".c3 It was agreed that the modification "introduces a necessary rewording in the definitions of authority delegation and its species".c4
- Sciento-2019-0018: Accept that the relationship of tool reliance can obtain between epistemic agents and epistemic tools. Also accept the definition of tool reliance, which states that an epistemic agent is said to rely on an epistemic tool when there is a procedure through which the tool can provide an acceptable source of knowledge for answering some question under the employed method of that agent. The modification was suggested to Scientonomy community by Paul Patton on 26 December 2019.1 The modification is currently being evaluated; a verdict is pending.
References
- a b c d e Patton, Paul. (2019) Epistemic Tools and Epistemic Agents in Scientonomy. Scientonomy 3, 63-89. Retrieved from https://scientojournal.com/index.php/scientonomy/article/view/33621.
- ^ Barseghyan, Hakob and Levesley, Nichole. (2021) Question Dynamics. Scientonomy 4, 1-19. Retrieved from https://scientojournal.com/index.php/scientonomy/article/view/37120.
- ^ Machado-Marques, Sarah and Patton, Paul. (2021) Scientific Error and Error Handling. Scientonomy 4, 21-39. Retrieved from https://scientojournal.com/index.php/scientonomy/article/view/37121.
- ^ Loiselle, Mirka. (2017) Multiple Authority Delegation in Art Authentication. Scientonomy 1, 41-53. Retrieved from https://www.scientojournal.com/index.php/scientonomy/article/view/28233.