Theory Rejection theorem (Barseghyan-Pandey-2023)

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This is an answer to the question Mechanism of Theory Rejection that states "A theory becomes rejected when other elements that are incompatible with the theory become part of the mosaic."

Theory Rejection Theorem (Barseghyan-Pandey-2023).png

This version of Theory Rejection theorem was formulated by Hakob Barseghyan and Aayu Pandey in 2023.1

Scientonomic History

Initially, the theory rejection theorem was accepted as deducible from the conjunction of the first law for theories and Harder's zeroth law. After the replacement of Harder's zeroth law with the compatibility corollary, suggested by Fraser and Sarwar, it became accepted that the theory rejection theorem is a deductive consequence of the first law for theories and the compatibility corollary.2pp. 72-74

Barseghyan's original 2015 formulation makes a restrictive claim that a theory can be replaced only by another theory. In 2023, Pandey suggested a correction to the theorem by allowing theories to be replaced by epistemic elements of all types, which is more in tune with the first law from which the theorem presumably follows.

Acceptance Record

This theory has never been accepted.

Suggestions To Accept

Here are all the modifications where the acceptance of this theory has been suggested:

Modification Community Date Suggested Summary Verdict Verdict Rationale Date Assessed
Sciento-2023-0002 Scientonomy 28 December 2023 Accept new formulations of the first law for theories, norms, and questions that are in tune with the formulation of the first law. Also accept new formulations of the respective rejection theorems - theory rejection, norm rejection, and question rejection. Open

Question Answered

Theory Rejection theorem (Barseghyan-Pandey-2023) is an attempt to answer the following question:

See Mechanism of Theory Rejection for more details.

Description

According to Pandey's new formulation of the theory rejection theorem, a theory becomes rejected only when other epistemic elements that are incompatible with the theory become accepted. This formulation differs from Barseghyan's original formulation in that it allows a theory to be replaced by an epistemic element of any type, not just by other theories. In other respects, Pandey's formulation is similar to Barseghyan's.

Implicit in both theorems is the idea that each theory is assessed on an "individual basis by its compatibility with the propositions of the newly accepted theory".3p. 168 If it turns out that a previously accepted theory is compatible with the newly accepted theory, it remain in the agent's mosaic.

Although we normally expect a theory to be replaced by another theory in the same "field" of inquiry, Barseghyan and Pandey both agree that this is not necessarily the case. For example, Barseghyan writes, "HSC knows several cases where an accepted theory became rejected simply because it wasn’t compatible with new accepted theories of some other fields".3p. 171 Similarly, Pandey provides several examples of this phenomenon in Dilemma of The First Law.1

Barseghyan summarizes the theory rejection theorem as such:

In short, when the axioms of a theory are replaced by another theory, some of the theorems may nevertheless manage to stay in the mosaic, provided that they are compatible with the newly accepted theory. This is essentially what the theory rejection theorem tells us. Thus, if someday our currently accepted general relativity gets replaced by some new theory, the theories that followed from general relativity, such as the theory of black holes, may nevertheless manage to remain in the mosaic. 3p. 171

The gist of this theory can be illustrated by the following examples.

Astrology

Another example of the theory rejection theorem, specifically explaining that theories may not only be rejected because of the acceptance of new theories in their respective theories, is the case of natural astrology presented in Barseghyan (2015).

The exile of astrology from the mosaic is yet another example. It is well known that astrology was once a respected scientific discipline and its theories were part of the mosaic. Of course, not all of the astrology was accepted; it was the so-called natural astrology – the theory of celestial influences on physical phenomena of the terrestrial region – that was part of the Aristotelian-medieval mosaic. ... Although, for now, we cannot reconstruct all the details or even the approximate decade when the exile of natural astrology took place, one thing is clear: when the once-accepted theory of natural astrology became rejected, it wasn’t replaced by another theory of natural astrology.3p. 172

Theology

The rejection of theology proper (the study of God, his being, his attributes, and his works) from the scientific mosaic is a historical illustration of the Theory Rejection theorem and how accepted theories in one field may become rejected due to theories in other fields. In essence, theological propositions were rejected, but were not replaced with more theological propositions. It is difficult to track the exact dynamics of theology's "exile," but it is possible that these propositions were rejected and replaced with the thesis of agnosticism, or that they were rejected due to the acceptance of evolutionary biology. The "exile," as Barseghyan terms it, could have also been a very gradual process, and that the rejection of theological propositions came about for different reasons in different mosaics. Despite the difficulties in tracking down the exact dynamics of the gradual rejection of theology from the scientific mosaic, Barseghyan summarizes the evidence as such: "what must be appreciated here is that a theory can be replaced in the mosaic by theories pertaining to other fields of inquiry".3p. 172

Plenism

Barseghyan considers the case of plenism, "the view that there can be no empty space (i.e. no space absolutely devoid of matter)", as a key historical illustration of the Theory Rejection theorem in Barseghyan (2015).

Within the system of the Aristotelian-medieval natural philosophy, plenism was one of many theorems. Yet, when the Aristotelian natural philosophy was replaced by that of Descartes, plenism remained in the mosaic, for it was a theorem in the Cartesian system too. To appreciate this we have to consider the Aristotelian-medieval law of violent motion, which states that an object moves only if the applied force is greater than the resistance of the medium. In that case, according to the law, the velocity will be proportional to the force and inversely proportional to resistance. Otherwise the object won’t move; its velocity will be zero ...

Taken as an axiom, this law has many interesting consequences. It follows from this law, that if there were no resistance the velocity of the object would be infinite. But this is absurd since nothing can move infinitely fast (for that would mean being at two places simultaneously). Therefore, there should always be some resistance, i.e. something that fills up the medium. Thus, we arrive at the conception of plenism ...

There weren’t many elements of the Aristotelian-medieval mosaic that maintained their state within the Cartesian mosaic. The conception of plenism was among the few that survived through the transition. In the Cartesian system, plenism followed directly from the assumption that extension is the attribute of matter and that no attribute can exist independently from the substance in which it inheres ...

In short, when the axioms of a theory are replaced by another theory, some of the theorems may nevertheless manage to stay in the mosaic, provided that they are compatible with the newly accepted theory. This is essentially what the theory rejection theorem tells us. Thus, if someday our currently accepted general relativity gets replaced by some new theory, the theories that followed from general relativity, such as the theory of black holes, may nevertheless manage to remain in the mosaic.3p. 168-170

Reasons

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Questions About This Theory

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References

  1. a b  Pandey, Aayu. (2023) Dilemma of the First Law. Scientonomy 5, 25-46. Retrieved from https://scientojournal.com/index.php/scientonomy/article/view/42258.
  2. ^  Fraser, Patrick and Sarwar, Ameer. (2018) A Compatibility Law and the Classification of Theory Change. Scientonomy 2, 67-82. Retrieved from https://scientojournal.com/index.php/scientonomy/article/view/31278.
  3. a b c d e f  Barseghyan, Hakob. (2015) The Laws of Scientific Change. Springer.