Difference between revisions of "Scientific Mosaic"

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|Question=What is '''scientific mosaic'''? How should it be ''defined''?
 
|Question=What is '''scientific mosaic'''? How should it be ''defined''?
 
|Description=''Scientific mosaic'' is one of the key concepts in current scientonomy. Thus, its proper definition is of great importance.
 
|Description=''Scientific mosaic'' is one of the key concepts in current scientonomy. Thus, its proper definition is of great importance.
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|Authors List=Hakob Barseghyan,
 
|Formulated Year=2015
 
|Formulated Year=2015
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|Authors List=Hakob Barseghyan,
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|Prehistory=Although almost all of the great philosophers of science of the 20th century have described the history of science in terms of a changing, systematic collection of beliefs, there has never been a real consensus in the language used to describe such a collection. [[Thomas Kuhn]] used the word ''paradigm'' to talk of integrated collections of theories, methods, and values that were replaced during episodes of revolutionary scientific change.[[CiteRef::Bird (2011)]][[CiteRef::Kuhn (1962a)]] [[Imre Lakatos]] described a set of propositions as fitting into a scientific ''research programme'';[[CiteRef::Lakatos (1978a)]] [[Larry Laudan]] used the concept of ''research tradition''.[[CiteRef::Matheson and Dallmann (2015)]][[CiteRef::Laudan (1984a)]] Richard DeWitt talks of ''worldviews'' to describe the beliefs held by a scientific community at any given time.[[CiteRef::DeWitt (2010)|p. 7]]  
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|Prehistory=Although almost all of the great philosophers of science of the 20th century have described the history of science in terms of a changing, systematic collection of beliefs, there has never been a real consensus in the language used to describe such a collection. [[Thomas Kuhn]] used the word ''paradigm'' to talk of integrated collections of theories, methods, and values that were replaced during episodes of revolutionary scientific change.[[CiteRef::Bird (2011)]][[CiteRef::Kuhn (1962)]][[Imre Lakatos]] described a set of propositions as fitting into a scientific “research programme”[[CiteRef::Lakatos (1978a)]]; [[Larry Laudan]] used the concept of ''research tradition''.[[CiteRef::Matheson and Dallmann (2015)]][[CiteRef::Laudan (1984)]] Richard DeWitt talks of “worldviews” to describe the beliefs held by a scientific community at any given time.[[CiteRef::DeWitt (2010)|p. 7]]  
 
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Although these terms are used to describe collections of scientific beliefs at some particular point in history, it would be wrong to assume that they are interchangeable. There has been much debate within the philosophy of science over what constitutes the exact contents of a given community’s system of beliefs. While for [[Karl Popper]] and [[Imre Lakatos]] a belief system would only include descriptive propositions, for the later Larry Laudan, methods and values should be included along with theories as part of the fabric of a community’s belief system.[[CiteRef::Laudan (1984)|p. 26]] According to Kuhn, all theories within a given paradigm use a certain “taxonomy” unique to that paradigm. Thus, beliefs held by a community holding paradigm A can never be fully understood by the community believing paradigm B, because both paradigms operate under at least partially untranslatable languages.[[CiteRef::Bird (2011)]]
 
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There has also been debate concerning whether or not scientific methods change over time. The methods of science were once supposed to be fixed.  The idea that methods should be included as historically relative elements within a community’s system of beliefs is known as [[Static and Dynamic Methods|the dynamic method thesis]], and was proposed by [[Paul Feyerabend]] in the 1970’s.[[CiteRef::Preston (2016)]][[CiteRef::Feyerabend (1975)]] In the late 1980's, the question of the existence of static methods became a focal point of the debate between Larry Laudan and John Worrall. In his ''Science and Values'', Laudan (referred to as the 'later Laudan' because his views changed substantially over his career) argued that no method of theory assessment is immune to change. Worrall disagreed, claiming that there are some methods which have persisted throughout all changes.[[CiteRef::Laudan (1984)]][[CiteRef::Worrall (1988)]][[CiteRef::Laudan (1989)]][[CiteRef::Worrall (1989)]] The idea that scientific methods change through time is now generally accepted among contemporary historians and philosophers of science.
 
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|History=The term ''scientific mosaic'' was coined by Hakob Barseghyan in 2012 within the context of the [[The Theory of Scientific Change]] (TSC). It was suggested at the outset that a scientific mosaic should be understood as a collection of changeable theories and methods. The mosaic metaphor was chosen because the tiles of a mosaic may be tightly adjusted, or their may be a considerable gap between them. In scientific mosaics there may be considerable gaps, such as that between general relativity and quantum mechanics, despite the fact that both are accepted parts of the mosaic.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)| p. 5]]
 
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When the TSC was initially formulated, it made no mention of the status of [[Theory#Descriptive and Normative|normative propositions]] in relation to the scientific mosaic. In 2014, Joel Burkholder identified a problem that would arise if normative propositions, such as, ethical conceptions or [[Methodology|methodologies]] – were included in the mosaic. If this were the case, then by [[The Third Law|the third law]], methods would have to be deducible from accepted methodologies. However, the history of science shows that methodologies and methods often conflict. How, then, can the latter be a deductive consequence of the former?
 
  
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In 2015, [[Modification:2016-0002|Zoe Sebastien proposed]] that the definition of “[[theory]]” should be changed to include both descriptive and normative propositions. She showed how this change could be implemented without violating [[The Zeroth Law|the law of compatibility]]. Her [[Modification:2016-0002|suggestion]] became [[Theory Acceptance|accepted]] in 2016.[[CiteRef::Sebastien (2016)]]
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Although these terms are used to describe collections of scientific beliefs at some particular point in history, it would be wrong to assume that they are interchangeable. There has been much debate within the philosophy of science over what constitutes the exact contents of a given community’s system of beliefs. While for [[Karl Popper]] and [[Imre Lakatos]] a belief system would only include descriptive propositions, for the later Larry Laudan, methods and values should be included along with theories as part of the fabric of a community’s belief system.[[CiteRef::Laudan (1984a)|p. 26]]  
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|Current View=Currently, a ''scientific mosaic'' is defined as a collection of all [[Theory Acceptance|accepted]] theories and [[Method Employment|employed]] methods.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 5]] A ''[[Theory|theory]]'' is defined as any set of propositions, descriptive or normative,[[CiteRef::Sebastien (2016)]] while a ''[[method]]'' is defined as a set of requirements employed in theory assessment.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 3-10]]
 
  
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[[File:Scientific_Mosaic_Theory_Method_Class_Diagram.png|center|632px]]
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There has also been debate concerning whether or not scientific methods change over time. The methods of science were once supposed to be fixed. The idea that methods should be included as historically relative elements within a community’s system of beliefs is known as [[Static and Dynamic Methods|the dynamic method thesis]], and was proposed by [[Paul Feyerabend]] in the 1970’s.[[CiteRef::Preston (2016)]][[CiteRef::Feyerabend (1975a)]] In the late 1980's, the question of the existence of static methods became a focal point of the debate between Larry Laudan and John Worrall. In his ''Science and Values'', Laudan (referred to as the 'later Laudan' because his views changed substantially over his career) argued that no method of theory assessment is immune to change. Worrall disagreed, claiming that there are some methods which have persisted throughout all changes.[[CiteRef::Laudan (1984a)]][[CiteRef::Worrall (1988)]][[CiteRef::Laudan (1989a)]][[CiteRef::Worrall (1989)]] The idea that scientific methods change through time is now generally accepted among contemporary historians and philosophers of science.
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|History=The term ''scientific mosaic'' was coined by [[Hakob Barseghyan|Barseghyan]] in 2012 within the context of the [[The Theory of Scientific Change]] (TSC). It was suggested at the outset that a scientific mosaic should be understood as a collection of ''changeable'' [[Theory|theories]] and [[Method|methods]]. The mosaic metaphor was chosen because the tiles of a mosaic may be tightly adjusted, or their may be a considerable gap between them. In scientific mosaics there may be considerable gaps, such as that between general relativity and quantum mechanics, despite the fact that both are accepted parts of the mosaic.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)| p. 5]]  
  
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At the moment, theories and methods are believed to be the only two fundamental entities that constitute a scientific mosaic. In the TSC, values are not regarded as separate entities within the scientific mosaic. This is because all values can be formulated as methods, there is no essential distinction between the two.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 6-7]]  
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The [[Scientific Mosaic (Barseghyan-2015)|initial notion of ''scientific mosaic'']] worked well with the original ontology of epistemic elements suggested by Barseghyan in [[Barseghyan (2015)|''The Laws of Scientific Change'']] as well as the modified ontology suggested by [[Zoe Sebastien|Sebastien]] in [[Sebastien (2016)|"The Status of Normative Propositions in the Theory of Scientific Change"]], since in both ontologies [[Theory Is a Subtype of Epistemic Element (Barseghyan-2015)|theories]] and [[Method Is a Subtype of Epistemic Element (Barseghyan-2015)|methods]] are the only two fundamental types of epistemic elements.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)]][[CiteRef::Sebastien (2016)]]
  
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While it is not included in the definition, it is understood that the bearer of a mosaic is a [[Scientific Community|scientific community]].[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. xi]] The reason for this omission is that there is currently no accepted definition of "scientific community".
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With the acceptance of [[William Rawleigh|Rawleigh]]'s new ontology of epistemic elements which added questions as a new [[Question Is a Subtype of Epistemic Element (Rawleigh-2018)|type of epistemic element]], it became apparent that the definition of scientific mosaic should be adjusted to include questions.[[CiteRef::Rawleigh (2018)]] [[Scientific Mosaic (Barseghyan-2018)|One such definition]] was suggested by Barseghyan in his [[Barseghyan (2018)|"Redrafting the Ontology of Scientific Change"]].[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2018)]] The new definition became [[Modification:Sciento-2018-0009|became accepted]] in 2020. As this definition does not refer to any epistemic elements explicitly, it is in principle compatible with any future ontology insofar as that ontology involves the notions of ''acceptance'' and ''employment''.
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|Related Topics=Scientific Change, Theory, Method, Mechanism of Scientific Change,
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|Related Topics=Scientific Change, Theory, Method, Mechanism of Scientific Change, Employed Method, Theory Acceptance,
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{{Acceptance Record
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|Community=Community:Scientonomy
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|Accepted From Era=CE
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|Accepted From Year=2016
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|Accepted From Month=January
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|Accepted From Day=1
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|Accepted From Approximate=No
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|Acceptance Indicators=This is when the community accepted its first definition of the term, [[Scientific Mosaic (2015)]], which indicates that the question is itself considered legitimate.
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|Still Accepted=Yes
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|Accepted Until Approximate=No
 
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Latest revision as of 19:20, 10 February 2023

What is scientific mosaic? How should it be defined?

Scientific mosaic is one of the key concepts in current scientonomy. Thus, its proper definition is of great importance.

In the scientonomic context, this term was first used by Hakob Barseghyan in 2015. The term is currently accepted by Scientonomy community.

In Scientonomy, the accepted definition of the term is:

  • A set of all epistemic elements accepted and/or employed by an epistemic agent.

Broader History

Although almost all of the great philosophers of science of the 20th century have described the history of science in terms of a changing, systematic collection of beliefs, there has never been a real consensus in the language used to describe such a collection. Thomas Kuhn used the word paradigm to talk of integrated collections of theories, methods, and values that were replaced during episodes of revolutionary scientific change.12 Imre Lakatos described a set of propositions as fitting into a scientific research programme;3 Larry Laudan used the concept of research tradition.45 Richard DeWitt talks of worldviews to describe the beliefs held by a scientific community at any given time.6p. 7

Although these terms are used to describe collections of scientific beliefs at some particular point in history, it would be wrong to assume that they are interchangeable. There has been much debate within the philosophy of science over what constitutes the exact contents of a given community’s system of beliefs. While for Karl Popper and Imre Lakatos a belief system would only include descriptive propositions, for the later Larry Laudan, methods and values should be included along with theories as part of the fabric of a community’s belief system.5p. 26

There has also been debate concerning whether or not scientific methods change over time. The methods of science were once supposed to be fixed. The idea that methods should be included as historically relative elements within a community’s system of beliefs is known as the dynamic method thesis, and was proposed by Paul Feyerabend in the 1970’s.78 In the late 1980's, the question of the existence of static methods became a focal point of the debate between Larry Laudan and John Worrall. In his Science and Values, Laudan (referred to as the 'later Laudan' because his views changed substantially over his career) argued that no method of theory assessment is immune to change. Worrall disagreed, claiming that there are some methods which have persisted throughout all changes.591011 The idea that scientific methods change through time is now generally accepted among contemporary historians and philosophers of science.

Scientonomic History

The term scientific mosaic was coined by Barseghyan in 2012 within the context of the The Theory of Scientific Change (TSC). It was suggested at the outset that a scientific mosaic should be understood as a collection of changeable theories and methods. The mosaic metaphor was chosen because the tiles of a mosaic may be tightly adjusted, or their may be a considerable gap between them. In scientific mosaics there may be considerable gaps, such as that between general relativity and quantum mechanics, despite the fact that both are accepted parts of the mosaic.12p. 5

The initial notion of scientific mosaic worked well with the original ontology of epistemic elements suggested by Barseghyan in The Laws of Scientific Change as well as the modified ontology suggested by Sebastien in "The Status of Normative Propositions in the Theory of Scientific Change", since in both ontologies theories and methods are the only two fundamental types of epistemic elements.1213

With the acceptance of Rawleigh's new ontology of epistemic elements which added questions as a new type of epistemic element, it became apparent that the definition of scientific mosaic should be adjusted to include questions.14 One such definition was suggested by Barseghyan in his "Redrafting the Ontology of Scientific Change".15 The new definition became became accepted in 2020. As this definition does not refer to any epistemic elements explicitly, it is in principle compatible with any future ontology insofar as that ontology involves the notions of acceptance and employment.

Acceptance Record

Here is the complete acceptance record of this term (it includes all the instances when the term was accepted as a part of a community's taxonomy):
CommunityAccepted FromAcceptance IndicatorsStill AcceptedAccepted UntilRejection Indicators
Scientonomy1 January 2016This is when the community accepted its first definition of the term, Scientific Mosaic (2015), which indicates that the question is itself considered legitimate.Yes

All Theories

The following definitions of the term have been suggested:
TheoryFormulationFormulated In
Scientific Mosaic (Barseghyan-2015)A set of all accepted theories and employed methods.2015
Scientific Mosaic (Barseghyan-2018)A set of all epistemic elements accepted and/or employed by an epistemic agent.2018
Scientific Mosaic (Rawleigh-2022)A model of all epistemic elements accepted or employed by the epistemic agent.2022
If a definition of this term is missing, please click here to add it.

Accepted Theories

The following definitions of the term have been accepted:
CommunityTheoryAccepted FromAccepted Until
ScientonomyScientific Mosaic (Barseghyan-2015)1 January 201617 May 2020
ScientonomyScientific Mosaic (Barseghyan-2018)17 May 2020

Suggested Modifications

Here is a list of modifications concerning this term:
Modification Community Date Suggested Summary Verdict Verdict Rationale Date Assessed
Sciento-2018-0009 Scientonomy 8 October 2018 Accept the new definition of scientific mosaic as a set of all epistemic elements accepted and/or employed by the epistemic agent. Accepted Initially, the modification raised an objection from Patton who argued that the modification "is not acceptable at present, because it contains a term; epistemic agent, which has not yet been defined within scientonomy".c1 This objection received two counterarguments. According to Barseghyan, the lack of such a definition of epistemic agent should not "be taken as a reason for postponing the acceptance of the definition of scientific mosaic", since inevitably any taxonomy contains terms that "rely in their definitions on other (yet) undefined terms".c2 This point was seconded by Rawleigh who argued that the definition of scientific mosaic is to be accepted regardless of whether there is an accepted definition of epistemic agent, since "it's de facto accepted already that some agent is required to have a mosaic".c3 In early 2020, Patton dropped his objection as he found that there was "sufficient general understanding of what an epistemic agent is to accept this definition of the scientific mosaic, even without first accepting a definition of epistemic agent".c4 Additionally, Rawleigh argued that the definition is to be accepted since we have "already accepted the revised question-theory ontology".c5 17 May 2020
Sciento-2022-0001 Scientonomy 28 February 2022 Accept a new model-theoretic definition of scientific mosaic, according to which, a scientific mosaic is a model of all epistemic elements accepted or employed by the epistemic agent. Open

Current Definition

In Scientonomy, the accepted definition of the term is Scientific Mosaic (Barseghyan-2018).

Scientific Mosaic (Barseghyan-2018) states: "A set of all epistemic elements accepted and/or employed by an epistemic agent."

Scientific Mosaic (Barseghyan-2018).png

According to this definition, scientific mosaic encompasses all accepted and employed epistemic elements. The definition is compatible with the ontology of epistemic elements that considers questions and theories (including methods as a sub-type of normative theories) as the only two fundamental types of epistemic elements. In addition, by not referring to any epistemic element explicitly, the definition also purports to be compatible with any future ontology of epistemic elements insofar as that ontology assumes that elements can be accepted and employed.

Ontology

Existence

In Scientonomy, there are currently no accepted claims concerning the existence of Scientific Mosaic.

Disjointness

In Scientonomy, no classes are currently accepted as disjoint with Scientific Mosaic.

Subtypes

In Scientonomy, there are currently no accepted subtypes of Scientific Mosaic.

Supertypes

In Scientonomy, there are currently no accepted supertypes of Scientific Mosaic.

Associations

In Scientonomy, there are currently no accepted associations of Scientific Mosaic.


If a question concerning the ontology of a scientific mosaic is missing, please add it here.

Dynamics

If a question concerning the dynamics of a scientific mosaic is missing, please add it here.


Related Topics

This term is also related to the following topic(s):

References

  1. ^  Bird, Alexander. (2011) Thomas Kuhn. In Zalta (Ed.) (2016). Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2016/entries/thomas-kuhn/.
  2. ^  Kuhn, Thomas. (1962) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. University of Chicago Press.
  3. ^  Lakatos, Imre. (1978) Philosophical Papers: Volume 1. The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes. Cambridge University Press.
  4. ^  Matheson, Carl and Dallmann, Justin. (2015) Historicist Theories of Scientific Rationality. In Zalta (Ed.) (2016). Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2016/entries/rationality-historicist/.
  5. a b c  Laudan, Larry. (1984) Science and Values. University of California Press.
  6. ^  DeWitt, Richard. (2010) An Introduction to the History and Philosophy of Science. Wiley-Blackwell.
  7. ^  Preston, John. (2016) Paul Feyerabend. In Zalta (Ed.) (2016). Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2016/entries/feyerabend/.
  8. ^  Feyerabend, Paul. (1975) Against Method. New Left Books.
  9. ^  Worrall, John. (1988) Review: The Value of a Fixed Methodology. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39, 263-275.
  10. ^  Laudan, Larry. (1989) If It Ain't Broke, Don't Fix It. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40, 369-375.
  11. ^  Worrall, John. (1989) Fix It and Be Damned: A Reply to Laudan. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40, 376-388.
  12. a b  Barseghyan, Hakob. (2015) The Laws of Scientific Change. Springer.
  13. ^  Sebastien, Zoe. (2016) The Status of Normative Propositions in the Theory of Scientific Change. Scientonomy 1, 1-9. Retrieved from https://www.scientojournal.com/index.php/scientonomy/article/view/26947.
  14. ^  Rawleigh, William. (2018) The Status of Questions in the Ontology of Scientific Change. Scientonomy 2, 1-12. Retrieved from https://scientojournal.com/index.php/scientonomy/article/view/29651.
  15. ^  Barseghyan, Hakob. (2018) Redrafting the Ontology of Scientific Change. Scientonomy 2, 13-38. Retrieved from https://scientojournal.com/index.php/scientonomy/article/view/31032.

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