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| − | {{Descriptive Theory
| + | The original Theory of Scientific Change proposed by Barseghyan in 2015 is a set consisting of the following claims: |
| − | |Title=The Theory of Scientific Change
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| − | |Topic=Mechanism of Scientific Change
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| − | |Authors List=Hakob Barseghyan,
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| − | |Formulated Year=2015
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| − | |Formulation Text=The laws of scientific change govern the process of changes in a scientific mosaic, i.e. transitions from one theory to the next and one method to the next. The theory of scientific change explains many different aspects of the process such as theory acceptance and method employment, scientific inertia and compatibility, splitting and merging of scientific mosaics, scientific underdeterminism, changeability of scientific methods, role of sociocultural factors, and more.
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| − | |Description====What is the theory of scientific change?===
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| − | [[File:Scientific change.jpg|right|475px]]
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| − | The ''theory of scientific change (TSC)'' is a general descriptive social scientific theory of the actual process of [[Scientific_Change|''scientific change'']] stated in axiomatic deductive form. It is the founding theory of the new field of [[Scientonomy|scientonomy]]. It was proposed by Hakob Barseghyan in 2015 in his book 'The Laws of Scientific Change'[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)]].
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| − | ====Methods====
| + | '''Definitions''' |
| − | As in the later works of Larry Laudan [[CiteRef::Laudan (1984)]], the TSC rejects the idea of a fixed universal scientific method, and accepts the idea that the methods of science have changed over time. This rejection is based on clear evidence from the history of science that the methods of science have, in fact, changed [[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 3-21]]. In contrast to most earlier views of the process of scientific change, TSC draws a clear distinction between methods, which are the implicit standards actually used in theory assessment, and the normative epistemic methodologies espoused by scientists or philosophers of science. The TSC takes normative methodological prescriptions to be outside its scope. It seeks a purely descriptive account of the methods employed by scientists to assess theories [[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 12-21]]. Following the resolution of logical problems by Sebastien [[CiteRef::Sebastien (2016)]], it also views the descriptive study of scientific methodologies, and their relationship to employed methods, as within its scope. The TSC rejects Kuhn[[CiteRef::Kuhn (1977)]]and Laudan's[[CiteRef::Laudan (1984)]] distinction between values and methods, asserting that values can more parsimoniously be included within the category of methods. Thus, the value of predictive accuracy is instead seen as the method 'accept theories that are predictively accurate'.
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| − | ====Theory appraisal====
| + | * [[Theory (Barseghyan-2015)]] |
| − | The TSC draws a distinction between the process of scientific theory construction, in which new theories are generated or constructed, and that of theory appraisal, in which theories are evaluated by a scientific community. It seeks a descriptive account of the process of theory appraisal, but does not view the process of theory construction as a necessary part of its scope [[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 21-30]]. Unlike past usage, the TSC seeks a clear technical vocabulary to categorize the stances that a scientific community can take towards a theory. It proposes three categories: acceptance, use, and pursuit. A theory is said to be ''accepted'' if it is taken to be the best available description of its object. A theory is said to be ''used'' if it is taken to be an adequate tool for practical application, and to be ''pursued'' if it is considered worthy of further development [[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 30-42]].
| + | * [[Method (Barseghyan-2015)]] |
| | + | * [[Methodology (Barseghyan-2015)]] |
| | + | * [[Scientific Mosaic (Barseghyan-2015)]] |
| | + | * [[Scientific Change (Barseghyan-2015)]] |
| | + | * [[Mosaic Merge (Barseghyan-2015)]] |
| | + | * [[Acceptance Criteria (Barseghyan-2015)]] |
| | + | * [[Compatibility Criteria (Barseghyan-2015)]] |
| | + | * [[Demarcation Criteria (Barseghyan-2015)]] |
| | + | * [[Theory Acceptance (Barseghyan-2015)]] |
| | + | * [[Theory Use (Barseghyan-2015)]] |
| | + | * [[Theory Pursuit (Barseghyan-2015)]] |
| | + | * [[Employed Method (Barseghyan-2015)]] |
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| − | ====Level of social organization====
| + | '''Ontology''' |
| − | [[File:Individual and group.jpg|right|500px]]
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| − | Rather than individual scientists, the TSC focuses primarily on the behavior of [[Scientific Community|scientific communities]]. A scientific community consists of individual scientists and their interactions with one another. Past research in the history of science has often focused on prominent individual scientists. The beliefs and decisions of individual scientists are diverse and the relationship between their behavior and that of a scientific community is by no means obvious. Scientific change takes place at the level of the community, when a community as a whole decides to accept a new theory, or employ a new method. This is the reason why the TSC focuses at this level [[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 43-52]]. It seeks distinctive historical research methods, such as the analysis of textbooks and encyclopedias, as indicators of the accepted beliefs of a scientific community [[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 113-120]].
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| − | ====Time, fields, and scale====
| + | * [[Theory Is a Subtype of Epistemic Element (Barseghyan-2015)]] |
| − | The TSC seeks to account for the process of scientific change during all historical time periods within which a corpus of accepted scientific beliefs existed. It seeks to account for this entire corpus of beliefs. The TSC defines "science" broadly. For example, during the medieval and early modern period, propositions about the natural world and about theological matters were considered part of the same system of beliefs. For those time periods, the TSC takes theological beliefs to be within its purview [[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 3-21]].
| + | * [[Method Is a Subtype of Epistemic Element (Barseghyan-2015)]] |
| | + | * [[Descriptive Theory Is a Subtype of Theory (Barseghyan-2015)]] |
| | + | * [[Epistemic Stances Towards Theories - Theory Acceptance (Barseghyan-2015)]] |
| | + | * [[Epistemic Stances Towards Theories - Theory Pursuit (Barseghyan-2015)]] |
| | + | * [[Epistemic Stances Towards Theories - Theory Use (Barseghyan-2015)]] |
| | + | * [[Theory Acceptance Is a Subtype of Epistemic Stance (Barseghyan-2015)]] |
| | + | * [[Theory Use Is a Subtype of Epistemic Stance (Barseghyan-2015)]] |
| | + | * [[Theory Pursuit Is a Subtype of Epistemic Stance (Barseghyan-2015)]] |
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| − | ====Basic tenets of the theory====
| + | '''Dynamics''' |
| − | The TSC begins by positing the existence of a [[Scientific_Mosaic|''scientific mosaic'']] consisting of the accepted [[Theory|''theories'']] and employed [[Method|''methods'']] of a [[Scientific_Community|scientific community]] at some particular time in history. [[Scientific_Change|Scientific change]] is the process by which the contents of the mosaic are altered over time. The TSC posits four laws as its axioms which together account for changes to both theories and methods. These are, [[The_Zeroth_Law|The Zeroth Law: The law of compatibility]], [[The_First_Law|The First Law: The law of scientific inertia]], [[The_Second_Law|The Second Law: The law of theory acceptance]], and [[The_Third_Law|The Third Law: The law of method employment]]. These laws are summarized briefly here, and are expounded at greater length in their respective encyclopedia articles. A number of theorems have been deduced from these basic laws and they are also summarized here[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)]].
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| − | === Axioms ===
| + | * [[The First Law (Barseghyan-2015)]] |
| − | The TSC posits four laws as axioms governing the process of change to the [[Scientific_Mosaic|scientific mosaic]].
| + | * [[The Second Law (Barseghyan-2015)]] |
| − | ====Zeroth Law: The Law of Compatibility====
| + | * [[The Third Law (Barseghyan-2015)]] |
| − | The [[The_Zeroth_Law|''Zeroth Law'']], also known as the ''Law of Compatibility'' states that at any moment in time, the elements of the [[Scientific_Mosaic|scientific mosaic]] are compatible with one another. These elements include both [[Theory|theories]] and [[Method|methods]]. The compatibility criteria are part of the [[Method|method]] of the time [[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 152-164]].
| + | * [[The Zeroth Law (Harder-2015)]] |
| − | [[File: The_Zeroth_Law.png |center|350px]] | + | * [[Theory Rejection theorem (Barseghyan-2015)]] |
| | + | * [[Method Rejection theorem (Barseghyan-2015)]] |
| | + | * [[Synchronism of Method Rejection theorem (Barseghyan-2015)]] |
| | + | * [[Contextual Appraisal theorem (Barseghyan-2015)]] |
| | + | * [[Necessary Method theorem (Barseghyan-2015)]] |
| | + | * [[Dogmatism No Theory Change theorem (Barseghyan-2015)]] |
| | + | * [[Methodology Can Shape Method theorem (Barseghyan-2015)]] |
| | + | * [[Asynchronism of Method Employment theorem (Barseghyan-2015)]] |
| | + | * [Sociocultural Factors in Theory Acceptance theorem (Barseghyan-2015)]] |
| | + | * [[The Zeroth Law (Harder-2015)]] |
| | + | * [[The Zeroth Law (Harder-2015)]] |
| | + | * [[The Zeroth Law (Harder-2015)]] |
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| − | ====First Law: The Law of Scientific Inertia====
| + | '''Second Order''' |
| − | The ''[[The_First_Law|First Law]]'', also known as the ''Law of Scientific Inertia'' states that an element of the [[Scientific_Mosaic|scientific mosaic]] remains in the mosaic unless replaced by other elements. These elements include both [[Theory|theories]] and [[Method|methods]]. Replacement takes place in accordance with the [[The_Second_Law|Second]] and [[The Third Law|Third]] Laws [[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 123-129]].
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| − | [[File:First-law-general.jpg|center|250px]]
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| − | ====Second Law: The Law of Theory Acceptance====
| + | * [[The Second Law (Barseghyan-2015) is Tautological (Barseghyan-2015)]] |
| − | The ''[[The_Second_Law|Second Law]]'', also known as the ''Law of Theory Acceptance'' states that in order to become accepted into the [[Scientific_Mosaic|scientific mosaic]], a [[Theory|theory]] is assessed by the [[Method|method]] actually employed at the time[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 129-132]].
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| − | [[File: The_Second_Law.png |center|275px]]
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| − | ====Third Law: The Law of Method Employment====
| + | '''Metatheory''' |
| − | The ''[[The_Third_Law|Third Law]]'', also known as the ''Law of Method Employment'' states that a [[Method|method]] becomes employed when it is deducible from some subset of other employed [[Method|methods]] and accepted [[Theory|theories]] of the time[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 132-152]].
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| − | [[File:Sebastien-2016-001 The Third Law.png|center|325px]]
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| − | === Theorems ===
| + | * [[Scope of Scientonomy - Descriptive (Barseghyan-2015)]] |
| − | Taking the four laws of scientific change as the starting point, the following theorems about the process of [[Scientific Change|scientific change]] have so far been deduced [[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|Chapt. 5]].
| + | * [[Scope of Scientonomy - Appraisal (Barseghyan-2015)]] |
| − | ====Rejection of elements====
| + | * [[Scope of Scientonomy - Acceptance (Barseghyan-2015)]] |
| − | We can deduce three theorems that have to do with the rejection of [[Theory|theories]] or [[Method|methods]] from the [[Scientific Mosaic|scientific mosaic]].
| + | * [[Scope of Scientonomy - Social (Barseghyan-2015)]] |
| − | =====Dogmatism theorem=====
| + | * [[Scope of Scientonomy - All Fields (Barseghyan-2015)]] |
| − | No [[Theory|theory]] acceptance may take place in a genuinely dogmatic [[Scientific Community|community]]. Suppose a community has an accepted theory that asserts that it is the final and absolute truth. By the [[The Third Law|Third Law]] we deduce the method: accept no new theories ever. By the [[The Second Law|Second Law]] we deduce that no new theory can ever be accepted by the employed method of the time. By the [[The First Law|First Law]], we deduce that the accepted theory will remain the accepted theory forever[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 165-167]].
| + | * [[Scope of Scientonomy - All Scales (Barseghyan-2015)]] |
| − | [[File:Dogmatism-theorem.jpg|center|500px]] | + | * [[Scope of Scientonomy - All Time Periods (Barseghyan-2015)]] |
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| − | =====Theory rejection theorem=====
| + | * [[Response to the Argument from Changeability of Scientific Method (Barseghyan-2015)]] |
| − | A [[Theory|theory]] becomes rejected only when other theories that are incompatible with the theory become accepted. By the [[The First Law|First Law]] for theories, an accepted theory will remain accepted until it is replaced by other theories. By the [[The Zeroth Law|Zeroth Law,]] the elements of the [[Scientific Mosaic|scientific mosaic]] must be compatible with one another. Thus, a theory can only become rejected when it is replaced by an incompatible theory or theories[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 167-172]].
| + | * [[Response to the Argument from Nothing Permanent (Barseghyan-2015)]] |
| − | [[File:theory-rejection-theorem.jpg|center|500px]] | + | * [[Response to the Argument from Bad Track Record (Barseghyan-2015)]] |
| | + | * [[Response to the Argument from Social Construction (Barseghyan-2015)]] |
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| − | =====Method rejection theorem=====
| + | * [[Assessment of Scientonomy - Relevant Facts (Barseghyan-2015)]] |
| − | A [[Method|method]] ceases to be employed only when other methods that are incompatible with it become employed. By the [[The First Law|First Law]] for methods, an employed method will remain employed until it is replaced by other methods. By the [[The Zeroth Law|Zeroth Law]], the elements of the [[Scientific Mosaic|scientific mosaic]] must be compatible with one another. Thus, a method can only become rejected when it is replaced by an incompatible method or methods[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 172-176]].
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| − | [[File:method-rejection-theorem.jpg|center|500px]]
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| − | =====Synchronism of method rejection theorem=====
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| − | A [[Method|method]] becomes rejected only when some of the [[Theory|theories]] from which it follows become rejected. By the method rejection theorem, a method is rejected when other methods incompatible with it become employed. By the [[The Third Law|Third Law]], this can happen only when some of the theories from which it follows are also rejected [[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 177-183]].
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| − | [[File:Synchronism-of-method-rejection.jpg|center|500px]]
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| − | ====Contextual Appraisal====
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| − | [[Theory Acceptance|Theory assessment]] is an assessment of a proposed modification of the [[Scientific Mosaic|scientific mosaic]] by the [[Method|method]] employed at the time. By the [[The First Law|First Law]], a [[Theory|theory]] already in the mosaic is no longer appraised. By the [[The Second Law|Second Law]], it is only assessed when it first enters the mosaic[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 185-196]].
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| − | [[File:Contextual-appraisal.jpg|center|500px]]
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| − | ====Scientific Underdeterminism====
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| − | Scientific underdetermination is the thesis that the process of [[Scientific Change|scientific change]] is not deterministic, and science could have evolved differently than it did. Hypothetically, two [[Scientific Community|scientific communities]] developing separately could experience an entirely different sequence of successive states of their respective [[Scientific Mosaic|scientific mosaics.]] Even without the TSC, the implausibility of scientific determinism can be seen by considering the process of [[Theory|theory]] construction, which is outside the present scope of the TSC. Theory construction requires creative imagination, and the formulation of a given theory is therefore not inevitable. Still, underdetermination can also be inferred as a theorem from the axioms of the TSC [[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 196-198]].
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| − | =====Underdetermined method change=====
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| − | The [[The Third Law|third law]] allows for two distinct scenarios of method employment. A [[Method|method]] may become employed because it follows strictly from accepted [[Theory|theories]] or employed methods, or it may the abstract requirements of some other employed method. This second scenario allows for creative ingenuity and depends on the technology of the times, therefore it may be fulfilled in many ways and allows underdeterminism [[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 198]].
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| − | [[File:Underdetermined-method-change.jpg|center|500px]]
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| − | | |
| − | =====Underdetermined theory change=====
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| − | The process of [[Theory Acceptance|theory assessment]] under the TSC is underdetermined for two reasons. First, only [[Theory|theories]] that are constructed are available for assessment. Whether or not a theory is ever constructed is, at least partly a matter of creativity, and is therefore outside the scope of the TSC. Second, it is at least theoretically possible that a process of theory assessment will be inconclusive. This might be because the employed method of the time is vague, or because it involves multiple criteria, only some of which have been met [[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)| p. 199-200]].
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| − | [[File:Underdetermined-theory-change.jpg|center|500px]]
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| − | =====Underdeterminism of science=====
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| − | Taken together the theorem of underdetermined method change and the theorem of underdetermined theory change imply that scientific change is not a strictly deterministic process [[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)| p. 201-202]].
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| − | [[File:Scientific-underdetermination.jpg|center|500px]]
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| − | | |
| − | ====Mosaic Split and Mosaic Merge====
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| − | Mosaic split is a [[Scientific Change|scientific change]] that results when one [[Scientific Mosaic|scientific mosaic]] splits into two or more mosaics containing incompatible accepted [[Theory|theories]] or employed [[Method|methods]]. This entails that a previously united [[Scientific Community|scientific community]] bearing a single mosaic becomes two or more communities, each with its own mosaic. Mosaic merge is a scientific change in which two or more mosaics containing incompatible theories or methods become a single united mosaic with compatible theories and methods. This likewise entails the formation of a single community out of two or more [[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p.202-216]].
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| − | =====Necessary mosaic split=====
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| − | Necessary [[Scientific Mosaic|mosaic]] split is a form of mosaic split that must happen if it is ever the case that two incompatible [[Theory|theories]] both become accepted under the employed [[Method|method]] of the time. Since the theories are incompatible, under the [[The Zeroth Law|zeroth law]], they cannot be accepted into the same mosaic, and a mosaic split must then occur, as a matter of logical necessity [[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 204-207]].
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| − | [[File:Necessary-mosaic-split.jpg|center|500px]]
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| − | =====Possible mosaic split=====
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| − | Possible [[Scientific Mosaic|mosaic]] split is a form of mosaic split that can happen if it is ever the case that [[Theory|theory]] assessment reaches an inconclusive result. In this case, a mosaic split can, but need not necessarily, result [[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 208-213]].
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| − | [[File:Possible-mosaic-split.jpg|center|500px]]
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| − | ====Static and Dynamic Methods====
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| − | A dynamic [[Method|method]] is one that is changeable and has changed over the history of science. A static method one that has persisted unchanged throughout that history. A debate which occurred through a series of papers by [[Larry Laudan]] and John Worrall identified a distinction between substantive methods and procedural methods. Substantive methods are those which presuppose at least one contingent proposition (i.e. something that could be otherwise, such as a fact or theory about the empirical world) and are therefore changeable. Procedural methods don't presuppose any contingent propositions and rely only on logically necessary truths and therefore must be fixed. The TSC has important implications for this debate [[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)| p.217-225]].
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| − | =====Dynamic substantive methods=====
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| − | The thesis of [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/certainty/ fallibilism] asserts that any [[Theory|theory]] referring to the empirical world is always vulnerable to rejection. The synchronism of [[Method|method]] rejection theorem, detailed above, asserts that a method becomes rejected only when some of the theories from which it follows are rejected. Therefore any method that follows from an empirical theory is always vulnerable to rejection. All substantive methods are therefore necessarily also dynamic [[Barseghyan (2015)|p. 223-224]].
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| − | [[File:Dynamic-substantive-methods.jpg|center|500px]]
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| − | =====Static procedural methods=====
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| − | The [[Method|method]] rejection theorem, detailed above, asserts that a method ceases to be employed when other methods incompatible with the method become employed. By definition, a necessary truth, or tautology, cannot be incompatible with other necessary or contingent truths. Thus, all procedural methods are also static [[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 224-225]].
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| − | [[File:Static-procedural-methods.jpg|center|500px]]
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| − | ====Necessary Elements====
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| − | The question of necessary elements is the question of what, if anything, the TSC requires to be theoretically present at the outset, in order for scientific knowledge to get its start[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 226-233]].
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| − | =====Non-empty mosaic theorem=====
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| − | The non-empty [[Scientific Mosaic|mosaic]] theorem asserts that in order for a process of [[Scientific Change|scientific change]] to be possible, the mosaic must necessarily contain at least one element. Scientific change is impossible in an empty mosaic. It can be deduced from the [[The Second Law|second law]], which asserts that in order to become accepted into the mosaic, a [[Theory|theory]] is assessed by the [[Method|method]] actually employed at the time, and the [[The Third Law|third law]], which asserts that a method becomes employed only when it is deducible from other employed methods and accepted theories of the time [[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 226]].
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| − | [[File:non-empty-mosaic-theorem.jpg|center|500px]]
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| − | | |
| − | =====Necessary method theorem=====
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| − | The necessary method theorem asserts that the necessary element required by the non-empty mosaic theorem must be a method. It can be deduced from the second law that in order for a new theory to become accepted, the mosaic must contain at least one employed method. It can be deduced from the third law that in order for a new method to become employed, the mosaic must contain at least one theory and one other employed method. Therefore the initial element could only be a method. Barseghyan [[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 230]] suggests that the primordial method might be something extremely general and vague, such as 'accept only the best theories'[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 228-233]].
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| − | [[File:necessary-method-theorem.jpg|center|500px]]
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| − | ====Sociocultural Factors====
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| − | The role of sociocultural factors as posited by the TSC can be deduced from the second law, which asserts that a theory will be accepted only when it satisfies the employed method of the times. Sociocultural factors can affect the process of theory acceptance insofar as it is permitted by the employed method of the time [[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 233-240]].
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| − | [[File:social-factors-theorem.jpg|center|500px]]
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| − | ====The role of Methodology====
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| − | The role of methodologies in shaping methods under the TSC is indicated by the third law, under which the employed method is strictly determined by other methods and accepted theories of the time. A methodology can shape employed methods, but only if its requirements implement abstract requirements of some other employed method[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p.240-243]]
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| − | [[File:methodology-shapes-method.jpg|center|500px]].
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| − | == Open Questions ==
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| − | •Should technological knowledge be formulated as “accepted” or “useful” beliefs. (Sean Cohmer, 2015).
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| − | • The Asynchronism of Method Employment theorem says that employment of methods is not always necessarily a result of the acceptance of new theories. But surely all methods (even concrete implementations of abstract requirements) are employed simultaneously with the acceptance of a descriptive proposition which states that that method is effective. Does this poses a challenge towards the Asynchronism of Method Employment theorem? (Mirka Loiselle, 2016)
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| − | • Currently, the existence of a mosaic split is the only way for us as historians of science to identify a case of inconclusive theory assessment. However, it is logically possible (given the Laws of Scientific Change) for the result of theory assessment to be inconclusive and yet the entire community chooses to accept the theory. In this case, no mosaic split would occur. Is it possible to identify these cases in our historical analysis? (Paul Patton, 2016)
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| − | • Currently, the Necessary Element theorem states that the method “only accept the best available theories” is a necessary element for any mosaic. Are there any necessary theories in addition to this method? It seems as though there must be some necessary analytic theories, because any scientific enterprise assumes a whole network of analytic propositions. Are there any necessary synthetic propositions? If so, this could mean that synthetic a priori knowledge is possible. (Hakob Barseghyan, 2016)
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| − | • Can there be delegation authority to tools, or other material objects? Imagine a community which takes all of its scientific knowledge from an ancient manuscript. Is the community delegating authority to the long-dead writers of this manuscript, or to the book itself? When scientists use an instrument in an experiment, who are they delegating authority to? Standard research practice says that when using an instrument in an experiment, the scientist should cite the manufacturers of the instrument in their research paper. Does this indicate that authority is being delegated to the manufacturers rather than the tool itself? If authority can be delegated to a material object, does this mean that the object is the bearer of a mosaic? (Nick Overgaard, Hakob Barseghyan, 2016)
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| − | |Resource=Barseghyan (2015)
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| − | |Prehistory====Ludwig Fleck 'Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact' 1935===
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| − | [[Fleck (1979)|Ludwig Fleck]], an epidemiologist, made one of the earliest attempts to understand scientific change as a social process, and to develop a conceptual framework for understanding how scientific communities function.[[CiteRef::Sady (2016)]] His most comprehensive work was 'Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact' published in 1935.[[CiteRef::Fleck (1979)]] For Fleck, cognition was necessarily a collective social activity, since it depends on prior knowledge obtained from other people. New ideas arise within ''thought collectives'', which are groups of people who participate in the mutual exchange of ideas. As an emergent consequence of mutual understandings and misunderstandings within such a group a particular ''thought style'' arises. An established thought style carves the social world into an ''esoteric circle'' of expert members of the thought collective, and an ''exoteric circle'' who are outside the thought collective. How individual members of a thought collective think and perceive within the relevant domain is determined by the thought style. Scientific facts are socially constructed by thought collectives. Reality in itself cannot be known, but the thought style can be compared with reality through observation and experiment, and may be revised or abandoned on the basis of such interactions.[[CiteRef::Fleck (1979)]] [[CiteRef::Sady (2016)]] The thought style of a particular collective can, at most, be only partially understood by members of other collectives, and may be completely ''incommensurable'' with the thinking of some other collectives.
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| − | ===Thomas Kuhn- 'The Structure of Scientific Revolutions' 1962===
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| − | Drawing partially on Fleck’s ideas, physicist and historian of science [[Thomas_Kuhn|Thomas Kuhn]] published his ideas about scientific change as 'The Structure of Scientific Revolutions' in 1962.[[CiteRef::Kuhn (1962)]] Kuhn spoke of ''scientific paradigms'', which are constellations of theoretical and metaphysical beliefs, values, methods, and instrumental techniques shared by a scientific discipline. A paradigm determines which questions are asked of the natural world by observation and experiment. Adherents to a paradigm engage in ''normal science'', which solves the puzzles needed to expand the range of natural phenomena that can be explained using the paradigm. Eventually, ''anomalies'' may be unearthed. These are phenomena that recalcitrantly resist explanation in terms of the paradigm. If anomalies persist and grow in number, practitioners seek fundamentally new approaches. If a new approach is successful at resolving salient anomalies and is deemed to hold promise for solving new puzzles, a ''scientific revolution'' may result, in which a new paradigm replaces the old. Because paradigms are holistic networks of theories, methods, and values, they are ''incommensurable'' with one another, meaning that the terms and categories of the old paradigm cannot be translated into those of the new. Adoption of a new paradigm thus appeared, especially to Kuhn’s critics, to involve a kind of non-rational leap of faith.[[CiteRef::Bird (2013)]] [[CiteRef::Kuhn (1962)]]
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| − | ===Paul Feyerabend 'On Method' 1975===
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| − | In his 'On Method', published in 1975, philosopher [[Paul_Feyerabend|Paul Feyerabend]], an epistemic anarchist, launched a much more radical attack on the idea of a fixed scientific method, and on the rationality of science.[[CiteRef::Feyerabend (1975)]] On his account, science does not possess the regularities that would make a science of science and a theory of scientific change possible. Social constructivists likewise favored an historically contingent, relativist, and particularist view of science, which they supposed was incompatible with a coherent theory of scientific change.
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| − | ===Irme Lakatos 'Methodology of Scientific Research Programs' 1970===
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| − | Philosopher [[Imre_Lakatos|Irme Lakatos]], a proponent of the rationality of science and of a fixed scientific method launched a new account of scientific change with his 'Methodology of Scientific Research Programs' in 1970.[[CiteRef::Lakatos (1970)]] Lakatos sought to challenge both Kuhn and Feyerabend. He saw interrelated scientific theories as constituting ''research programs''. Unlike Kuhn, he believed that scientific fields typically host multiple competing research programs and rejected the idea of coherent unitary paradigms. Not all theoretical constituents of a research program were assigned equal importance. The ''hard core'' of a research program consisted of those theoretical claims that were indispensable to it. Adherents to a research program attempt to explain an increasingly wide range of natural phenomena in terms of the core claims. This is the ''positive heuristic'' of the research program. The ''protective belt'' consists of those theoretical assumptions that allowed the application of the hard core to an increasing range of cases. Scientists used their ingenuity to protect the hard core by making alterations to the protective belt so as to protect the core from falsification. The protection of the hard core is a research program's ''negative heuristic''. A ''progressive'' research program is one that makes successful novel predictions. A ''degenerating'' research program is one whose predictions repeatedly fail, and whose protective belt must be altered in an arbitrary, ad hoc fashion to protect the hard core from falsification. Lakatos rejected Kuhn’s distinction between normal and revolutionary science, and supposed that a revolution occurs when scientists simply switch allegiance from a degenerating research program to a progressive one.
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| − | ===Larry Laudan 'Science and Values' 1984===
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| − | In his 1984 'Science and Values' philosopher [[Larry_Laudan|Larry Laudan]] accepted growing empirical evidence that the methods of science had changed with time.[[CiteRef::Grobler (1990)]] [[CiteRef::Laudan (1984)]] "Our views about the proper procedures for investigating the world", he wrote, "have been significantly affected by our shifting beliefs about how the world works".[[CiteRef::Laudan (1984)|p. 39]] However he did not accept Feyerabend’s anarchism, or his view that a coherent theory of scientific change was impossible. Laudan proposed a ''reticulated model'' of scientific rationality in which other theories, methods, and research aims all interact in the assessment of a theory, with all three subject to alteration or replacement in the light of the others. Like Lakatos, he supposed that scientific theories were linked into logically related groups which he called ''research traditions'', and rejected the radical holism of Kuhnian paradigms. Laudan distinguished between the ''acceptance'' of a theory by a scientific community as the best available and ''pursuit'' of a theory as holding potential. Similar ideas were adopted as part of the Barseghyan theory of scientific change.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)]]
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| − | |History=The ''theory of scientific change'' (TSC) was proposed by Hakob Barseghyan in ''The Laws of Scientific Change'', published in 2015.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)]]
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| − | In 2016, Zoe Sebastien resolved an important logical paradox, which necessitated a [[Modification:Sebastien-2016-001|change]] to the [[The_Third_Law|third law of scientific change]].[[CiteRef::Sebastien (2016)]] At the same time, the definition of [[Theory|''theory'']] was also [[Modification:Sebastien-2016-002|modified]] to include not only descriptive propositions but also normative propositions (e.g. normative scientific methodologies, ethical beliefs, etc.). As a result, the scope of the TSC was expanded to include also normative beliefs accepted by a community.
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| − | {{Acceptance Record
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| − | |Accepted by Community=Community:Scientonomy
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| − | |Accepted From Era=CE
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| − | |Accepted From Year=2016
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| − | |Accepted From Month=January
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| − | |Accepted From Day=1
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| − | |Accepted From Approximate=Yes
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| − | |Still Accepted=Yes
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| − | |Accepted Until Approximate=No
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| − | }}
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